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leadership qualities enabled him to have an impact on the church and 
political scene as apartheid became a burning issue at home and abroad. 
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Preface 
Dr Christiaan Frederick Beyers Naude, known widely as Beyers Naude, has played an important 
role in political and church affairs in South Africa. Before 1960 he had silently acquiesced to 
apartheid, but after this period he became a thorn in the side of the National Party and the 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, or Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) for publicly opposing their 
race and political policies. By 1977, when he was banned by the Vorster government and the 
Christian Institute (CI) was declared unlawful, he had become a symbol of resistance and w.as well 
known locally and internationally. 
This study is primarily concerned with Naude's work at the Christian Institute between 1963 and 
1977, with particular focus on changes in his political thinking during this time. Before discussing 
sources on Naude and the reasons for and aims of the dissertation, it is necessary to contextualise 
Naude in the post-February 1990 era since the unbanning of the ANC. The drastic changes that 
have occurred in South African politics since 1990 have created a new context in which many 
public figures can now be assessed. For many years Naude was regarded in established white 
political and church circles as extremely "radical". But since the unbanning of the African National 
Congress (ANC), particularly since this organisation took over power in South Africa in May 
1994, the controversy surrounding him has largely disappeared. There has, in fact, been a 
reconciliation between Naude and the DRC, in the form of a public apology to him at the DRC's 
general synod in Pretoria in 1994 and an apology by an individual DRC presbytery for ostracising 
members who criticised apartheid. 1 
1Handelinge van die Algemene Sinode van die N G Kerk, Oktober 1994 and Presbytery 
of Stellenbosch, DRC, "A submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission at its Paarl 
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One of the features of President Nelson Mandela's early days of rule was a public commitment 
lo reconciliation. Mandela's presidential theme during 1995 and 1996 was reconciliation and he 
met a wide range of white and black groups to bring home this point.2 He always had a special 
word for "honourable" Afrikaners who opposed.apartheid during National Party rule. Elements 
in the ANC did not always fully go along with the President in his reaching out to whites, but the 
organisation was more in accord with Mandela when he honoured Afrikaner opponents of 
apartheid such as Beyers Naude. 
Naude was the only Afrikaner lo be included in the talks which took place at Groote Schuur on 
2 - 4 May 1990 shortly after the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Mandela and other 
high-profile political prisoners. Mandela and other ANC leaders, such as former ANC general 
secretary Walter Sisulu, have singled Naude out for praise as a patriotic South African who is 
also an Afrikaner.3 After his involvement in the talks at Groote Schuur and the subsequent signing 
of the ground-breaking Groote Schuur Minute, Naude announced that while he fully supported 
the ANC, his calling as a minister prevented him from officially joining the organisation. From that 
point he dropped out of formal negotiations involving the ANC and the National Party 
government, but he continued to be widely consulted behind the scenes and was periodically 
session of 14 - 16 October 1996 in which an apology is given for supporting the ideology of 
apartheid; acknowledgement is made of "voices from among our own ranks" who were 
"suppressed or ignored ... Others suffered defamation and found themselves being given bad 
names". 
2Mandela has made numerous speeches emphasising reconciliation, and signalled his 
intention to follow such a policy in his inauguration speech on 10 May 1994 at the Union 
Buildings.Typical of this approach was his meeting with Afrikaner leaders, including Beyers 
Naude, in Pretoria on 28 June 1995. 
3Star, 20 April 1990. 
VI 
consulted by the ANC in the months and years that followed. 4 
Carl Niehaus, a former ANC spokesman, MP and now an ambassador, has also stressed his 
Afrikaner roots; he is another figure the ANC can point to as an indication of its acceptance of 
whites and specifically Afrikaners. It is of significance that Niehaus, perhaps the most influential 
Afrikaner to serve on the ANC's National Executive Committee, has a close relationship with 
Naudc. Niehaus has regarded Naudc as a "father figure" and has consulted him frequently. 5 
Further evidence of NaudC's stature in the ANC is that many of the organisation's regions 
nominated him as a candidate on their parliamentary lists before the 1994 elections, but his name 
was not put forward because he decided to stay out of parliamentary politics.6 
Naudc's public identification of himself as an Afrikaner reinforces the argument that one of his 
important contributions has been that he has acted as a role model for white Afrikaners who 
rejected apartheid. Several "anti-apartheid" Afrikaners who were close to Naudc in the 1970s and 
1980s confirmed in interviews with me that Naudc fulfilled this role for them.7 Carl Niehaus has 
also stressed that Naude urged him never to deny his Afrikaner roots. 8 Perhaps a more important 
contribution Naude has made, as far as the ANC is concerned, is that the organisation had a 
'This information was supplied by ANC spokesman and MP Carl Niehaus in an interview 
on 7 May 1994 and was substantiated by Naude in several discussions I conducted with him 
between 1990 and 1994. 
5Interview with C Niehaus, May 1994 and C Niehaus, Fighting for hope, p 84. 
6C Niehaus-Clur interview. 
7Rcv R Meyer, K Kritzinger, Cle Roux, G Lubbe, D van Zyl interviews with C Clur, 1988 
and 1989. 
8Nichaus, Fighting for hope, p 74. 
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high-profile Afrikaner that they could point to, to demonstrate their public commitment to 
non-racialism. Thus in the mid-1990s period of transition Naude's major contribution has been 
that of a symbol of reconciliation. 
With regard lo sources on Naude, a biography written by myself was published in 1990.9 
It was the first detailed biographical work to be published on Naude and my dissertation relies 
substantially on a portion of the book. Since then, Naude has published his autobiography, which 
covers much of the same ground as my biography. He deals with the CI years in only 36.pages, 
but my dissertation covers this crucial period from a critical perspective and in greater detail. 10 
Other important recent publications are a Festschrift published to mark his 80th birthday, edited 
by Charles Villa-Vicencio and Carl Niehaus11, and another book by Villa-Vicencio reflecting on 
religion and politics in South Africa which includes a chapter on Naude. 12 The latter two books 
contain biographical information largely based on an earlier essay written by Villa-Vicencio in the 
first Festschrift which he co-edited to mark NaudC's 70th birthday, published in 1985.13 
Naude is mentioned in several other books, but an earlier work stands out. Edited by Peter 
Randall, it consists of a short sketch of his life written by Randall and other essays by Peter 
Walshe, Denis Hurley and Charles Villa-Vicencio which all shed light on issues which shaped 
9C Ryan, Beyers Naude: pilgrimage of faith. 
10C F B Naude, My land van hoop: die lewe van Beyers Naude. 
11C Villa-Vicencio and C Niehaus (eds), Many cultures. one nation: festschrift for Beyers 
Naude. 
12C Villa-Vicencio, A spirit of hope: conversations on politics. religion and values. 
PC Villa-Vicencio and J W de Gruchy (eds), Resistance and hope: South African essays 
in honour of Beyers Naude. 
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Naude 's thinking. 14 Randall's book, intended as a tribute to Naude, was published at a time when 
Naude was still banned and so the author was unable to quote his subject directly. His essay 
nevertheless succeeds in highlighting some of the major points in NaudC's life. Randall made his 
taped interviews with Naude available to me and where I quote from these interviews this is 
acknowledged. 
The 1985 Festschrift on Naude, edited by Charles Villa-Vicencio and John de Gruchy, was 
published shortly after Naude was unbanned. This book includes a section of biographical 
information, as well as essays on Afrikaans Reformed Churches and the conflicts involving the 
churches in South Africa. Like Randall's work, the main purpose of the book was to bestow 
honour on Naude and the biographical essay, while perceptively written, covers much of the same 
ground as that detailed by Randall. 
When I began my own biography in 1987 I relied on Randall and Villa-Vicencio' s early essays as 
a launch pad to provide a much more detailed examination of his life. However, the more recent 
works published make it important that my dissertation focus more sharply on a specific aspect 
of his life that has not been fully.covered in these works. As mentioned earlier, NaudC's own 
autobiography has little detail on the CI years. I have chosen to focus on NaudC's CI years for 
two reasons. Firstly, I deal with them in more detail and in a more critical way than has been 
done in any of the works mentioned above. Secondly, they were crucial years in terms of NaudC's 
change of political stance. When he left the Dutch Reformed Church in 1963 he had rejected 
apartheid and had left the Afrikaner Broederbond. He was never considered a liberal in the 
14 P Randall (ed), Not without honour: tribute to Beyers Naude. 
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context that it is generally used in South African politics, but in broad political terms he was close 
to liberal thinking prevailing in the 1960s, ie he still adopted a paternalistic view of what he 
thought blacks wanted. The years at the Christian Institute coincided with a more radical 
development in his thinking; in 1963 he regarded the ANC as a radical, illegal organisation, but 
by 1977 he was ready to make common cause with its aims and objectives. 
One of the reasons that Naude is important in South Africa is because he demonstrated to blacks 
that Afrikaners, and whites, can change. This crucial point was made by former South African 
Council of Churches general secretary Frank Chikane in his foreword in my original biography. 
In the many interviews I conducted with prominent black associates of Naude during my research, 
this point was made again and again. 15 Naude also played a crucial role in facilitating early 
discussions between whites and the ANC in the 1980s, a role made possible by the acceptance he 
had gained among black South Africans in the liberation struggle.16 I believe it will contribute to 
a greater understanding of how he came to be able to play a facilitating role, and how he came to 
be accepted as a symbol of reconciliation, if we more closely analyse how he came to make the 
political shifts which occurred during his years as director of the Christian Institute. 
Naude is mentioned in numerous other books on South Africa, but three other important sources 
can be highlighted. They are John de Gruchy's book on how the South African churches reacted 
15F Chikane, "Foreword" in Ryan, Beyers Naude: pilgrimage of faith, p vii and H Adonnis, 
P Moatshe, H Ngada, E Thema, F Chikane interviews with C Clur, 1987 and 1988. 
16F Van Zyl Slabbert interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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to apartheid17, A Luckhoff's analysis of the World Council of Churches' 1960 Cottesloe meeting18 
and Peter Walshe's book on the Christian Institute. 19 These three books deal with issues and 
events in which Naude was closely involved and they laid important groundwork for anyone 
wishing to delve further into Naude's life. However, none of these books devoted much space to 
Naude's life as such and so I found that there was a great deal more research to be done. In the 
light of my focus on N aude' s years at the Christian Institute, Walshe' s book in particular was a 
valuable source. It is more of a broad history on the CI than a narrow focus on N aude and I thus 
feel justified inf urther examining his work during these years. 
A problem with regard to research on Beyers Naude was the confiscation and apparent loss of 
the Christian Institute's (CI) archives when it was banned. All its assets and property, including 
the Cl's archives and some of Naude's private correspondence, were seized. Subsequent enquiries 
by Professor Villa-Vicencio about the whereabouts of the documentation elicited the response 
from the police that the material had been destroyed. I have made new inquiries to the Ministry 
of Safety and Security and the police are unable to shed any light on the whereabouts of this 
material. In spite of this loss, I have been able to gather a great deal of information. 
I consulted Ministry of Justice documents pertaining to the banning of Naude in 1977 at the 
National Archives Repository in Pretoria. Although documents dated before 1976 are now open 
to the public, I could trace no useful information for this period. Fortunately I traced a file dating 
to the 1979-1980 period and was given permission to study these documents. They contain very 
17J W de Gruchy, The church struggle in South Africa. 
18 A H Luckhoff, Cottesloe. 
19P Walshe, Church versus state: the case of the Christian Institute. 
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interesting information shedding light on the reasons for the banning of Naudc and they also show 
there was a difference of opinion in security circles on whether his ban should have remained in 
force. 
Naudc has been the subject of many local and international newspaper reports. At the height of 
Naude's conflict with the Dutch Reformed Church in the 1960s his activities were closely 
monitored by both English and Afrikaans newspapers. The Rand Daily Mail, The Star and 
Die Vaderland, to name three major newspaper sources, all reported on him extensively and these 
reports, although often superficial, were of use when I was constructing an initial skeleton of his 
life. 
Naude has also been interviewed for film documentaries and video programmes on South Africa. 
The most valuable of these documentaries was made by Worldwide Documentaries in 1986.20 The 
documentary deals with Naude's life in an uncritical manner; however, it contains a great deal of 
footage in which he tells his own story. But as is often the case, the filmmakers edited the 
interviews extensively. Full transcripts of the interviews were made available to me and were of 
help as an additional source. Another televic;ion documentary was screened in 1995 on SABC TV 
on the life of Naude, produced by J H P Serfontein.21 It contains details of Naude's activities 
during his banned years, but with regard to his earlier life it covers no new ground. 
Naude has made available to me a number of his personal letters, speeches and other personal 
20A cry of reason: Beyers Naude. an Afrikaner speaks out. 
21 Beyers Naude: pilgrimage of an Afrikaner prophet. 
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Christian Institute documents from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The documents cannot be 
described as complete in the light of the state's confiscation of much other material. However, the 
documents do include some important material which I made use of in my dissertation. 
Unpublished archival sources consulted include the Fred van Wyk Papers AD 1752 at the 
Department of Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand. This collection contains a large 
section on the Christian Institute and the documents include primary sources on the planning of 
the O:ittesloe conference and on the conference itself. There are some important documents, some 
handwritten by Naudc, which show his thinking during this pivotal event. The collection includes 
primary sources on the establishment of the Christian Institute and correspondence between 
Naude and Van Wyk. The Van Wyk collection of documents was probably my most single 
valuable source of documents. 
Other archival sources I consulted included the full minutes of various synods of the Dutch 
Reformed Church, Transvaal Dutch Reformed Church and Southern Transvaal Dutch Reformed 
Church. I also consulted the Southern Transvaal Synodical Commission documents pertaining to 
the mid-1960s and studied a variety of church publications at various libraries. 
Pro Veritate, a journal co-founded by Naudc, was published from May 1962 to September 1977. 
He was the first editor of this journal which was intended to stimulate debate on theological, racial 
and political issues. Although not the official mouthpiece of the Christian Institute, it largely 
served this purpose. In later years Naude relinquished editorship, but Pro Veritate continued to 
publish NaudC's articles and they chart the changes that occurred in his thinking over the years. 
I found it essential to study Naude's writings because they reflected his actual position at the time. 
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Whenever I used information from interviews conducted with him later, I compared it with what 
he had said or written at the time. 
I al<;o consulted issues of Die Kerkbode, the official mouthpiece of the Dutch Reformed Church. 
For many years the journal was edited by Dr Andries Treurnicht, who represented the views of 
the extreme right wing in the DRC in the 1960s. A strident and consistent critic of Naudc and the 
CI, Die Kerkbode launched many attacks on Naude. Naude often replied to these attacks in Pro 
Veritate. A comparative study of the two journals was an interesting way of follow.ing the 
argument over the issue of biblical justification of apartheid, which was at the core of the dispute 
between the CI and the DRC. 
In the 1970s Naude was influenced by the Black Consciousness (BC) philosophy. I consulted 
numerous sources on the BC movement, both primary and secondary publications. I also 
interviewed Barney Pityana, a close associate of Steve Biko in the 1970s and a man involved in 
the Black Community Programmes, an organisation partly sponsored by the Christian Institute. 
The conflicts and tensions in the relationships between the CI and the BC groupings are an 
important theme of this dissertation. It was necessary to explore this issue far more closely than 
I had done in my original biography on Naude. 
Before concluding, this preface asks how useful biography is to historians. There has long been 
debate on "the hero in history", as Sidney Hook refers to it. Hook examines this issue and 
contends that even social determinists acknowledge the role of important individuals in shaping 
events. There is no denying this, but there is still the question of whether people like Naude are 
truly heroes or, especially in the modern context, merely creations of the media. As Hook points 
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out, society seeks out "heroes", giving them names such as saviours or prophets, particularly at 
a time of "sharp crisis in social and political affairs". 22 Naudc and the CI received a great deal of 
attention from the media, the government, and local and overseas churches because he spoke out 
at a time when there was no meaningful Afrikaner dissent towards apartheid. It is true that his 
fame was partly due to a great deal of media interest, but his voice was significant because he 
actually did dare to step outside the fold. Naudc was a white Afrikaner who saw the error of 
apartheid long before most of his peers were ready to question this ideology; he played an unusual 
role in South African politics and this made him a person of note and a worthwhile figure of 
study. 
A related issue is the question, also raised by determinists, of the justification of "glorifying" or 
focusing on individuals to the detriment of "the people". This philosophical question is perhaps 
even more relevant in South Africa at present than has previously been the case, since we are at 
a juncture when "mass suffering" is being probed in forums such as the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission hearings. But the reality is that history is not just about the masses, about societal, 
economic and political systems; it is also about "great" men and women. Leaders, and Naude 
certainly was a leader, have a role in the telling of history because their lives have an effect on 
society. Charles Villa-Vicencio has said that Naude is one of the "great people" of South African 
history because he personified the spirit of his times but also anticipated future trends; he was 
regarded as a prophet because he was ahead of his people, but not so far ahead that he was lost 
to them.23 
22S Hook, The hero in history: a study in limitation and possibility, pp 12 - 13. 
nc Villa Vicencio, "A life of resistance and hope" in Villa-Vicencio and De Gruchy \eds), 
Resistance and hope, p 12 and C Villa-Vicencio-C Clur interview, 1988. 
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Two important questions must be satisfactorily addressed before a biography can be said to have 
any value in the field of history: Has the work presented the facts accurately; and has it 
succeeded, through interpretation and selection, in adequately illuminating and explaining the 
subject's life? 
The above aims are central to the biographer and he or she must be aware of potential problems 
which can hinder in trying to achieve these objectives. At the outset it is important for the 
biographer to acknowledge his subjectivity. NI historians grapple with this problem, yet it is of 
particular relevance to life writers. No two biographies on the same person will reflect the subject 
in exactly the same way and so, however the biographer may struggle to maintain his neutrality, 
he will unavoidably leave his own imprint on the central character.24 
Allied to this is the question of selection, since the biographer may choose to highlight particular 
events or achievements while ignoring or minimising others. The biographer must cover the most 
important events or "facts" as the life of the subject unfolds, but where the difficulty comes in is 
in the relationship between the events themselves and the meanings attached to them. 
Interpretation, like selection, is a critical issue, and once again it must be acknowledged that 
interpretation in biography depends on the qualities of both the subject and the biographer.25 
It has been argued that most biographers, at the outset of their studies, already have a 
24H Kuper, "Biography as interpretation: eleventh annual Hans Wolff memorial lecture", 
Part II, p 43. 
25lbid, pp 29-30. 
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well-developed idea about their subjects and seek evidence to support this view.26 This may 
sometimes be the case but the biographer must keep an open mind and let the information he 
uncovers guide him, rather than his own preconceived ideas. I tried to be conscious of all these 
problems as I researched Naude's life. 
The problems of subjectivity must be tackled, yet the biographer can still succeed in creating a 
balanced portrait if he or she does a thorough study of all available sources, weighing up their 
value and reliability. Written sources are vital, but if one is tackling the life of a contemporary 
figure, then personal interviews are often just as important.27 The great advantage of conducting 
interviews is that the biographer can ask specific questions; interviewees, when asked to 
concentrate their minds on a subject or issue, often volunteer extremely interesting and useful 
information which would otherwise remain undiscovered. I conducted interviews extensively for 
this dissertation, both in South Africa as well as in England, Sweden and the Netherlands. All 
interviews were taped and fully transcribed. 
Interviews with the subject of the biography, if this is possible, are also very helpful. But the 
biographer must strive to maintain some distance to avoid writing a "hagiography". Whether the 
character is living or dead, the biographer must be wary of being "taken over" by the subject.28 
I conducted extensive interviews with Naude between 1987 and 1989 and have remained in 
contact with him since then. I naturally was guided by him in what he regarded as the important 
26 I B Nadel, Biography: fiction, fact and form, p 10. 
27U O'Connor, Biographers and the art of biography, p 15. 
28L Edel, "Biography and the science of man", in AM Friedson (ed), New directions in 
. biography, p 9. 
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milestones in his life but I continually strived to maintain some distance. I found the fact that I 
was simultaneously conducting interviews with many other people with differing views was a 
useful way of trying to keep a critical attitude towards my subject. With regard to the milestones 
he identified, I largely agreed, at the end of the study, that most of these were important. 
However, my research of other sources and interviews with other people enabled me to uncover 
additional events and issues that were also significant in his life. Interestingly, the one subject on 
which he was silent was the symbolic role he has come to serve. It was largely in interviews with 
other sources that I identified this aspect of Naude's contribution. 
There could be criticism that this study relies too much on oral evidence, from Naude and others 
whose memories may at best be faulty and at worst be selective; I believe this is unfounded in the 
light of the fact that wherever possible I cross-checked information I received from other sources. 
The main thrust of this study, which is from 1963 to 1977, relies far more on a wide range of 
primary arid secondary written sources than merely on interviews with Naude. However, 
interviews with Naude and many of his colleagues from those days enabled me to sharpen and 
contextualise his life and work. 
This dissertation, then, is a good example of modern history that relies in part on oral evidence. 
In the light of the gaps that exist because of the loss of some written sources on Naude and the 
CI, I felt it was essential to conduct many interviews with relevant people. A major criticism of 
studies based on interviews could be that the historian recounts a story as the subjects see it in 
hindsight. This raises the issue of memory. In interviews, was Beyers recounting the past 
accurately? Was he retelling a story that had a life of its own, that had, almost, the makings of a 
legend? John Tosh raises the issue of memory in the context of using oral sources, pointing out 
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the danger of oral accounts having been "constantly reworked to articulate their meaning more 
clearly, and sometimes to change it". The longer the gap between the original event and its 
retelling, the greater the potential for distortion. As Tosh notes: 
"From the historian's point of view, the great merit of traditions pertaining, say, to the 
lifetime of the grandparents of today's elders is that the process of abstraction has not 
yet gone very far: details which meant a great deal to the original participants may have 
been dropped, and the stories may have been aff ectcd by the perspective of hindsight, but 
the exploits of named individuals and their social world remain clearly visible."29 
These arc relevant questions, but I believe I have overcome them by concentrating not solely on 
oral evidence. In general, I did not make use of my interview material to verify facts and dates, 
but rather to gain an understanding of the motives of Naude and his colleagues for a particular 
course of action. A final point in this regard is that at the outset of my research, Peter Randall, 
made available taped interviews he had conducted with Naude in 1982, some six years before I 
began my research. I thus had relatively "fresh" memories obtained by Randall on which to base 
my questions. In general I found Naude to have had a very good memory, especially when 
prompted with questions I obtained from researching other sources. I tried to be constantly aware 
that certain issues would have more prominence in his mind than others. 
i\ final point to be made in defence of oral history is that there is a tradition of some excellent 
historical writing using this mode of research in South Africa. Gail Gerhart, in several works, and 
especially in her book examining the development of black nationalism in South Africa since 
1943, acknowledges in her preface that much of the information and interpretation was drawn 
from interviews with South Africans carried out between 1968 and 1973. In addition, she made 
291 Tosh, The pursuit of history: aims. methods and new directions in the study of modern 
history, pp 223 - 225. 
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use of transcribed interviews conducted by Gwendolen Carter, Thomas Karis and Sheridan John 
conducted between 1963 and 1964.30 Her study, however, also was based on numerous traditional 
written sources, and it is her ability to weigh up all the evidence, both written and oral, that 
enabled her to produced a worthwhile study. I have tried to maintain this principle, of having a 
critical attitude towards all sources, in my dissertation. 
It is not enough to chronicle the events of a person's life or to spell out his achievements without 
depicting his personality31, since it is the person's unique characteristics which make him a 
worthwhile subject of study. Again, I found interviews to be extremely useful in this respect; by 
repeating the same questions to many interviewees one is often able to extract a broad picture of 
the subject's personality. In my interaction with Naude I also naturally developed my own 
impressions of his personality. 
Allied to the issue of personality is the more controversial practice of delving into the psyche of 
the subject. While some biographers regard it as imperative to give a detailed psychological 
perspective32, psychological interpretations may prove difficult to substantiate. This does not, 
however, preclude the biographer from searching for early influences which may have shaped the 
subject's life and from attempting to broadly identify important psychological and moral forces. 
I found that interviews with Naude on the issue of early influences, and particularly discussions 
with some of his other family members, helpful in this regard. 
30G M Gerhart, Black power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology, pp vii - viii. 
31 0'Connor, Biographers and the art of biography, p 13. 
32Nadel, Biography: fiction. fact and form, p 6. 
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This dissertation, in chapter one, deals briefly with the first half of Beyers Naude's life, from his 
birth in 1915 until the launch of the Christian Institute in 1963. Early influences and the factors 
that led to his initial rejection of apartheid are dealt with in the chapter. The remaining chapters 
focus more closely on his work from 1963 until closure of the Christian Institute and the serving 
of a banning order on him in 1977. The focus in these chapters centres closely on answering the 
question: how did he continue to adjust his political thinking in this period? What were the factors 
that led him to broadly support the Black Consciousness groupings in the 1970s? By answering 
this question it becomes far easier to grasp why he came to fully support and promote the ANC 
after he was banned in 1977. The seeming contradiction, that he first supported Black 
Consciousness and later the Freedom Charter-supporting ANC, is explained by the fact that the 
BC organisations in the 1970s were the dominant black political force, while from the 1980s the 
ANC, and later the UDF, were at the forefront of the black liberation struggle. From the mid-
1970s he pragmatically supported the black organisations mostly likely to succeed in the battle 
for liberation. 
One of the most important themes throughout this dissertation is that while his political thinking 
evolved quickly, he always regarded himself as an Afrikaner. There are a large number of 
conservative white Afrikaners who may still argue that Naude relinquished his claim to being an 
Afrikaner after his break with his church in the 1960s; he nevertheless always regarded himself 
as one. As he grew to believe that apartheid was indefensible, he never abandoned his 
commitment to Afrikaans, and in the early years of the Christian Institute I will show how he and 
his colleagues concentrated on trying to win over members of the DRC. 
The next part of the dissertation chronicles and examines Naude's almost lone battle against the 
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united forces of the National Party, the Afrikaner Broederbond and the DRC; his failure to 
influence his church significantly caused him and the Christian Institute to work more closely with 
English-speaking Christians who were members of the CI. However, in the late 1960s, while there 
were individuals in the English-speaking churches who opposed apartheid, the rank and file 
church membership did not actively support the activities of the CI and the SA Council of 
Churches. This lead me to conclude that Naude was regarded by most whites, not just Afrikaners, 
as a highly controversial figure. 
The last chapters deal with Naude's encounter with black groupings such as the African 
Independent Churches and later the Black Consciousness (BC) movement. The relatioI?-ship 
between the CI and the student leaders was often strained and uncomfortable. BC organisations 
relied on Naude and the CI for funding, but there is evidence that many in the BC organisations 
did not fully trust the CI, and dismissed Naude and other CI figures as "liberals". In spite of these 
tensions Naude's political convictions became more radical in the 1970s as he led the CI to a 
closer identification with the black struggle. It was therefore not surprising that when the Vorster 
government clamped down on the BC movements in 1977, it also banned Naude and closed 
down the Christian Institute. 
In conclusion, why a dissertation on Beyers Naude? I have shown that while there have been 
other books written on Naude's life, these have not provided sufficient detail and have usually 
chronicled his activities in an uncritical manner. In this dissertation I have tried to critically explain 
his political transformation from 1963 until 1977 and interpret his actions, also to assess the 
impact he has had in South African church and political life since 1960. His influence on various 
organisations is still being felt. He has often been described as a prophet or a person ahead of his 
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time. His recognition, for example, of the inevitability of black rule and the pivotal role that the 
ANC would play in SA politics has certainly been proven correct. I hope that this biographical 
study will make a valuable contribution to South African history. 
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1 Early influences and DRC years 
For the first 45 years of his life Christiaan Frederick Beyers NaudC's first loyalty was to his 
Afrikaner people. He rejoiced when the National Party came to power in 1948 and did not 
question when it began implementing the political policy of apartheid, which consolidated 
segregation and white domination that had long been a feature of South African society. But 12 
years later the Dutch Reformed Church minister concluded that support for apartheid was 
incompatible with his faith, and so began a long struggle with the ruling white establishment. 
This chapter is devoted to the first years of his life. Beyers Naude's early story has been well-
chroniclcd by several writers, but it is important to survey the major features in his early life for 
an understanding of his actions during the Christian Institute years of 1963 to 1977, which is the 
prime focus of this dissertation. This chapter also examines the theological and political 
developments in the DRC which led it to support apartheid. 
Beyers Nau de has identified a number of important themes in his own life. One does not 
necessarily have to accept his views, but they arc a useful starting point in trying to understand 
his life and the contribution he made to South African history. Firstly, as stated in the preface, he 
always saw himself as an Afrikaner and this chapter highlights aspects of his traditional Afrikaner 
nationalistic background. Later chapters will explain why Naude, in his political struggle, always 
sought to be identified as an Afrikaner. 
Secondly, he believed that his Christian commitment provided an answer to understanding why 
he challenged apartheid. The emphasis placed on mission and evangelism by the Dutch Reformed 
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Church and by ministers like his father strongly influenced Naudc. One of his initial concerns 
about apartheid was that it could hinder the DRC's attempts to minister to the black community. 
But later, as he became better acquainted with the complexities and hardships associated with 
apartheid, he felt that it was unchristian not to speak up. 
The third point, not remarked on by Naudc but one nevertheless generally accepted about his life, 
is that he became a rebel among his people. What enabled him to challenge the Afrikaner 
establishment while many of his colleagues stood silent in the 1960s and 1970s? That is a cCJmplex 
question. It can partly be answered by highlighting aspects of his character which showed him to 
be rebellious as a young person. Therefore, this chapter also focuses closely on these aspects of 
his character. 
Naude's parents were closely involved in the struggle for Afrikaner political freedom. His father, 
Jozua Francois Naude, also a Dutch Reformed Church minister, championed the cause of 
Afrikaans and Afrikaners throughout his life. 1 After completing school, he attended the Normaal 
Kollege in Cape Town where at the age of 20 he qualified as a teacher. His first post was in the 
small village of Riebceck-West and during this time, while visiting the Van Huyssteen family at 
Wittedrif, near Plettenburg Bay, he met his future bride. Adriana Johanna Zondag van Huyssteen, 
or Ada, was only 15 years old at the time, but their meeting led to a lengthy courtship and 
eventual marriage in 1906.2 Ada, who studied teaching at the Huguenot College in Wellington, 
appears to have been a highly strung woman. Like her husband, she believed in the justness of the 
1M Jordaan, Jozua Naude as kultuurdraer en kultuurleier, p 10. 
2lbid, pp 10-20. 
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Afrikaner's cause and was given to expressing strong nationalistic sentiments.-:~ 
Sharp contrasts have often been drawn between Jozua Naude, the zealous Afrikaner nationalist, 
and his son Beyers, held up as one who "betrayed the volk". In spite of the differences in the 
causes they espoused, there were similarities between father and son; both were deeply religious, 
with strong convictions and a sense of justice, not afraid to go against the stream and to risk 
criticism when they felt their principles were at stake. Jozua displayed great energy and drive, and 
piled on himself numerous commitments and responsibilities, a characteristic also recognisable in 
Beyers Naude. 
Jozua was strongly committed to the DRC's evangelism and fervently believed in the need to 
spread the gospel. He also agreed with the view then emerging that God had created the Afrikaner 
nation, like the Israelites of old, for the purpose of spreading His Word, and for keeping the 
Christian faith alive on the dark continent of Africa. 4 Jozua believed that for Afrikaners to fulfil 
their destiny, their language and culture had to be set free and allowed to develop. With the 
outbreak of the South African war in October 1899, Jozua Naude, living in the South African 
Republic, resigned his post as a teacher and joined the war effort as unofficial pastor to the Boer 
forces. Jozua Naude kept detailed notebooks throughout the war, some of which he buried and 
later dug up and used when he wrote a book in Dutch on his own experiences and on the 
campaigns of his close wartime friends, generals Jan Kemp and Christiaan Frederik Beyers. As 
3C F B Naude and R O'Brien Geldenhuys interviews with C Clur, 1988. 
4P 69 Sermons by Jozua Naude 1920 - 1930; diverse sermons, Nedcrduitse Gcreformeerde 
Kerk Archives, Cape Town: Private Paper J F Naude. In several of these sermons, Naude 
compares the Afrikaners to the Israelites. 
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the war dragged on, Jozua realised that the struggle of the Afrikaner volk would not be an easy 
one, but he believed that ultimately his people would triumph. He described this vision in his 
book: one day, riding alone through the veld on his horse, he stopped to rest at a small waterfall 
on the Tugela River. As he watched the trickling water he thought about the long battle which 
lay before the Afrikaner people. Upstream, the river was merely three little rivulets meandering 
through a shallow river bed but, as the streams neared the waterfall, they flowed into a big rock 
pool and then, joined as one, tumbled powerfully down. It struck Jozua that just as the waterfall 
had only become a force when the separate streams had been joined, so, too, the Afrikaner.people 
would only triumph when they were united.5 These metaphysical musings of an Afrikaner 
nationalist are enlightening in that they show an almost romantic or idealistic side to Jozua Naude. 
It was a characteristic his son also showed in his idealistic commitment to a non-racial South 
Africa in the era when the odds seemed heavily stacked against an end to white domination. 
But by 1902 the Boers were close to surrender. The formal treaty in which the Transvaal and Free 
State surrendered their independence was signed on 31 May 1902, but not before a bitter debate 
among the Boers. Jozua Naude was one of the bittereinders who personally told General Jan 
Smuts that he could not agree to surrendering.6 Again, it is possible to draw a parallel between 
Jozua Naude's refusal to surrender against all odds and his son's refusal to surrender his beliefs, 
even when faced with the wrath of the Afrikaner establishment. 
51 F Naude, Vechten en vluchten van Beyers en Kemp, p 55. 
6Jozua Naude jun interview with C Clur, 1988. A letter written by Jozua Naude, addressed 
to his two sons, Jozua and Beyers, as well as to his son-in-law, FE O'Brien Geldenhuys, dated 
31 May 1948, rejoices in the National Party's victory and recounts how Smuts tried in vain to win 
him over to surrender. 
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The war and the ultimate defeat of the two Boer Republics profoundly affected Jozua Naudc and 
he believed a spirit of unity had emerged among Afrikaners throughout South N"rica. He 
dedicated the rest of hii; life to the struggle to regain their independence and was at the forefront 
of the Afrikaner nationalists' struggle for freedom. Jozua completed his theological studies at the 
DRC's Theological Seminary in Stellenbosch in 1909 and worked briefly at the Goedemoed work 
colony, established by the church in the Orange Free State as a refuge for poor, dispossessed 
white tenant farmers; he moved to the DRC in Roodcpoort in 1911, shortly after the unification 
of the four former British colonies of the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal in 1910. 
There were deep divisions among Afrikaners, who were split between the policy of conciliation 
as espoused by the first prime minister of the Union of South Africa, General Louis Botha, and 
the pro-Afrikaner sentiments of General J BM Hertzog; the Naudes strongly supported Hertzog. 
Jozua Naude also sided with the rebels in the 1914 rebellion and was close to General Beyers, 
who drowned while attempting to evade capture by crossing the Vaal River. It was during the 
turmoil of the First World War, on 10 May 1915, that the Naudes' youngest son was born at the 
Roodepoort parsonage. He was named Christiaan Frederick Beyers, in honour of General Beyers. 7 
Beyers, his older brother and sisters (Ada bore two sons and four daughters) grew up in a home 
where broader community and political issues were often discussed. As a dominee, Jozua 
commanded great respect in the community and people streamed to him with their problems. Thus 
Beyers Naude came from a home where there was a focus on broader issues, not just personal 
family concerns. As an adult, and particularly after the changes that occurred in his thinking in the 
1960s, conversation in Beyers Naude's home was similarly often focused on political issues. 
7C F B Naude-Clur interview and P Randall (ed), Not without honour: tribute to Beyers 
Naude, p 3. 
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Jozua Naude was also involved in the struggle for the recognition of his own language at a time 
when English was still favoured in the courts, in schools, in the civil service and business, and 
when Dutch, and not Afrikaans, was the official language of the DRC. At successive synods 
Jozua put forward the case for Afrikaans. He pointed out that Afrikaans, not Dutch, was the 
language of the people and that the time had come for the church to recognise it. The arguments 
made by him and others eventually won the day and in 1916 the synods of the Orange Free State 
and Transvaal accepted that Afrikaans should have the same status as Dutch in the church. In 
1919, after a motion introduced by Jozua at the General Synod of the DRC, Afrikaans was 
accorded the same status as Dutch throughout the church.8 Jozua played a prominent role in 
fighting for Afrikaans in schools, starting in Roodepoort where he triumphed in pressuring the 
authorities to create an Afrikaans-medium school which opened in July 1918. It was the first 
school in the Transvaal where the medium of instruction was exclusively Afrikaans - an important 
victory for the nationalist cause.9 
Jozua was also at the forefront of the movement which led, in 1918, to the founding of the 
Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood of Afrikaners). It was to be a service organisation "for the 
reconciliation of all Afrikaners in a single brotherhood - an organisation in which Afrikaners could 
find each other in the midst of great confusion and disunity and be able to work together for the 
survival of the Afrikaner people in South Africa and the promotion of its interests". Jozua Naude 
was elected its first president. In 1920, a constitution was adopted and it was decided that the 
8P B van der Watt, Die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk. 1905-1975, p 307. 
9Jordaan, Jozua Naude, p 84. 
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Brocderbond should become a secret body. 10 Highly selective about who could join, the 
Broedcrbond cultivated the cream of Afrikaners within its ranks. Beyers Naudc later joined the 
Broedcrbond and his traumatic break with the movement in the 1960s was a turning point in his · 
life. 
In 1919, at the same time as the Broederbond was establishing itself, Jozua accepted an invitation 
to the eastern Transvaal town of Pict Retie[, where the family lived for two years. The Naude 
family moved to Graaff-Reinet in the winter of 1921 when Jozua Naude took up the post as. senior 
minister; he contributed in advancing the nationalist cause and helped win recognition for 
Afrikaans both in the church and in the classroom. Jozua Naude remained in Graaff-Reinet for the 
remainder of his life and so it was in this town that Beyers Naude spent his formative years. 
How then can we begin to explain the seeming contradictions in Beyers Naude's views, which by 
the 1960s were at odds with the Afrikaner nationalist tradition in which he was raised? I believe 
we need to separate the "Afrikaner" from the "nationalist". The Afrikaner cultural tradition -
where the home language was Afrikaans and all friends and family were Afrikaners, where the 
religion was Reformed and where the father was the clear head of the family - was something he 
was proud of and never attempted to deny. As a young man he also supported the prevailing 
views of Afrikaner nationalism, and identified with his community's struggle for political freedom 
and power. As we briefly outline his you~g life, we begin to see a picture of a very intelligent 
young man with a natural propensity to question. As a teenager he even become something of a 
rebel. Yet he could only become a true rebel against nationalism when he was sufficiently 
10I Wilkins and H Strydom, The Super-Afrikaners. inside the Afrikaner Broederbond , pp 
35 - 52, Commission of Inquiry into Secret Organisations, p 4 and Jordaan, Jozua Naudc, p 183. 
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informed about the errors that Jed the DRC and Afrikaner society in attempting to find Biblical 
justification for apartheid. 
As a child Naude was energetic and sociablej quite different from his older brother Jozua, 
nicknamed Joos, who was quiet, introverted and often plagued with illness. Ada kept Joos out of 
school for a year because of ill-health and, from their third year of school, the two brothers were 
in the same class. In this way the boys almost became "twins", with Beyers taking the leading role, 
at both school and in their games. 11 He began developing leadership qualities as a very. young 
person. 
Jozua and Ada shared two ideals which dominated the Naude home: they had a deep, unshakable 
faith in God and felt strongly about the future of their volk. They adhered to old-style pietism, and 
every morning and evening they held Bible reading and prayer. The children had to attend at least 
one church service on a Sunday. Ada Naude made sure her children lived sheltered, almost 
secluded lives. Her two sons were not allowed to play contact sports like rugby, but in his teens 
Beyers became so insistent that Ada reluctantly allowed him to play rugby. 
As a child, Naude saw that his parents concerned themselves mostly with their white Afrikaner 
parishioners, but they also extended a helping hand in the form of overnight shelter to destitute 
white tenant families who moved from the country to the towns in search of work. Nau de was 
moved by the hopelessness of these people, and as an adult he came to feel the same empathy for 
the impoverished black people of South Africa. He said of his contact with poor whites: 
11 R O'Brien Gelcndhuys- Clur interview and J Naude-Clur interview. 
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"Through that experience my social consciousness was formed: of hunger, of poverty, of 
people in situations of dire di<;tress, of the helplessness of people who experienced forces 
or events over which they were powerless, either to control or to direct; this left a very 
deep impression on my mind."12 
Beyers Naudc made thi<; point frequently in interviews when asked to explain his concern for the 
suffering of others. There may have been other factors which led him to challenge apartheid which 
he could not pinpoint. But judged by his later actions, where at considerable sacrifice to himself 
he broke with the Afrikaner estabfuhment, it is clear that he developed a genuine compassion for 
oppressed people which made it possible for him to challenge apartheid. 
Jozua Naude was drawn into several controversies in Graaff-Reinet, starting with his decision in 
1921 to deliver his induction service in Afrikaans instead of the conventional Dutch. 13 He later 
was involved in a bitter dispute with some members of his church which led to a split in the 
congregation and the founding of a splinter church in 1927.14 Jozua Naude also joined the battle 
to establi<;h an Afrikaans school in the town. The language debate began in earnest in 1916, before 
the arrival of the Naudes, but Jozua Naude, as the senior minister of the DRC in the town, was 
an important voice in the battle which ultimately led to the establishment of the Hoer Volkskool 
in the town in January 1922. It was not achieved without considerable acrimony and division 
among Engli<;h and Afrikaans townsfolk and it was a battle in which Jozua Naude played a pivotal 
part. 15 It is outside the brief of this dissertation to examine these events closely, but the important 
12C F B Naude interview with P Randall, 1982. 
Dp 69/2: Sermon by Jozua Naude June, 1921; diverse sermons, J F Naude papers. 
14R van Graan, "Graaff-Reinet, 1786-1986", Lantern, Journal of Knowledge and Culture, 
p 83. 
15A de V Minnaar, Graaff-Reinet 1786-1986, pp 109 - 110 and Jordaan, Jozua Naude, 
pp 224 - 236 and CF B Naude-Clur interview. 
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point was that as a youth Naudc became accustomed lo controversy and supported the 
Afrikaner's right lo speak his language freely. His father received his share of criticism for his 
actions and withstood them all. It was a trait his son also demonstrated in his adult life. 
During these years of conflict, Jozua managed lo maintain an aura of self-control and composure, 
but his wife was not as composed. Her large family responsibilities added to the pressure on her. 
The situation was not made any easier by Ada's own sense of her status ·as the minister's wife and 
the impression she conveyed in her daily conduct that her family was slightly superior. Ada was 
also beset with health problems. Jozua was kept busy with his church work and with his campaign 
to promote Afrikaans, and so Ada took full control of the children and the home. Beyers later 
realised that this arrangement had sometimes led to tensions between his parents. He gained the 
impression that Ada resented Jozua's constant preoccupation with his work; Jozua, in tum, did 
not always know how to handle his volatile wife. 16 Ada encouraged her daughters to take an 
interest in church work and three of them eventually married DRC ministers. She also wanted 
both boys, but particularly her eldest son Joos, to follow their father's example and enter the 
ministry. The Naude children later developed different opinions about their mother's motives. One 
of the Naudes' daughters, Reinet (Netta), said: 
"My mother was a perfectionist and she wanted the best for her family. She went to great 
lengths and made many sacrifices to get the f cw things she wanted for us. She did not ask 
much for herself but she absolutely insisted on the best for her children. And she adored 
those two sons."17 
Naude agreed with this to some extent, but felt his mother was very conscious of status. He felt 
that she wanted to bask in the glory of her sons' success. Being one of the middle children in a 
16lbid. 
17R O'Brien Geldenhuys-Clur interview. 
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large family and with his father away from home a great deal, Naude became an independent, 
self-sufficient boy. His mother tried to impose her standards and values on all her children, but 
Naude built up a resistance to this. He would sometimes go to great lengths to win this war of 
wills, as was the case when he finally won the right lo play rugby at school. 18 
In 1924, after General Hertzog won the general election, the government attempted to address 
the "poor white problem" with programmes and legislation that further prejudiced the black 
population. The Land Act already barred blacks from owning land in white South .Africa; 
legislation such as the Wages Act of 1925 and the Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926 
ensured that skilled jobs would remain the preserve of whites. Hertzog also introduced legislation 
to promote Afrikaans language and culture. Jozua Naude applauded all these steps. The question 
of whether blacks were being unjustly treated was not an issue in the Naude household; the 
children grew up with the belief that their parents were justified in their battle for Afrikaner 
freedom. Jozua and Ada were very clear in their minds about what they believed should be the 
correct relationship between whites and "non-whites". In South Africa the former were destined 
to act as political leaders of the country, while blacks were intended to occupy inferior positions 
in society. At the same time, Afrikaners had a duty to spread the gospel to the blacks and civilise 
the country, and to do this they would need to maintain themselves as a separate race. While 
Afrikaners would fulfil their Christian responsibilities towards non-whites, there would be no 
social mixing of the races. 19 
18C F B Naude interview with B Bilheimer, for A cry of reason: an Afrikaner speaks out 
and C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
19Ibid. 
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In line with this thinking, and because of his own strong evangelical background, Jozua supported 
mission work among the coloured people of Graaff-Reinet provided it took place on segregated 
lines. In the 1930s the DRC accelerated mission work in the coloured areas of the town and 
converts were expected to join the coloureds-only Sendingkerk.20 The influence of his father's 
work, which was also a prominent trend in the DRC, is clear from the fact that Beyers Naude, in 
his early ministry, also showed a great commitment to mission and evangelism. 
When Naude was 15 years old, he underwent one of the most important experiences of his life: 
he experienced a Christian "rebirth". It was the practice in the DRC to hold a series of prayer 
meetings and church services leading up to the day of Pentecost. Naude was deeply moved by the 
Pentecostal sermons his father delivered in May and June 1930 and decided to give his life to 
Christ. This brings us to another central thread in Naude's makeup: his Christian, Reformed 
tradition. After he accepted Christ as a young man, he never deviated from a strong faith and 
weighed up major decisions on this basis. 
His commitment to the faith of his father did not however prevent him from becoming somewhat 
rebellious as a teenager. Towards the dose of his final year at school, Naude joined his brother 
and four other boys in drawing up a letter of protest against the "authoritarian" attitude of their 
headmaster, U J Cronje. The boys regarded him as extreme and short-tempered. They had their 
letter professionally printed and distributed it around the school. In Naude's words, the letter 
"created a hell of a row". His father, who was chairman of the school committee, was acutely 
embarrassed by his sons' involvement in the affair, and if it had not been for his position, the boys 
20Ibid. 
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could have been expelled.21 
While many factors influenced Naudc's later rejection of traditional political values, early family 
experiences appeared to have played some part. It is evident that already as a youngster he had 
already developed the ability to question rather than accept. One possible reason for his 
rebelliousness is that he was seeking liberation from his domineering father. But if one searches 
for early influences, it seems his independent nature stemmed more from resentment of his mother. 
Naudc himself said that his mother was the stronger iniluence in the home, and he admitted it was 
from maternal captivity that he sought to escape. Naudc did not speak as readily of his mother as 
he did of his father, and when he did so it was sometimes in negative terms.22 
Of his family relationships Naudc commented later: 
"My father was a person with very deep convictions, strong convictions which he held 
firmly to, and which he def ended. I respected him for that. On the other hand, as a 
teenager I could not agree with a number of viewpoints which he expressed. I felt very 
strongly that he should have opposed my mother much more with regard to certain of her 
views which she wanted to impose on us, especially on her two sons. I came out in strong 
resistance against that, and I also conveyed that to him in my second or my third year of 
university when I said that I felt in that respect, he had allowed her too much, and that she 
was using her illness very skilfully in order to create the necessary sympathy where she 
could then impose her thoughts and her ideas, or force him in order to impose those ideas. 
Certainly a measure of my deep concern for the underdog grew out of the conviction that 
if there was a person whose ideals, wishes were suppressed in this way, and not given the 
necessary opportunity, that could never be a way in which one could really reach your 
highest potential. I rebelled against that and felt that was unfair."23 
And so Naudc, by the time he left for Stellenbosch University in 1932, had developed an 
22 C Villa-Vicencio, " Life of Resistance and Hope'', in C Villa-Vicencio and J W de 
Gruchy (eds), Resistance and hope: South African essays in honour of Beyers Naudc, p 5 and C 
F B Naudc-Clur interview. 
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independent streak. He began his BA studies with a career in the ministry, or teaching, in mind. 
Beyers and Joos started university together and, following in their father's footsteps, they entered 
Wilgenhof, the oldest residence serving students in Stellenbosch. Naude became a well-known 
figure in the hostel and was later elected its student chairman. The brothers spent their university 
days with many Afrikaners who were destined for top positions in church and political life -
including future prime minister John Vorster, one of Naude's adversaries in debating circles.24 
During the years he spent reading for his BA and just over a year completing his MA, Naude 
immersed himself in numerous student activities. A natural public speaker like his father, he joined 
the Universiteitse Debatsvereniging, one of two debating societies on campus, the other being 
the Unie Debatsvereniging, in which Vorster was a dominant figure. As a senior Naude was 
elected on to the Students Representative Council for two years and served as president in 1937. 
He was also a regular churchgoer and member of the Christelike Studentevereniging (CSV). 
Joos Naude, speaking about his university days with his brother, remarked: 
"Beyers and I were very different in our personalities. I took part in student affairs and 
enjoyed it, but Beyers was far more active. He was more outgoing and was marked out 
as a leader."25 
Naude also joined the hiking club, the Berg en Toer Klub (BTK), on which he served several times 
as chairman. It was through the BTK that Naude met his future wife, Ilse Hedwig Weder, who 
was studying for a BSc. She was born at Genadendal, the oldest mission station in South Africa, 
to Moravian missionary parents on 21 August 1913. Naude soon became a frequent visitor to 
Ilse's home at Genadendal where he was welcomed. What impressed him most was the openness 
of relations between white and coloured people, both in Ilse's home and in the congregation. 
24Ibid. 
251 Naude-Clur interview. 
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Unlike most Afrikaner missionaries who were e mphatic that there should be no social intercourse 
with their "non-white" flock, the German missionaries were less rigidly separatist in their attitudes 
to race and mission. NI races worshipped in the same church and coloured people visited Ilse's 
parents in their home - quite a revelation for Naude. For the first time in his adult life he spoke 
to people of another colour on a basis approaching equality. He started to develop an interest in 
race issues and missionary work, but it would be many years before his feelings and thoughts on 
these issues would crystallise.26 
Naude himself was not deeply interested in politics, but the subject was hard to ignore altogether, 
especially since new political ideas had begun to appear on the university campuses in the 1930s. 
Young Afrikaner nationalists, dissatisfied with the economic and social status of their people, 
challenged the notion that there should be closer co-operation with English-speaking whites, and 
asserted the need to preserve and promote the separate language and culture of the Afrikaner. 
This mobilisation was encouraged by the Afrikaner Broederbond, which set up various political 
and cultural organisations to promote the cause of Afrikanerdom in the 1920s and 1930s.27 
On university campuses the mouthpiece for this assertive nationalism was the Afrikaanse 
Nasionale Sllldentebond (ANS). This was established in 1933 after the three Afrikaans universities 
in the Transvaal and Free State withdrew from the English-dominated National Union of South 
African Students (NUSAS). Stellenbosch was at first not in favour of pulling out of NUSAS, and 
the ANS-NUSAS row became a hot issue on the campus. Finally, in 1936, the Stellenbosch SRC 
261 Naude interview with C Clur, 1988, C F B Naudc-Clur interview and C F B 
Naude-Randall interview. 
27 J H P Serfontein, Brotherhood of power, p 34. 
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seceded from NUSAS to throw its full weight behind the ANS. Although Naude regarded himself 
as a nationalist and a loyal Afrikaner, he disliked the all-embracing control which the nationalist 
movement sought to exert and so shied away from the more exclusive claims of Afrikanerdom. 
He also began to read widely, in English, Dutch-and Afrikaans, and was already something of a 
"moderate'' in Afrikaner nationalist terms. He said later: 
"I was questioning all the time. I wanted a justification and an explanation for whatever 
stand I took. But it was not a very probing, critical questioning, because we were not 
allowed to do that. In our whole upbringing we had been too much part of an authoritarian 
structure, which emphasised the authority of the parent, teacher, minister, or party. But 
there was at the back of my mind that constant question: Is this the real truth and the full 
truth?"28 
The two brothers also demonstrated their independence by joining the editorial staff of the 
clandestine student newspaper, Pro Libertate which was launched in 1932 by a small, anonymous 
group of more liberal-minded senior students; the newspaper challenged some of the less sacred 
but nevertheless stultifying aspects of Afrikaner culture and politics. Naude and his brother were 
keen readers of Pro Libertate. Although only mildly provocative, critics accused it of practising 
"underhand politics", of being negative towards the church and the Theological Seminary, and of 
usurping the function of the official student newspaper, Die Stellenbosse Student. Pro Libertate 
denied the charges and, while affirming its respect for authority and the Christian faith, it declared 
itself in favour of freedom of thought and expression.29 The newspaper's editors had to guard 
their identities very closely because once exposed they were often subjected to pressure and 
criticism; for this reason Pro Libertate experienced a frequent turnover of staff. Naude and his 
brother joined the journal to fill gaps left by other departing students. Their parents were upset 
to hear of their involvement in the journal. Ada in particular was angry when she found that her 
28C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
29Pro Libertate, issues from 1932 - 1934. 
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sons were coming home with strange ideas which did not conform with her outlook. She also 
disapproved of her son's relationship with Ilse Weder, whose family were not Afrikaners. 
Although Ili;e's father was a mii;sionary, Ada did not regard him as a real "dominee", and Ilse was 
not a member of the DRC.30 
Naudc completed his BA at the end of 1934 and, still unsure about a career, he decided to devote 
the following year to his MA. The love Naudc felt for his language was evident in the thesis he 
chose, an examination of Afrikaans poetry. The thesis showed a good understanding of the works 
of Naude's favourite poets, many of whom were staunch nationalists, including CJ Langenhoven, 
Totius and Uys Krige.31 At the end of 1935 Naudc decided to enter the Theological Seminary of 
the DRC. 
To understand the larger social forces which shaped his career, it is necessary to deal briefly with 
the political and theological issues which influenced the church's decision to support the policy 
of apartheid. It was during Beyers NaudC's student years that the foundation was laid for 
apartheid theology in the DRC. New theological ideas from Europe began to influence the 
church, enabling leaders who propounded a racist theology to win ground. But it was not only 
the new imported ideas which made apartheid theology possible; the historical traditions of the 
DRC provided fertile ground for their growth. The Calvinist notion of the "elect" or chosen 
people was seized on by N'rikaner ministers, who encouraged their followers to identify 
themselves with Israel of old. As they had been called by God to bring Christianity and civilisation 
3
°C F B Naudc-Clur interview, I Naudc-Clur interview and J Naudc-Clur interview. 
31C F B Naude, Die waardering van poesie: enkele aspekte van die vraagstuk, toegelig met 
voorbeelde uit die Afrikaansc poesie. · 
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to the African continent, no claim could be made for the equal treatment of Afrikaners and blacks, 
as this was not the will of God. 32 
Moreover, for the first 150 years of white settlement the DRC had concerned itself almost 
exclusively with white colonists. There were only sporadic efforts to minister to slaves and the 
indigenous Khoikhoi, and although these "non-whites" were permitted to join the DRC, the 
church in no way challenged discrimination in early Cape society. Indeed, as early as 1857 the 
Cape synod considered the question of segregated worship and holy communion, and while 
agreeing that it was scriptural for blacks to be admitted to white churches, accepted the principle 
of racially-segregated churches as necessary, because of the "weakness of some".33 
In 1881, a separate, "daughter" church for Coloureds, the Sendingkerk or Mission Church, was 
established; and in time the NGK in Afrika was founded for blacks and the Reformed Church in 
Africa for Indians. At a later stage, when the DRC had formalised its apartheid policies, its 
mission work came to be seen as an integral part of the church (and state) strategy to keep the 
races apart, as a way of ensuring white self-preservation.34 
32D J Bosch, "The roots and fruits of Afrikaner civil religion", in J W Hofmeyr and W S 
Vorster (eds), New faces of Africa: essays in honour of Ben Marais, p 15. 
33The full resolution said: "The Synod considers it desirable and scriptural that our heathen 
(black) members be received and absorbed into our existing congregations wherever possible; but 
where this measure as a result of the weakness of some, impedes the furtherance of the cause of 
Christ among the heathen, the heathen congregation, founded or still to be founded, shall enjoy 
its Christian privilege in a separate building or institution.", as quoted in J Kinghorn, (ed), Die 
NG Kerk en apartheid, p 76. 
34 Z E Mokgoebo, Broederkring: a calling and struggle for prophetic witness within the 
Dutch Reformed Church family in South Africa, p 130. 
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In the early decades of the twentieth century, patriotic Afrikaans students who went abroad were 
searching for a new brand of Reformed theology which could accommodate their new-found 
nationalism. They found it in the ideas of Abraham Kuyper, the founder of the Free University of 
Amsterdam. Kuyper was an influential figure in the Gereformeerdc Kerken, a splinter church in 
Holland which had rejected liberali~m and rationalism, and he developed a new theology. He said 
that human life consisted of separate spheres, such as the church, the state and the family, and that 
each had sovereignty over its affairs through God. He emphasised the principle of "diversity" and 
this was seized on by Afrikaner theologians, who searched and found biblical passages which 
apparently proved that God willed separate nations. 35 
Throughout the 1920s and the 1930s there was conflict between theologians who adhered to the 
old evangelical tradition of the DRC and those who favoured the new ideas from Holland. 
Between them stood a large group of ministers like Jozua Naude who remained faithful to 
evangelism and were committed to their church's missionary work, but also identified with the 
idea of the Afrikaners as a "chosen people" and a separate race. The final influence which swayed 
the church into adopting apartheid was romantic nationalism emanating from Nazi Germany.36 
Prominent Afrikaner nationalists, such as Nico Diedrichs, Pict Meyer and Geoff Cronje, who 
studied in Germany and sympathised with the Nazis because they were the enemies of the British, 
were influenced by the Nazi idea of racial purity.37 This group began to work out a racial blueprint 
35J Durand, "Afrikaner piety and dissent", in De Gruchy and Villa-Vicencio (eds), 
Resistance and hope, p 42. 
36J Kinghorn, "Vormende Faktore'', in Kinghorn (ed), Die NG Kerk, p 86. 
nBosch, "The roots and fruits", in Hofrneyr and Vorster (eds), New faces of Africa, p 32. 
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for the future. Building on the established pattern of segregation in South Africa, they envisaged 
a Christian Nationalist country where the solution to the racial problem would he found in the 
separation of the races. They declared that because the Bible supported the diversity of nations, 
the introduction of apartheid in South Africa could he regarded as the will of God. The DRC, now 
falling more closely into line with the thinking in the Broederbond and the National Party, started 
to give attention to race issues. In 1926, for example, the Native Commission of the DRC's 
Federal Council held a conference with English-speaking churches to consider the "native 
question". At the conference the DRC managed to gain acceptance for a resolution. which 
declared that it was not necessarily unchristian to "seek the progress of the native people 
separately from the whites".38 
However, a few voices in the DRC began to speak out against the national and political mission 
the church was taking upon itself. The principal of the DRC's Theological Seminary at 
Stellenbosch, Professor Johan du Plessis, was a man who adhered to the evangelical, missionary 
traditions of the church and clashed with nationalists on this issue. In 1928 his opponents seized 
on a non-political issue, a biblical interpretation in which he held that Christ had completely laid 
down his divine nature when he had lived on earth, to charge him with heresy. The presbytery 
commission at first rejected all the charges against him, but his political adversaries continued with 
a series of appeals, until two years later a special synodal commission found him guilty of heresy 
and had him removed from his Chair. He took the case to the civil court, which declared his 
conviction of heresy invalid, and he was technically reinstated. But the church, while it continued 
38Ao; quoted in E'Regehr, Perceptions of apartheid: the churches and political change in 
South Africa, 151. 
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to pay his salary and subsidise his house, never allowed him back in the Seminary.39 
When Beyers Naudc entered the Theological Seminary in 1936, there was still tension over the 
firing of Professor du Plessis and students were. divided into two groups - the more liberal "Du 
Plessis men" and the conservative "Oupajane men". The name "Oupajane" was derived from Die 
Ou Paaie journal, edited by Dr Dwight Snyman, which had been founded to counter Professor du 
Plessis's journal, Die Soeklig. 40 
Naude read both journals to gain greater understanding of the controversy, despite his father's 
support of the "Oupajane", his natural sympathy for the underdog brought him to side with the 
Du Plessis faction. He was upset by the "pettiness, the corruption and the closed-minded attitude" 
of the DRC, and felt that the action taken against one of the church's most eminent and 
committed academics was "totally unjust": 
"I didn't know Du Plessis, I knew nothing about the theology, but on the human level, 
what they had done to this man was an absolute shame."41 
In the aftermath of this episode, the DRC embarked on a purge, and the Seminary came to be 
staffed by anti-Du Plessis academics: Professor D G Malan, who was Du Plessis' successor in 
New Testament studies; EE van Rooyen, professor of Old Testament studies, and D Lategan, 
professor of Church History, who all contributed to Ou Paaie journal. Naude felt his lecturers 
were proponents of second-rate theology; stifled and frustrated by what he regarded as a lack of 
meaningful intellectual depth and clarity in the classes he attended, he developed an aversion to 
39F E O'Brien Geldenhuys, In die stroomversnellings: vyftigjaar van die NGK, pp 1 - 11. 
40Ibid, pp 3 - 11. 
41 Villa-Viccncio, "A life of resistance and hope", p 8 and CF B Naudc-Clur interview. 
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his studies. Some students pursued other courses while at the Seminary. Naude completed his 
MA during his first year at the Seminary and his friend Frans O'Brien Geldenhuys, his future 
brother-in-law, completed his LLB.42 
One exception to the theologians Beyers regarded as "second rate" was Professor B B (Bennie) 
Keet. A brilliant theologian who taught ethics and dogmatics, Keet had a profound impact on 
Naude. A Stellenbosch graduate, Professor Keet came from the old evangelical and 
mission-oriented tradition of the church and, like Du Plessis, was firmly opposed to the racist 
theology that had been introduced into the DRC. When Naude first entered the Seminary, 
Professor Keet was the only "Du Plessis" man left among the teaching staff and contributed to 
Soeklig. Keet never openly supported all aspects of Du Plessis' theology. Often statements made 
by the lecturers were scrutinised in the theological magazines, and Professor Keet was careful to 
avoid charges being brought against him. But later, when the DRC began to work out its 
apartheid charter in detail, Keet spoke openly against it. In 1939 he sounded his first public 
warning that hostility between the races was increasing as a result of the agitation for racial 
segregation. In the decades that followed Professor Keet frequently clashed with 
apartheid-'supporting theologians. 43 
At the end of 1937 Ilse, who had completed her BSc and MSc with distinction, accepted a 
teaching post in Pretoria. Naude still had two years to complete at the Theological Seminary, and 
42C F B Naude-Randall interview and O'Brien Geldenhuys, In die stroomversnellings, p 
11 
43Durand, "Afrikaner piety" in De Gruchy and Villa-Vicencio (eds), Resistance and Hope, 
pp 467 - 47. 
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they decided to gel engaged. Naude's mother, still bitterly opposed to the relationship, was upset 
when he informed his parents that he would be spending Cbristmas with Ilse at Genadendal, where 
they planned to announce their engagement. Ada pleaded with Beyers to change his mind, and 
also begged her husband to reason with her son .. But Naude ref used to consider their pleas and 
he travelled to Genadendal as planned. On Christmas Eve, 1937, the night before the couple were 
to announce their engagement, Ada sent her daughter Hymne to the mission station to try to 
dissuade Beyers. It was under this cloud that their engagement was announced on Christmas Day. 
The episode created a rift between him and his parents and, although they later accepted his 
marriage to Ilse, the emotional break was never completely healed. In January 1938 Ilse began 
teaching mathematics at an Afrikaans girls' school in Pretoria, but after a year she moved to a 
teaching post at La Rochelle School in Paarl so that she could be closer to Naude.44 
In May 1938, Beyers Naude had voted for the Nationalists in an election which produced a 
massive victory for Hertzog and Smuts's fused United Party. But this unity was smashed by the 
outbreak of war in September 1939; Smuts wanted South Africa to enter the war on the side of 
the Allies, while Hertzog insisted on a neutral stance. The vote in parliament went against 
Hertzog, and so began a new era in South African politics. It was also the end of a chapter in 
Beyers Naude's life: he began his career in the ministry in December 1939 when he moved to 
Wellington to serve as a trainee minister. The following year, on 3 August 1940, he married Ilse 
at the Genadendal mission station. 
For the next 23 years he served as a dominee in the DRC and rose steadily through the ranks. 
During this "middle period" of his life he went along with the system of apartheid and did not 
44I Naude-Clur interview. 
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speak out in spite of growing misgivings. His failure lo speak out in these crucial years, when 
biblical support for apartheid in the DRC was consolidated, can be partly ascribed to his personal 
desire to succeed and be promoted to senior positions in the church, and because of the pressure 
he perceived the church and Broederbond put on members to conform ; over the years it was his 
loyalty to the Broedcrbond which made it difficult for him to challenge conventional wisdom in 
his community. 
Naude joined the organisation at the start of his career, while working in Wellington in 1940. The 
senior DRC minister in Wellington, the Reverend Evert J du Toit, was a member of the 
Broederbond and considered that Naude met the requirements necessary for membership. An 
aspiring member had to believe in the destiny of the Afrikaner as a separate nation; promise to 
give preference to Afrikaners and Afrikaans firms in public, economic and professional life; speak 
Afrikaans in his home and outside; be a Protestant of "firm principles and strong character"; be 
financially secure and prepared to participate as an active and loyal member of the Broederbond.45 
When their first son was born in 1941 a dispute arose with Ada over his names. Beyers and Ilse 
Naude had baptised him Johann, after the disciple John, and Friedrich because it was the German 
word for peace and expressed their longing for an end to the war. Ada Naude was upset that her 
grandson had not been given family names - and so the tensions between Naude and his mother 
continued.46 The couple had four children, three boys and a girl. 
45Scrfontein, Brotherhood of power, p 35 and pp. 130 - 140. 
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In his ministry within the DRC three issues always remained pre-eminent in his thinking and 
activity: youth work, evangelism and mission work. Having held leadership positions in various 
youth organisations during his student days and being the junior minister, he concentrated on 
establishing contacts with young people in the college town. The emphasis he placed on 
evangelism in his ministry was also not unexpected. Both his parents had stressed its importance 
and hie; own conversion had been the result of a profound experience at Pentecost. His father had 
impressed upon him the need to win new converts, and his interest in mission work was 
heightened as a result of his visits to the Genadendal mission station. He was exposed to the 
mission policy of his church at the DRC's training college in Wellington, where white students 
were trained for careers as ministers of the coloured Sendingkerk. Naude did not voice his 
misgivings, but he was uneasy that the training given to these men was inferior and of a shorter 
duration than the instruction given at Stellenbosch to ministers for the white church. 47 
In April 1943 he accepted an invitation to be minister in the small Karoo town of Loxton. He 
developed a very close relationship with the townsfolk since most people belonged to the DRC. 
In addition he visited the families on farms in the district twice a year. His years in Loxton 
coincided with the Second World War, which created bitter divisions in South Africa. Naude was 
opposed to his country's participation in the war and, like many Afrikaners, was sympathetic to 
the Germans' cause because they were the enemies of the British. Although Naude regarded 
himself as a loyal Afrikaner nationalist, some questions began to disturb him. As a result of his 
contact with the impoverished coloured people who lived in a township outside of Loxton he 
began to feel uneasy. A white lay preacher served the small Sendingkerk in the township and 
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occasionally Naude was asked to officiate. He said later: 
"Once a quarter, or when there was communion and baptism, I conducted services in the 
little mission church in Loxton. Looking at the terrible poverty, the Jack of any real or 
proper education, I began to ask, 'How can we justify this?'Whitcs were always justifying 
why the people got the wages they did, and that there was very little they could do about 
it. I started to question this .... This was also linked to my very strong sense of mission .... 
I said to myself, 'part of your mission, certainly, is to uplift the people'. And in that sense 
the knowledge and experience I gained in Genadcndal, where at least you had a 
community of coloureds who were living on a higher standard and who were able to 
sustain themselves to a certain degree, raL<;ed the question why it was not possible to have 
this in other parts of the country." 
However, in spite of these misgivings, his preoccupation with his own congregants meant that he 
did nothing to challenge the status quo. 48 
He left Loxton in 1945 and moved to the Transvaal to minister to a congregation in Pretoria 
South. The church had been established to serve members who lived in an extensive rural area on 
the southern border of the capital city. By 1948 it had become clear that the Pretoria South region 
was far too large to manage. When it was decided to split the congregation Naude accepted the 
invitation to Olifantsfontein. 49 
In 1948 the National Party came to power on the platform of apartheid. While the political 
programme of apartheid had been developed by nationalist ideologies in the 1940s, the DRC had 
also elaborated on theology which supported apartheid. In 1942, members of the DRC formed 
a Federal Mission Council and assigned a special commission to refine the policy of segregated 
churches for the various race groups:'0 The Federal Mission Council also promoted segregation 
48lbid. 
~01 Kinghorn, "Die groci van 'n teologie: van sendingsbelcid tot verskeidenheidsteologic", 
in Kinghorn (cd), Die NG Kerk, p 91. 
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in other spheres. Its commLr.;sion on education, for example, proposed that the education of black 
children be organised under the Department of Native Affairs rather than under the Department 
of Education, so that the school programme for blacks "could he made more suitable for their 
special character and circumstances". The Council also pleaded for the prohibition of sex and 
marriage across the colour line.51 
In the 1940s, too, DRC theologians extended their search for biblical texts to substantiate their 
call for apartheid. Theologians cited "evidence" from both the Old and New Testaments, and one 
of the cardinal texts was the story of Babel, which they claimed showed that God willed the 
creation of separate nations. A comparison between the nation of Israel as it existed in the old 
Testament and the position of Christian Afrikaners was made to prove that apartheid was not 
against God's will. Similar interpretations were given to several other passages in the Bible. 52 
Naude did not concern himself too much about these political and theological developments. He 
said later: 
"It never really worried me. I didn't get involved, I didn't look at apartheid theology 
critically, compare it to real, meaningful theology. I did not look at the specific texts of 
the Bible and try to get the correct interpretation. I was not enough of a theology 
student. That was the tragedy - my lack of theological training and my unwillingness to 
be really involved."53 
This "unwillingness to be involved" is probably the key to understanding why Naude kept silent 
about apartheid, because there is evidence that as early as 1948 he felt unhappy about this policy. 
51 Regehr, Perceptions of apartheid, p 151. 
52G Cronje, W Nicol and E P Groenewald, Regverdige rasse-apartheid, pp 14-17 and J 
H Kritzinger, "Rasse-apartheid in die lig van die Skrif'', in Op die horison, pp 22 - 31. 
5JC F B Naude-Clur interview. 
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In that year, the Transvaal synod of the DRC gave its sanction to apartheid. Professor Ben Marais 
stood virtually alone at the synod, as he had also done at the synod four years earlier54, in 
opposing a church report which set out a biblical justification of apartheid. In spite of his 
protestations, the report was accepted by an overwhelming majority. But at the close of the synod 
Naudc and 12 other ministers asked that the records reflect that they did not support the report. 
Ben Marais later said of Naudc: 
"He did not say a word, but had his name taken afterwards. My point of view was that 
if you were against something, you had to stand up and say it in the circle where it was 
appropriate .... "55 
At this stage of his life Naude was reluctant to rock the boat and so continued to accept, with 
misgivings, the route his church was taking. 
On 26 May 1948, white South Africans, along with a minority of coloured people in the Cape still 
entitled to vote, went to the polls. Naude voted Nationalist. There was a national swing against 
Smuts's United Party which propelled the National Party to power by a narrow margin. Naude's 
father was jubilant. Shortly before his death, on 31 May 1948, the anniversary of the Treaty of 
Vereeniging, he wrote a joyful letter addressed to his sons and son-in-law: 
"It is now 6 in the morning. We have drunk coffee and read the old chapter, Lamentations 
5, which I have been reading for the last 46 years on this day .... Thank you very much for 
your lovely telegram. It meant so much to me because it showed that you have also found 
that the Word ... has become real.... The sun of freedom which went down at Vereeniging, 
has after 46 years risen more magnificently and more wonderfully than when it 
disappeared. My vision at the Tugela waterfall has been fulfilled."56 
The letter symbolises the triumph that Afrikaner nationalists felt at this electoral victory, which 
54B Marais, "Voorwoord", p 8, in CF B Naude, My land van hoop. 
55B Marais interview with C Clur, 1988 and Handelinge van die Transvaalse Sinode van 
die NG Kerk, 1948. 
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compensated for the defeat they had suffered in the South African war. The next phase of the 
Afrikaner nationalist struggle continued until the formation of the Republic of South Africa in 
1961, under the leadership of Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd. Beyers Naudc's enthusiasm 
and support for the nationalist cause wavered decidedly in this period, but for most of it he was 
still not prepared to speak out. 
Naude continued to make steady progress in his work and in 1949 he was appointed student 
pastor in Pretoria East, where he worked with Ben Marais and Johann Luckhoff. His.special 
responsibility was the welfare of the students at the University of Pretoria and in the six years he 
spent there he worked hard to promote youth work. One of the theology students at Pretoria at 
the time was Dr Nico Smith, a man who later also rejected apartheid. The two men's paths 
crossed several times in their careers, and Dr Smith later said of his student pastor: 
"I had very close contact with him when he was student chaplain. He had come out of the 
Stellenbosch Seminary and it was unbelievable how little he knew about theology. At the 
time I thought, 'What this chap knows about theology is dangerous.'But he had the gift 
to make you enthusiastic, and you didn't know why because there was no theology behind 
it."57 
During this time steps were taken to unite the four provincial synods of the white DRC, and 
Naude helped found the Kerkleugvereniging (KJV) - a national youth group for young, working 
Afrikaners. He assumed his first executive position when he was elected chairman of the KJV in 
1951, and by then was also secretary of the Synodal Youth and the Federal Youth Council. 58 
While Naudc was going from strength to strength in his church work, the National Party 
57N Smith interview with C Clur, 1987. 
58Vaderland 19 July 1951 and CF B Naude-Randall interview. 
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government was pressing ahead with apartheid legislation, including the Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act (1949), Group Areas Act and Population Registration Act (1950), the Abolition 
of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act (1952), Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 
(1953) and Bantu Education Act (1953). Moreover, in 1950 the government gave itself wide 
powers to suppress "radical political activity" by enacting the Suppression of Communism Act. 
Naudc, however, paid little attention to the enactment of these laws. 
In 1950 the DRC's Federal Mission Council held a conference to discuss the "native questicm" and 
called for the total separation of the races. The council went much further than the government's 
policy at the time in backing drastic structural change to South African society. The findings of 
the conference, which were laid before the government, were based on the premise that apartheid, 
correctly applied, would help the development of the black, coloured and Indian race groups.59 
In 1952 Ben Marais published a controversial book on the race issue in which he examined racism 
in North America and Brazil. According to Marais, segregated churches were a very late 
development in the history of Christianity and were a fruit of slavery. He firmly rejected any 
biblical defence of segregated churches but said it could be justified on practical grounds -
provided it did not break down Christian brotherhood. Marais put the arguments of apartheid 
theology to the test by asking 13 of the world's leading theologians to reply to a series of 
questions dealing with nationalism and segregation in the Christian church. The theologians, who 
included Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, J H Bavinck, H Berkhof and Franz Leenhardt, were 
591 Kinghorn, "Die groci van 'n teologie" in Kinghorn, Die NGK Kerk, pp 98 - 99. 
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unanimous in their rejection of racial segregation.60 The book sent shockwaves through the DRC 
and Marais encountered a great deal of hostility from many of his colleagues and members of his 
congregation. A review in the official church journal Kerkbodc was equally critical, and rejected 
Marais's claim that apartheid in the church was.destroying Christian fellowship. Professor Keet 
sprang to Marais's defence in Kcrkbodc as the debate raged.61 Marais's work had a great impact 
on Naude. He said: 
"The book was a very clear and disturbing challenge to the traditional theological 
concepts which I held up till then. Reading the book brought home to me a number of 
crucial questions about the biblical understanding of church, of race, of human dignity, of 
the unity of the church, of the whole pattern and structure of the DRC. Pronouncements 
were made by theologians of great repute, and they all challenged the basic theological 
presumptions on which we based and justified our whole policy here." 
New questions were beginning to surface in Naude's mind, but he held back, fearful of being 
disloyal to the Brocderbond: 
"On the one hand I was a member of the Broederbond, looking at all these issues from 
primarily the interest of the Afrikaner people, and on the other hand Ben Marais was a 
colleague, a friend. He was criticised and partially ostracised, but I never discussed it 
with him - I was cautious because of my allegiance to the Brocdcrbond." 
Although Marais had not said so in his book, he was highly critical of the Broedcrbond because 
it operated in secrecy. Naude continued: 
"This led to tremendous tension within the church council and within the congregation. 
Johann Luckhoff and I were both members of the Broedcrbond. I was in the invidious 
position where my loyalty to a secret organisation made it very difficult for me to feel free 
to study and evaluate certain basic theological views which were in conflict with the 
traditional views of the DRC. I had this increasing feeling of doubt and unhappiness 
about the position in which I found myself. It was virtually impossible for me to be open 
to a fellow theologian, to differ with him, to debate and to discover the truth."62 
60B Marais, Die kleur krisis en de Weste. 
61 Kerkbodc, 10, 31December1952. 
62C F B Naudc-Clur interview. 
32 
Marais's book made Naudc determined to improve his knowledge of theology, and from 1953 he 
began an intensive programme of reading and self-study. He concentrated on interpretations of 
the Bible, on church history in South N'rica and other countries, and on the role of race in the 
Christian church. For the first time he seriously studied the works of Karl Barth and the modern 
Dutch theologians and realised there was something fundamentally wrong with the DRC's race 
policies. 
It was during this crucial period, in July 1953, that Naude, as chairman of the Kerk 
.Teugvereniging, embarked on a six-month study tour overseas. He was accompanied by the KJV's 
general secretary, the Reverend Willem de Wet Strauss, and they toured the United States, 
Canada, Great Britain, Holland, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. The South· 
Africans received a polite reception from the various overseas Reformed churches which had 
helped draw up their itinerary, and they were also assisted by the youth department of the World 
Council of Churches to which the DRC then belonged. The two men naively thought they would 
be able to avoid political issues merely by declining to talk about them, but everywhere they went 
- at youth camps, conferences and seminars - people would question them about South Africa. 
At first Naude tried to defend his church's race policies: 
"I used all the arguments, all the references in the Old Testament, I knew them by heart, 
the whole lot of them. But I realised very soon that I was up against theologians who 
could shoot down the one straw doll after the other. I became increasingly cautious about 
using these arguments, realising that something was wrong."63 
On their return the two men published a book giving details of their tour. It dealt with the various 
types of youth work they had encountered, but made no attempt to analyse their experiences. It 
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also made no mention of the issue with which they had been confronted day after day - South 
Africa's race policies. 64 The book contained not the slightest indication of the real impact the 
overseas tour had on Naude. The tour broadened his vision and understanding of church and 
society. Now convinced that the DRC was wrong to support apartheid, he still refused to speak 
out: 
"I felt I was theologically inadequate and I was still a member of the Brocderbond .... 
I felt that I first had to prepare myself, find the necessary theological insight and 
knowledge and justification for my stand. I began to see if I could find allies within the 
DRC, ministers who could be convinced, because I knew I was up against an ideological 
barrier that would be very difficult to break." 
Naude continued his private theological study and the more he read, the more uneasy he became. 
He became convinced that the policy of apartheid could not be justified on scriptural grounds. 65 
In 1954 Naude received an invitation from the Potchefstroom DRC and the family moved to the 
town in 1955. The five years Naude spent there were important in his theological and political 
development. As Naude's ministry unfolded, so he came to be increasingly driven by a tremendous 
energy. According to Ilse, her husband "worked himself to pieces" in Potchefstroom. She said he 
discovered "entire families that had never been baptised", and so he had to devote much of his 
time in visits to farming families. Ilse also worked hard to revitalise the women's organisations 
and accepted as well all the responsibilities in the home: 
"Bey was of the old stock who thought the wife was there for the children, to run the 
house and to see to all the work of the minister's wife".66 
This statement reinforces the argument that culturally Naude was no different to most of his 
64C F B Naude and W de W Strauss, Kerk en jeug in die buiteland en Suid Afrika . 
65C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
661 Naude-Clur interview. 
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fellow-Afrikaners in many respects for the first half of his life at l~t, believing that the husband 
and father was head of the household. 
While privately NaudC's thinking was moving away from acceptance of the prevailing racial order, 
he steered away from all controversy in his sermons and interaction with his conservative 
congregation. During that time the National Party government continued to extend apartheid. In 
1954, Native Affairs Minister Hendrik Verwoerd spelled out bis ideal for the future: total 
separation of the races in every sphere of life, social, political, economic and religious. In the next 
decade, under the leadership of Verwoerd and later John Vorster, apartheid began to be applied 
systematically across a broad social front. While there were some differences between Verwoerd 
and Vorster about the implementation of apartheid, the key goal was to reverse the movement 
of black people to the "white" cities and more than two million black South Africans were forcibly 
uprooted and moved to the ethnically designated homelands in the 1960s and 1970s.67 
While the majority of ministers in the DRC sided with the government, Keet and Marais continued 
to oppose the biblical justification of apartheid. Privately Naude agreed with Marais's views, but 
a hurdle remained: he was still a member of the Broederbond, although he felt uncomfortable 
about his membership. Naude's uneasiness about belonging to the Broederbond is evident from 
an incident that occurred at the DRC's Transvaal synod of 1955. The synod had been discussing 
the Freemasons when Ben Marais rose and criticised the Broedemond. Marais recalled: 
"I was not a member of either organisation and I had no intention of taking part in the 
debate. But when I saw that the loudest critics of Freema.5onry were all Broederbond 
members, I stood up and proposed that we accept that no minister of the NG Kerk should 
67T R H Davenport, South Africa: a modern history, pp 339 - 340 and M Nash, Black 
uprooting from 'white'South Africa: the fourth and final stage ohpartheid, pp 1 - 23. 
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belong to any organisation which had an oath of secrccy ... The next morning when the 
synod reopened, the moderator stood up and said he had decided that my motion was not 
in order and could not be discussed. He put his decision to synod and by about a 
three-to-two majority, they supported the moderator's stand. That night Beyers Naude 
came to me and he told me what had happened the previous night after the synod had 
adjourned. He said to me: 'You know, Ben, I can't look you in the eye.' And I said: 'Why, 
Beyers'!'Thcn he told me that after the adjournment, by word of mouth and by telephone, 
the Broederbond had called a special meeting of members. They had discussed a strategy 
should my motion be accepted for debate. Then Beyers told me that at that meeting one 
speaker after another got up and said: 'Now, Ben Marais must be broken in the church.' 
Beyers told me he felt ashamed, he felt he did not belong at that meeting."68 
Other non-Broederbond colleagues also noticed ambiguities in Naude's thinking at the time. Nico 
Smith, who worked for a while with Naude in Potchefstroom as assistant minister and who was 
not yet a member of the Broederbond, said: 
"We often had long, involved theological discussions. I knew that Beyers was in the 
Broederbond but I didn't know how it functioned. What always puzzled me was that we 
would have discussions and decide what we believed was theologically the way, but then 
at a church meeting Naude would take another stand. I realised that Beyers had changed 
his mind. That was the influence of the Broederbond. They forced you to conform to a 
certain way of thinking."69 
Naude agreed with this assessment of the Broederbond: 
"At Broederbond meetings I began to feed in my ideas and concerns and asked what we 
were going to do about them. I told them we can't dose our eyes. But they would come 
up with counter-arguments, and so I would say to myself, 'Perhaps I am wrong, perhaps 
I should take more seriously what these people are saying'." 
The prospect of advancing his career also caused Naude to temper his criticism of apartheid: 
1955. 
"I was told by my colleagues that if I handled my career wisely I would become the 
moderator of first the regional synod and then of the national synod. I think it is important 
to realise that at that stage the moderator of the NGK was the second most powerful 
68B Marais-Clur interview and Handelinge van die Transvaalse Sinode van die NG Kerk, 
69N Smith-Clur interview. Smith later joined the Broederbond but ultimately resigned from 
the organisation. 
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position in the country [after the prime minister]. So I kept silent. "70 
Naude 's recollections of the promises made to him by Broeders about his prospects for 
advancement in the church are borne out by what happened in 1963 when he was elected 
moderator of the Southern Transvaal synod of the DRC, at a time when he again came under 
pressure from Broederbond colleagues to conform. 
During his ministry at Potchefstroom, Naude's political and theological views came to be shaped 
in a number of decisive ways. The influence of the smaller Afrikaans Reformed Church, the 
Gereformeerde (or Dapper) Kerk was strong in the town, with the university it founded, the 
Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, a focal point for many academic and 
religious activities. Kuyperian theology was strongly entrenched in the Gereformeerde Kerk and 
its leading theologians believed in the biblical basis of apartheid; in general the Gereformeerde 
church preached a conservative brand of Christianity in which all actions had to be tested against 
the Bible. 71 In spite of their ultra-conservatism on race issues, Naude found more depth in the 
theology of the Dappers than in his own church. Gereformeerde Kerk members who attended his 
church services and Bible studies gave him a new understanding of the demands of the Scriptures. 
The Dappers, according to Naude, showed more concern for evaluating their actions and political 
and social issues in the light of Scripture. This strengthened his approach to assessing and 
evaluating what was happening in the country in terms of his Christian faith. Charles Villa-
Vicencio has also noted that in spite of the Gerformeerde Kerk's conservative stance in general, 
7
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Naude, from his contact with the Dappers, "gained a decisively new existential understanding of 
the Word of God, within the life of the Christian". 72 
The period was also significant in that the 1950s was the last period until 1986 that major 
criticisms of apartheid were allowed to be heard within the DRC. Thus, three years after the 
appearance of Ben Marais's book on race issues, Keet published a short work in which he 
challenged the biblical validity of apartheid. He set out to demolish the arguments from Scripture 
in defence of apartheid, pointing out that it was only because segregation and discrimination 
existed in the first place in South Africa that DRC theologians had searched for passages in the 
Bible to support the policy. He warned Afrikaners who dreamt of complete racial separation that 
they were living in a make-believe world. The response of the DRC was summed up in a review 
of the book in Kerkbode. It criticised Keet for being negative and defended the church and 
government's apartheid policy as having had a "positive" impact on all the country's races and on 
the church's mission work. 73 
Ministers like Naude who disagreed with the policy of apartheid but who were still loyal to the 
church often took ambiguous and contradictory positions on controversial issues. One telling 
example of this was after the government's attempt to prevent inter- racial mixing in the churches 
by introducing in 1957 an amendment, the so-called "church clause", Clause 29 (c), to the Native 
Laws Amendment Act. The government believed the English churches were provocatively and 
intentionally arranging multi-racial services to make a political point, and the "church clause" was 
72C Villa-Vicencio, "A life of Resistance" in Randall ( ed) Not without honour, p 8 and C 
F B Naude-Clur interview. 
73B B Keet, Whither South Africa?, pp 19 - 85 and Kerkbode, 15 February 1956. 
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introduced to head this development off. The clause empowered the government to prohibit the 
holding of classes, entertainments and even church services if they were attended by blacks in 
white group areas. 74 The publication of the draft amendment prompted an immediate protest from 
the English-speaking "multi-racial" churches, and the Archbishop of the Church of the Province 
of South Africa, or Anglican church, Geoffrey Clayton, in an open letter, warned the government 
that it would be forced to disobey the law. The Federal Council of the DRC was also opposed to 
the amendment. The council drew up an eight-point statement, unusually critical, which 
emphasised the complete freedom the church should enjoy and which warned the government 
against exceeding its power and impinging on the sovereignty of the church. In keeping with the 
close co-operation between the DRC and the state, a delegation from the church met Bantu 
Affairs Minister Hendrik Verwoerd to discuss the issue. After listening to their views, Verwoerd 
explained how English churches were provoking the government by deliberately arranging 
multi-racial church services. After he assured them that the new law would be applied 
circumspectly, the DRC decided not to release the full eight-point statement to the public, but 
instead released only the first, more general, part of the statement. The points more critical of the 
government were excluded in the release. The unpublished points were specific in criticising the 
government for going beyond the bounds of what the state was entitled to do, suggesting it was 
interfering with religious freedom. 75 
The decision to release a shorter, less critical statement caused division within the DRC. Beyers 
Naude was one of those who tried, not very successfully, to reach a compromise at the Transvaal 
74Davenport, South Africa, p 344. 
751 W de Gruchy, The church struggle in South Africa, p 61. 
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synod in 1957. He proposed that the Federal Council's original, full statement be approved as "an 
explanation of the church's standpoint as it is grounded in God's Word". But his motion also 
thanked the government for granting the church an audience and called on the synod to accept 
"o.fficially" the church's less critical statement. R Lombard has summed up the DRC's 
contradictory behaviour: 
"The anomalies in the decision of the Transvaal synod were evidence of the conflict of 
conscience the church clause caused the DRC. The church was aware that the 
government, with the clause, was infringing on the terrain of the church, but at the same 
time did not want to withdraw their support for the government and apartheid".76 
The government's controversial clause was finally promulgated but was never strictly enforced, 
partly because even in the so-called "multi-racial" English churches there was not a great deal of 
racial mixing. 
Another important event in Naude's development during this time was the world Reformed 
Ecumenical Synod which met in Potchefstroom in August 1958. Hosted by the Gereformeerde 
Kerk, the conference brought together representatives from the smaller, conservative Reformed 
churches worldwide. N aude attended all the public sessions of the synod. It dealt with a variety 
of social and church issues, but placed particular emphasis on the crisis facing Africa and the 
problem of race relations. The synod devoted four days to the latter, during which time strong 
critiques of apartheid in the church were launched by various overseas delegates. DRC 
theologians also contributed a great deal to discussion at the synod, and the South African 
influence on the proceedings was reflected in the cautious statement issued by delegates on the 
76Lombard, Die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, p 170 and Handelinge van die 
Transvaalse Sinode van die NG Kerk, 1957. 
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race issue, based on a report submitted by a commission on race relations. 77 The report found no 
"direct Scriptural support for or against the mixing of races by marriage". Despite the failure of 
the synod to condemn apartheid, the contribution of the overseas delegates made a profound 
impression on Naudc and he was aware of the gulf which already separated the thinking of his 
church and the world Reformed community. 78 
The political and theological climate in Potchefstroom, while generally conservative, had also 
created conditions for a minor challenge to the Verwoerd government - the sorcalled 
''professorale rebellie" at the University of Potchefstroom in 1959 when Professor D W Kruger 
predicted that Dr Albert Luthuli would probably be the Republic of South Africa's first president -
not Verwoerd. Professors L J du Plessis and J H Coetzee were considered part of a trio of rebels, 
having themselves also criticised Verwoerd before Kruger's startling "prediction". The row that 
these statements provoked resulted in the three having to answer for their statements before a 
University Council. Although no action was taken against them, the episode , in the words of C 
J Coetzee, demonstrated the "all-encompassing rigid monopoly exercised by the Verwoerdian 
regime on race relations whereby the very basic principles of academic freedom and the lifeblood 
of being a university had been smothered on a national level". 79 Naude had not been directly 
involved in this controversy, but he had come across some of the group of more liberal-minded 
77 Acta van die Vierde Gereformcerde Ekumeniesc Sinode, Potchcfstroom, 6 - 13 
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academics at the university, such as Professor S du Toit, an associate of the three rebels, and a 
member of the race relations commission that had sat at the Reformed Ecumenical Synod in 
1958.80 
During 1958 Naude was elected to the moderature of the Transvaal synod as vice-chairman. One 
important consequence was that younger ministers who had encountered him as students in 
Pretoria began to seek him out to discuss their dilemmas about apartheid. Most of them served 
as mi'isionaries in the separate African, coloured or Indian churches, and they were disturbed by 
the implementation of residential apartheid which deeply affected their members. Charl le Roux, 
a minister in the Indian church, recalled approaching Naude for help: 
"I had known Beyers as a child when I was growing up in Wellington. He was an open, 
friendly, communicating minister. In those days many ministers were quite stuffy, but he 
was relaxed and approachable. In the 1950s I had been involved with mission work in the 
Indian community and they had many problems and frustrations. We took Beyers to the 
heart of all this. At that stage many people were living in slums, they were pushed into a 
corner. He saw all this and it changed his whole outlook."81 
In many parts of South Africa, the authorities had begun uprooting "non-whites" in terms of the 
Group Areas and Natives Resettlement Acts, and removals occurred in Johannesburg's 
Sophiatown as well as areas where many coloureds and Indians lived.82 DRC ministers who served 
these communities were disturbed by this and Naude recalled that ministers like Le Roux, Chris 
Grey ling, Francois Malan, and Gert Swart came to him for advice: 
"They told me about the problems they were experiencing and of the growing resistance 
of African, coloured and Indian Christians to the stand the white NGK was taking on 
apartheid. These people were challenging the white ministers by saying, 'How do you 
80Acta van die vierde Gereformeerde Ekumeniese sinode, 1958. 
81 C le Roux interview with C Clur, 1988. 
82 Davenport, South Africa, p 344. 
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justify what is happening to us on the basis of Scripture?'The ministers invited me to come 
and share their experiences with them. And when they told me what they were 
experiencing, I said to them: 'I have to accept that you are telling me the truth, but I 
cannot believe it.' And so they invited me to come and look for myself. And I did. And 
what I found was a shattering experience.''83 
Naude went on four or five visits to the Indian communities of Pageview and Fordsburg in 
Johannesburg, to the new Indian township of Lenasia, to the black migrant compounds and to 
coloured slum areas and was confronted with the human misery created by apartheid. He was 
horrified by his ignorance of his own country: 
"I realised I had been living in a wonderful 'white world'. And right next to me was a 
black world and a brown world and an Indian world that I knew nothing about. I went 
to the South African Institute of Race Relations and bought their annual surveys on race 
relations. I bought copies of all the laws, and for the first time in my life I began to study 
the race laws of the country. It brought me to the conclusion, not only on theological 
grounds, but also on practical grounds, on the grounds of justice, these laws were even 
less acceptable.''84 
Naude believed it would be futile for him and the small group of like-minded ministers to try to 
change the policies of their church. He felt that the only effective way of changing the church's 
race policy was to convince enough of its ministers that it was wrong. Yet because of their 
shallow theological and political education especially in respect of racial issues, they were unable 
to do so. He urged them to study to improve their theological knowledge . 85 He was convinced 
that armed with better theological arguments, they could start challenging prevailing political and 
theological convention in the DRC. 
Speaking of Naude's concern about race issues, the late theologian David Bosch believed that it 
8~C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
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stemmed from his commitment to missionary work: 
"I would say Naude's early interest in race issues stemmed from his deep commitment to 
mii;sion, and this was the tradition out of which he had come. In the late 1950s the DRC 
experienced a mii;sionary revival, and it was because of his interest in spreading the gospel 
to black South Africans that he was willing to make contact with DRC missionaries. They 
then introduced him to their black congregations and he was able to witness their 
suffering under apartheid. His typical evangelical approach created the opportunities for 
him to be exposed to what was happening in South Africa. "86 
In 1959 Beyers Naude received an invitation to the new Aasvoelkop church in the suburb of 
Northcliff, north-west of Johannesburg. The church was an offshoot of the Linden congregation, 
served by a close confidant of Verwoerd, Gideon Boshoff. The Aasvoelkop church was originally 
responsible for about 600 adult members spread out over a very large area, and including the 
affluent suburbs of Northcliff, Emmarentia, Blackheath and Roosevelt Park, as well as the poorer 
area of Greymont. The congregation was therefore primarily made up of prosperous and middle-
class families who were enjoying the fruits of government policies which favoured whites. Its 
members included very influential and powerful Afrikaners, such as the chairman of the Board of 
the South African Broadcasting Corporation, Dr Piet Meyer, and the former editor of Transvaler, 
Jannie Kruger. This elite position, it was generally thought, was Naude's reward for faithful 
service to his people. He himself realised that he was being brought into the heart of the cultural 
and political life of Afrikanerdom to fill a leading role. Not all Naude's friends were in favour of 
his move to Aasvoelkop. Dr Willie Jonker, a close family friend and minister in the Johannesburg 
area at the time, said there was a generally accepted view that the Broederbond had engineered 
Naude's appointment to the prestigious new church: · 
"Beyers was very popular and was being brought to Johannesburg, not only as a church 
leader, but as a leader of the Afrikaner community. The Broederbond had advised him 
strongly to accept the position. I had never joined the Broederbond and had strong 
86 D Bosch interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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reservations about the way it operated. They did not only want a minister, but a strong 
Afrikaans cultural leader in Johannesburg, and Beyers was invited there for that 
purpose. "87 
While in Aasvoclkop, and in consultation with other moderate voices in the Afrikaans churches, 
Naude helped establish Bible study groups to c6nsider apartheid. Study groups were formed in 
Johannesburg and Pretoria, and these eventually expanded to include some black and coloured 
churchmen as well as ministers from other denominations, but to start with the study circles were 
attended by Afrikaans, Reformed ministers. At first the meetings were held on a very informal 
basis, but early in 1960 the Johannesburg circle became more formalis~d when Gert Swart was 
appointed secretary of the Rand Ecumenical Study Circle. The study circle was strongly 
supported by the ministers in Naude's circuit, and at one stage all but one of the 13 ministers took 
part in the meetings. Another important figure who lent weight to the group was NaudC's friend 
Willie Jonker. As the groups expanded the organisers battled to find suitable places where blacks 
and whites could meet. The Methodist Church in Johannesburg was sympathetic and offered a 
venue, but throughout their existence the groups struggled to find venues. The study groups kept 
as low a profile as possible but they were always viewed with suspicion by the conservative 
majority in the DRC.88 
Naude's thinking had come a long way since the mid-1950s, yet he knew very little about the 
major black political movement, the African National Congress. In the urban areas the ANC's 
protests centred on the pass laws but organised opposition was complicated by the divisions 
87W Jonker interview with C Clur, 1989. 
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which had appeared in the organisation's ranks. The breach culminated in March 1959 in the 
establishment of the breakaway Pan-Africanist Congress. In 1960 the ANC and PAC 
simultaneously launched campaigns to protest against the pass laws and, on 21 March 1960, 69 
black people were shot dead by police at Sharpeville while taking part in a pass law protest. The 
Sharpeville massacre was followed by the declaration of a state of emergency and both the ANC 
and PAC were banned. 89 
N aude, although shocked by the events of March 1960, was still reluctant to challenge the 
government's policies openly. Indeed in the months to come, he would even agree with his church 
when it placed the major responsibility for the township unrest on "communist agitators". He was 
still preoccupied with the interests of his own congregation and in advancing as a leader in the 
DRC. After serving for three years on the Transvaal moderature he had become a familiar figure 
at important church meetings and in the course of 1960, while still serving as vice-chairman on 
the Transvaal moderature, he was nominated as acting moderator of the newly formed Southern 
Transvaal synod. 
Outwardly, he was not considered a "great theologian", but he was well liked by most of his 
fellow ministers. His relaxed style, his warmth and his concern for people's personal problems 
made him very popular with his congregation and it was these qualities that helped make him such 
a prominent media personality in the years which followed. Klippics Kritzinger, a DRC minister 
who later served in the Indian Reformed Church, commented: 
"Beyers was a very friendly person and had a great pastoral heart. We were living in a 
89Davenport, South Africa, pp 358 - 359 and South African Institute of Race Relations, 
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46 
neighbouring congregation, but my parents no longer attended church. I went to a service 
at Aasvoelkop and liked it, so I joined the church. It had nothing to do with political 
considerations, I was attracted to him as a person."90 
Naudc, in his public utterances on Sharpeville at the time, regarded black unrest as a threat to the 
mission of his Church and displayed no deeper understanding of the political forces at work. 
Writing about the Sharpeville massacre in his church newsletter in May 1960, he said: 
"The NG Kerk stands condemned before the whole world as a church which has neglected 
its Christian calling with regard to the non-whites, which has not done enough to plead 
for their legitimate needs. It is clear that the NGK has a great responsibility to correct the 
outside world's twisted image and to convince overseas churches of the sincerity of our 
intentions and the scriptural basis of our standpoint."91 
Sharpeville created a serious rift between the DRC and the English-speaking churches. Although 
the DRC in the Transvaal and the Cape were still members of the World Council of Churches, the 
disagreement over Sharpeville threatened to destroy the bonds between the churches. In their 
statements, most of the country's English churches blamed the violence on apartheid. In March 
1960, nine leading members of the Transvaal, Free State and Cape moderatures of the DRC 
issued a statement deploring the "shocking" declarations against the government which had been 
made by churches at home and abroad and called on these churches'leaders to behave more 
responsibly.92 The Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Joost de Blank, responded to this by 
delivering a strong attack on the DRC and in a letter to the World Council of Churches he 
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91Maandbrief van die NG Gemeente Aasvoelkop, 1May1960, No. 3. My translation. 
92
"Statement on the Riots in South Africa", by members of the NG Kerk moderatures, as 
reproduced in Handelinge van die Transvaalse Sinode van die NG Kerk, 1961. (fhe Cape and 
Transvaal synods of the DRC had been founder members of the Christian Council of SA, but had 
withdrawn in 1941 for political regions.) 
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demanded that the DRe be expelled from the world body.93 In response to appeals from the 
Archbishop, the wee decided to send a representative on a mission off ellowship to try to heal 
the rift. One of the associate general secretaries of the wee, J\rnerican Dr Robert Bilheimer, was 
chosen to mediate and wee-member churches agreed to take part in a consultation at eottesloe, 
Johannesburg. 
The December 1960 eottesloe consultation has been described as "a compromise that failed"94 
and this observation is correct in the light of the eventual rejection of the Cottesloe statement by 
the synods of the Afrikaans churches. For a week, 80 South African delegates, one observer from 
the Christian Council, forerunner of the SAee, and six representatives of the World Council of 
Churches gathered at a hostel in Cottesloe, Johannesburg, to discuss the pressing problems facing 
South Africa and the churches. Memoranda prepared by the churches, including important 
submissions from the DRe churches which were to remain confidential, were intended to form 
the basis of discussion but not limit it. A drafting committee was appointed by the conference and 
it began to draw up a statement based on points which the majority of delegates supported. The 
draft statement was discussed and amendments were proposed. Finally, the amended document 
was voted on, paragraph by paragraph, with an 80 percent majority being required for acceptance 
of any point. As the statement took shape the conservative Hervormde Kerk delegation withdrew 
and in a separate statement reaffirmed its commitment to the policy of "separate development". 
Among the more important proclamations of the statement were that all population groups had 
93As quoted in A H Luckhoff, eottesloe, p 8. 
94Regehr, Perceptions of apartheid, p 189. 
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equal rights to share in the privileges and responsibilities of their country, that no Christian should 
be excluded from any church on the basis of race, that there were no scriptural grounds for 
prohibiting mixed marriages but that "due consideration should be given to certain factors which 
may make such marriages inadvisable", that the migrant labour policy was unacceptable, that 
wages paid to "non-whites" were unacceptably low, that the policy of job reservation for whites 
should be replaced with a more equitable system, that South Africans of all races had the right to 
own land wherever they were "domiciled", that a policy which permanently denied such people 
the right to partake in government was not justifiable, and that there was no objection ta.direct 
representation of Coloured people in parliament.95 
For the English-speaking churches, the statement was moderate, and it has been suggested that 
they compromised to the extent that they had joined the "architects of apartheid in asserting unity 
and equality in terms compatible with separate development". 96 Far more significant, however, 
was that the DRC delegates, for the first time, had come to express marked differences from 
government policy. The DRC delegates were aware of the risks they were taking in departing 
from official policy, and much discussion took place among them on how they should proceed. 
It was decided that they should issue an additional, separate statement, motivating their reasons 
for signing the Cottesloe declaration. This separate statement, written in Beyers Naude's 
handwriting, made it clear that in supporting the Cottesloe statement, the DRC was not giving up 
support for the government's policy of apartheid. "We wish to confirm that ... a policy of 
differentiation can be defended from the Christian point of view, that it provides the only realistic 
95AD 1752 (3cd2bl), Van Wyk, Statement of the World Council of Churches 
Consultation, CoHesloe, Johannesburg, 7 - 14 December 1960. 
96 Regehr, Perceptions of apartheid, p 193. 
49 
solution to the problems of race relations and is therefore in the best interests of the various 
population groups. We do not consider the resolutions adopted by the consultation as in principle 
incompatible with the above statement."97 Naude supported the DRC's qualifying statement, 
including approval for a policy of "differentiation" or apartheid, in spite of his own misgivings. 
Commenting about this later, he said he did so because he still believed he had an important future 
in the church and hoped to lead the membership away from its conservative direction.98 
Opposition to the Cottesloe conference began to emerge even while the deliberations wi:;re still 
in progress, after an unfavourable report appeared in Transxaha:/9 Afrikaans newspapers, with 
the exception of the Burger, took an extremely negative view of proceedings, while the 
enthusiastic support for Cottesloe among the English newspapers only served to confirm 
Afrikaners' fears that the DRC delegates had been infected by the "liberalism" of the World 
Council of Churches and the English-speaking churches. A statement issued by the DRC's 
Transvaal moderature defending their delegation's position and reiterating support for the policy 
of "differentiation" failed to calm DRC adherents. They had reason to doubt the moderature since 
three out of its four members had been present at Cottesloe.100 
Crushing blows to Cottesloe came from the Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, and then the 
Broederbond. In his New Year's message broadcast in 1961 Verwoerd said Cottesloe had been 
an attempt by outsiders to interfere in South Africa's internal affairs. The Cottesloe statement had 
97AD 1752 (3ca2b4), Van Wyk, Statement by the DRCs of the Cape and Transvaal. 
98C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
99Transvaler, 9 December 1960. 
100Luckhoff, Cottesloe, p 126. 
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not yet received the support of the DRC, but only of a few individuals in the church who had 
attended the consultation. The DRC synods would have the final say on the matter. 101 The 
Broederbond sent out a special circular after a meeting of members in Pretoria saying it "wished 
to prevent any serious detrimental effects on our nation as a result of this conference". 102 
The leadership of the DRC in the Free State and Natal churches, neither of which was a member 
of the World Council, had also opposed the Cottesloe declaration, and in March the Federal 
Council of the DRC followed suit. The "Cottesloe men" thought it likely that the Cape and 
Transvaal synods would vote to leave the WCC. Cape delegate A J van Wijk voiced his concerns 
to Bilheimer in a letter, warning of this likelihood. He was also concerned that Naude would lose 
his leadership position at the next synod. 103 
The Hervormde Kerk had voted at a synod in March 1961 to leave the WCC. A month before the 
Transvaal synod met, the General Synodical Commission of the Transvaal DRC appointed an "ad 
hoc committee" to study the merits of the Cottesloe statement and to determine whether the 
church should stay part of the World Council. The committee was dominated by men opposed 
to Cottesloe. When the DRC's Transvaal synod met on 5 April 1961 the tone of the synod was 
set immediately by elections to the moderature. Moderator and Cottesloe delegate AM Meiring 
clung to his position by a narrow margin of only nine votes, while Naude and his brother-in-law 
Frans O' Brien Geldenhuys both lost their places. The synod first considered the recommendations 
and findings of the ad-hoc committee; a report compiled by the Cottesloe delegates and submitted 
101lbid, p 116. 
102Wilkins and Strydom, The super-Afrikaners, p 296. 
103Luckhoff, Cottesloe, p 123. 
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to the committee was merely available for information. The committee found that in some respects 
the Cottesloe findings intruded into areas on which only the synod was empowered to speak. 
Among its many objections, the ad hoc committee remarked that at the start of Cottesloe the 
intention had not been to issue and vote on a statement: as a result of the change in procedures, 
black church delegates had represented and voted on behalf of the white DRC. The committee 
also found that while the Cottesloe delegates might have believed the policy of "differentiation" 
was not incompatible with its findings, some of the Cottesloe statement did indeed conflict with 
the policy of apartheid. 104 
Using the ad hoc committee report as a basis, the synod discussed the Cottesloe deliberations for 
two-and-a-half days, with speaker after speaker condemning the findings. When discussion ended 
on 10 April 1961 the Cottesloe delegates were asked to sit in the front of the hall and were given 
an opportunity to speak. While most still supported the spirit of the findings, some, in their 
utterances, began to retreat. Naude said of this time: 
"For me it was a turning point in my life, because the night before the final decision was 
made at the synod, I had to decide - would I because of pressure, political pressure and 
other pressures which were being exercised, give in and accept, or would I stand by my 
convictions which over a period of years had become rooted in me as firm and holy 
Christian convictions? I decided on the latter course .. .1 could not see my way clear to 
giving way on a single one of those resolutions, because I was convinced that they were 
in accordance with the truth of the Gospel."105 
Six Cottesloe delegates addressed the synod. Most defended the findings in apologetic tones. In 
104Handelinge van die Transvaalse Sinode van die NG Kerk, April 1961 and Ibid, pp 131 
- 138. 
105 As quoted in International Commission of Jurists (eds), The trial of Beyers Naude: 
Christian Witness and the rule of law, p 65. 
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his address to the synod, Naudc said he was prepared to admit the possibility that the Cotlesloe 
delegates had made errors with regard to procedure, but added that he would accept changes to 
Cottesloe only if these were based on the Scriptures. In an attempt to appease the conservatives 
he argued that the delegates had never agreed to voting and land-ownership rights for all 
"non-whites'', but submitted that if complete segregation was impractical they were entitled to 
something. "I will admit if I am wrong, but what is the alternative?" he asked. Finally the synod 
voted to reject all the Cottesloe findings, claiming that these should first have been debated by the 
church. The synod aL-;o reaffirmed its support for what it called the policy of "differentiation". It 
resolved further, without allowing any debate, to withdraw the Transvaal DRC from the WCC. 106 
Six months later the Cape synod considered the Cottesloe findings and was, on the whole, less 
hostile to them. Some of the findings were accepted, some were rejected, and a study commission 
was appointed to investigate the issue further. But the synod followed the Transvaal DRC by 
voting to leave the wcc. 107 
The failure of the WCC to keep the DRC churches faithful to Cottesloe occurred because the 
weight of Afrikaner opinion, led by Verwoerd and the Broederbond, was overwhelmingly against 
the resolutions that had been adopted. At the same time as the Cottesloe controversy had been 
raging, Verwoerd had sought in a referendum a mandate from white voters to take the country 
out of the Commonwealth and create a Republic. The Republic of South Africa came into being 
on 31 May 1961. The Afrikaner nationalist movement had realised its major mission, complete 
freedom from British imperialism and Commonwealth influence, and this led to the elaboration 
106Handelinge van die Transvaalse Sinode van die NGK, 1961 and Luckhoff, Cottesloe, 
p 139. 
107Ibid, pp 145 - 149. 
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of apartheid ideology and policy during the next decade. 108 It was hardly surprising, given this 
political climate, that there was tremendous hostility to those who were still faithful to Collesloe. 
Naudc went back to his church in Aasvoelkop uncertain of the future, although he realised he was 
headed for conflict with the conservative majority in the DRC. At that stage Naude had still not 
considered leaving the church. He was deeply involved in his pastoral work; the church-building 
programme was progressing well and the new parsonage in Northcliff had just been complcted. 109 
Before Cottesloe, the inter-church Bible study sessions had been progressing steadily. Groups 
were meeting at several places on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria. After the synod, when a 
notice was sent out to all participating churchmen to attend the next study session, the response 
was devastating. Two-thirds of the DRC ministers, referring to the decision taken at synod, 
answered they were no longer prepared to consider an alternative race policy based on a study 
of the Bible.110 
In September 1961 Bob Bilheimer returned to South Africa for a three-week visit, much to the 
alarm of leading members of both the Hervormde Kerk and the DRC. He liad been invited by A 
J van Wijk, minister of the DRC "moederker!C' in Stellenbosch, to address theological students 
at the Seminary, but because of the negative reaction from the DRC establishment and a critical 
editorial in Kerkbode, the meeting had to be cancelled. 111 In his report on the visit, Bilheimer 
remarked on the fear in church circles about being associated with the "Cottesloe men". Referring 
108S Bekker, Ethnicity in focus: the South African case, pp 38 - 39. 
109C F B Naude-Bilheimer interview. 
110Jbid. 
111Kerkbode, 6 September 1961. 
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to the "Cottesloe men", Bilheimer said that about 12 out of 20 of the original delegates were 
"fighting hard". "I have no hesitation in saying that thic; little group of DRC men is engaged in one 
of the most decisive struggles of the Spirit and the Church that we are privileged to witness. Their 
verdict is: We shall lose a battle or two, but we shall not lose the war."112 
Bilhcimcr also made contact with Naudc and Fred van Wyk, and the media came out in force 
when Naude arranged for Bilhcimer to address the Rand Ecumenical Study Circle in 
Johannesburg, the surviving Bible study group in Johannesburg. Afterwards Bilheimcr met 
privately with some of the Cottesloe men, including some from the English-language churches. 
Among those present were Naude and Frans O'Brien Geldcnhuys. Bilheimcr told the ministers 
that he was convinced it was necessary for people in the churches to make contact with one 
another because they were trapped in isolation. "It is also of crucial importance for people across 
the colour lirie to get to know and trust each other, as happened at Cottesloe, because without 
that trust there is no hope."113 
The ideas outlined by Bilheimer corresponded with the thinking of Naude and some of his 
colleagues. By 1962 the small group who still supported the Bible study sessions felt the time was 
ripe to launch an independent Afrikaans theological journal to stimulate theological debate about 
racial and political issues in South Africa, and to promote the ideal of Christian unity. They 
decided to name the new monthly journal Pro Veritate, "For the Truth", a name similar to the 
rebel student newspaper on which Naude had worked, Pro Libertate. Naude was its first editor. 
112As quoted in Luckhoff, Cottesloe, p 152. 
113As quoted by Rand Daily Mail, 25 August 1961 
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Fred van Wyk played a significant role in securing finance for the project for the first year. 114 The 
initial issue appeared on 15 May 1962 and was sent to DRC ministers countrywide free of charge, 
with appeals to them to subscribe to the new journal. The front-page report attacked biblical 
justification of apartheid by citing biblical texts which emphasised the unity of the Christian 
church. In his first editorial Naude highlighted the need for co-operation between Christians and 
churches in South Africa and for a more serious and intensive study of the Bible to find answers 
to troubling questions. Recalling the spirit of Cottesloe and referring implicitly to the Afrikaner 
churches, he wrote: 
"Churches can no longer operate in isolation ... and hope to challenge worldwide 
movements like communism, Islam and secularism. Churches which do not want to work 
with others in areas where a united witness is essential are weakening their own witness 
and are inadvertently strengthening the forces of evil."115 
Beyers Naude's growing interest in ecumenicism is evident in this first editorial and his emphasis 
on Christian unity was one of the factors that prompted him to launch the Christian Institute the 
following year. 
There was negative reaction in the DRC community to the new journal. Members of the 
Aasvoelkop church council asked Naude to withdraw from the journal. In neighbouring Linden, 
the Reverend D Beukes introduced a motion to that effect in the local church circuit. Naude was 
also approached by individual members of the Broederbond who expressed serious reservations 
about Pro Veritate's attack on apartheid. Naude would not hear of withdrawing, however, and 
Pro Veritate, despite its precarious financial position, continued to appear once a month. Critical 
items began appearing in Kerkbode and the secular Afrikaans press. 
114C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
115Pro Veritate, 15 May 1962. 
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In a report to Bob Bilheimer alx)ut developments in the church, Fred van Wyk wrote that Naudc 
was being warned by friends in the DRC not to risk forfeiting his status as DRC minister by 
undertaking any other ecumenical work. 116 
Confosion and unhappiness over Naude's role in the ecumenical movement grew steadily in the 
Aasvoclkop parish, in spite of his pastoral work which was appreciated; he had been the driving 
force in rai-;ing funds for the new church and hall, the foundation stone of which had been laid in 
February 1962. In an attempt to clear the confusion Naude decided to depart fmm his 
non-political approach in the pulpit and to state his views plainly. Preaching in the Emmarentia 
school hall on Sunday morning, 27 May 1962, Naude told his congregation: 
"Nobody can be excluded from the Church of Christ on grounds of race or colour. I am 
not saying for a moment that the church only exists when people of all races worship 
together ... history has shown time and time again that God wills rich diversity ... But to 
try to forbid mixed worship is against the Word of God."117 
The address served to antagonise and anger the conservative element in his church further. At the 
June council meeting a formal complaint was lodged against the sermon by some members of the 
church. One of the leading voices against Naude at that meeting was Jannie Kruger, former editor 
of Transvaler. Naude was not without support, however, and some of his friends spoke up on his 
behalf. After a long debate, a motion censuring Naude for the sermon was put to the vote, but it 
was defeated by a two-thirds majority. 118 
116As quoted in J W de Gruchy, "A short history of the Christian Institute", in Villa-
Vicencio and De Gruchy (eds) Resistance and hope, p 15. 
117C F B Naude sermon, Aasvoclkop, Sunday 27 May 1962. My translation. 
118 AD1752, (4cB2), Van Wyk, Letter from CF B Naude to W Landman and A van Wijk, 
6 August 1962, and G Kotze interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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/\s the events in Naude's church were being repeated in DRC circles else~here, the small group 
of dissenting Afrikaner theologians began to give serious thought to the establishment of an 
independent, ecumenical organisation. The aim was to present Afrikaners with alternatives to 
apartheid theology and to unite Christian witness, especially on race issues, in South Africa. 
Prominent figures in those early days included Beyers Naudc, Hervormde Kerk theologian Albert 
Geyser, Fred van Wyk and Dr Jan Schutte, a leading minister from the Gereformeerde Kerk. 
In the search for support for the proposed ecumenical body Naudc wrote a carefully worded letter 
in August 1962 to two former "Cottesloe men" in the Cape, Willem Landman and A J van Wijk. 
It gives a good indication of the role of Bilheimer in encouraging the dissenters and outlines 
Naude and Van Wyk's thinking about the goals of such an organisation. It further shows that 
Naude was serious about taking up the leadership of the new body, even at the risk of losing his 
status as a dominee. He wrote: 
"You will remember that the possibility of full-time ecumenical work was raised for the 
first time in August 1961 when Bob Bilheimer visited South Africa .... You will also 
remember that the reason for creating such a mobile Christian institute (preferably with 
the head office in Johannesburg) was among others, to organise and initiate courses, 
conferences, Bible study weeks and discussions ... for different church groups and 
Christians on issues which affect the church in Southern Africa. A further goal woµld be 
the creation and building of ecumenical study groups in various centres, the distribution 
of factual information on the ecumenical movement, and to help Fred van Wyk with his 
ecumenical activities .... 
"As for my own position, I want to make it clear that I am not looking for any other work 
than what I am presently doing. It is going well in the congregation .... The point is simply 
that I can't go on for much longer with all my congregational work and carry out all the 
other activities as I am doing at present - in any case not for longer than the end of this 
year. If we are convinced that the work of Christ can be done from within but also from 
outside the DRC, then I am prepared to make myself available for such work. Preferably, 
I would like to retain my status [as minister], but if that is not possible, then I would be 
prepared to lose that status after all possible channels to retain it are exhausted."119 
119 AD 1752 ( 4cb2), Van Wyk, Naude letter to Landman and van Wijk. 
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In the closing months of 1962 several meetings were held among ministers and laypersons in 
Johannesburg to discuss the Institute's formation. On 1 November 1962 about 200 people met 
at the Central Methodist Church in Johannesburg at which Naudc hoped the Institute would be 
launched. But the meeting, chaired by the Reverend J B Webb of the Methodist Church, did not 
go according to plan. The views of mainly Af"rikaner laymen and clergy, who were afraid of an 
open clash with the DRC and who claimed that the time was not right for the launch of the Cl, 
prevailed. They warned that the Afrikaans churches, through their synods, could make it 
impossible for their members to participate. One of the strongest arguments against formation of 
the institute was that the southern and northern Transvaal synods of the DRC were due to meet 
in April 1963, and it was suggested that the Cl's establishment be delayed until after this date to 
escape condemnation at the synods. A provisional committee including Fred van Wyk and Naude 
was appointed by the meeting to consider the objections, and it decided to go ahead with the 
establishment of the CI. Even before the CI was formally constituted, the provisional committee 
had opened an office in Dunwell House, Braamfontein, in December 1962. 120 The fact that the CI 
had established offices before its official launch demonstrated Naude's commitment to his 
ecumenical vision. He had travelled a long way to this new position, which was to represent a 
fundamental, Biblically-based challenge to apartheid. In the next 14 years, as director of the 
Christian Institute, he would still travel much further. 
120AD 1752 (4Bb(2)), Van Wyk, Minutes of the Meeting held on 1November1962 to 
discuss the proposed Christian Institute. 
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2 The launch of the Christian Institute, 1963 
In 1963 Beyers Naudc upset both the DRC and the Broederbond when he launched the Christian 
Institute. He took this significant step because he could no longer reconcile himself with the 
DRC's defence and support of apartheid. But, as I have shown in Chapter 1, Naudc's views on 
the apartheid issue had long differed with those of the DRC. A factor that swayed Naude into a 
definite course of action to challenge the DRC was when he became a victim of the system of 
pressure which existed in DRC-Broederbond circles to force members to stay in line .. As the 
leader of the DRC group which defended the Cottesloe declaration, he had become a direct target 
for censure in church, Afrikaans media, political and Broederbond circles. As I have already 
argued, he began to realise there was no middle course: he believed an independently-run study 
group had to be launched to challenge the DRC from the outside. 
Naude, in his conflict with the Broederbond, was also influenced by his friend Dr Albert Geyser. 
Geyser was extremely bitter towards, and critical of, the Broederbond, believing the organisation 
to have been behind trumped-up heresy charges his Nederduitse Hervormde Kerk had brought 
against him because of his attack on the Hervormde Kerk's biblical justification for apartheid. 
Geyser was active among a group of Afrikaners, in the Hervormde Kerk and DRC, who from 
1962 had begun questioning the Broederbond 's control over the Afrikaans churches. The 
Broedcrbond was concerned about this questioning trend that had been evident in the DRC since 
Cottcsloe. In August 1962 the executive council of the Broederbond issued a special three-page 
memorandum on the tendency within the church to question apartheid, warning that: 
"Even within our own circles it is sometimes argued with a great measure of fanaticism 
that our policy of apartheid is not Biblical. The executive council solemnly calls on our 
Church leaders to combat this hbcralistic attack on our Christian spiritual convictions and 
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on the Christian-National philosophy on which our national struggle on the cultural, social, 
economic and educational front is founded, and to expose it firmly and clearly."1 
Another document issued by the Broederbond in October 1962 voiced similar sentiments. In an 
apparent reference to Beyers Naude and the· study circle he had helped found, the Rand 
Ecumenical Study Circle, the circular from the executive council declared that the "Afrikaans 
churches cannot allow the formation of groups outside or within the church to continue". And 
in an attack directed against Pro Veritate, it called on ministers to stop criticising their church in 
public: 
"Everyone is surely aware of the fact that in each of the churches there exist groups who 
are not only acting disloyally to the Church but are also busy with the formation of groups 
alongside or against the church. This should not be permitted, and these elements 
should be forced to work through the 'official channcls'."2 
These documents, which show how deeply the Broederbond was involved in church matters, had 
been in Naude's possession; he handed them to Geyser, who later leaked them to the Sunday 
Times. In order to understand Geyser's motives for making the documents public, it is necessary 
to elaborate on the struggle Geyser had waged against the Broederbond. Geyser, a member of the 
Hervormde Kerk, had begun his academic career as a loyal Nationalist, and was a professor of 
theology at the University of Pretoria. He became involved in the apartheid debate in the 
mid-1950s after the Hervormde Kerk was challenged by the World Council of Churches to 
provide biblical justification for its race policy. Geyser, a New Testament expert and linguist, 
was appointed to the Hervormde Kerk's two-man commission to find such justification. The 
commissioners began their study confident that they would find support for their church's Article 
1Translation as quoted in Sunday Times, 21 April 1963. 
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Three which confined membership to whites only. But contrary to their expectations, both 
theologians came to the conclusion that the Scriptures did not provide justification for apartheid. 3 
In October 1961 Geyser was charged with heresy on an unlikely technical offence - he had been 
accused of teaching an heretical tenet of Arianism, an ancient heresy in church history involving 
the claim that the Son is subservient to the Father4• At the hearing Geyser blamed the 
Broederbond for orchestrating the campaign against him. On 8 May 1962, the church commission, 
which was dominated by Broederbond members, found by a 13-2 majority that he was gMilty of 
heresy. Geyser was defrocked as a minister of his church. He challenged his dismissal in a civil 
action brought in the Transvaal Supreme Court. In May 1963 the church offered an out-of-court 
settlement, agreeing to pay all costs, amounting to RlOO 000; in exchange, Geyser dropped his 
case. He finally left the Hervormde Kerk in May 1964 when the church's general synod refused 
him a second hearing. 5 
Geyser was convinced that the Broederbond had engineered the charges against him, a view he 
shared with Naude. Naude also discussed his concerns about the Broederbond with Geyser's loyal 
supporter in the Hervormde Kerk, Professor A van Sclms, who served on the editorial board of 
Pro Veritate. Van Selms upset the Afrikaner establishment in June 1963 with a 15-page booklet 
attacking the Broederbond and describing Christians who were members as hypocrites.6 
31 Wilkins and H Strydom, The Super-Afrikaners. inside the Afrikaner Broe_derbond, pp 
293 - 294. 
4lbid, p 298. 
~Ibid, pp 301-305. 
6J HP Serfontein, Brotherhood of power, p 244 and CF B Naudc interview with C Clur, 
1988. 
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Naudc gave Geyser a number of Broederbond documents, and later said that it was Geyser who 
asked to see them: 
"Geyser said to me, 'I cannot judge your concern about the Broederbond, except if I am 
able to read what the Broederbond has been saying all these years.' ... He also wanted the 
documents because of the fight with his own church, to fight the injustice which they did 
lo him .... Hi-; was a desperate stand, on his own, against hi-; whole church leadership. They 
were more militant and much worse than the NG Kerk. I can understand why he felt he 
was standing with his back against the wall, that he needed every possible form of 
evidence."7 
Geyser later said he realised the documents were invaluable; never before had the Broederbond 's 
secrecy been breached. He said he took the documents to his offices at the university and 
painstakingly photographed every page with his Leica camera and then returned them to Naude. 
A little later Geyser contacted Charles Bloomberg, who was political reporter on the Sunday 
Times, and gave him the negatives of the Broederbond documents.8 
At the same time that Naude was involved in this intrigue with Geyser, he was also preparing to 
take part in the DRC's Southern Transvaal Synod, which began on 26 March 1963. Just a few 
days before the synod, Naude finally resigned from the Broederbond. 
At the synod, quite unexpectedly, Naude was nominated and elected moderator. His friend, Willie 
Jonker, another Cottesloe supporter, was elected as actuary. But their elections did not indicate 
a sudden sway of support among members for their viewpoint. The mood of the synod was in fact 
hardline. Naude was asked to give up his editorship of Pro Veritate. On April 9, a report was 
tabled which dealt in hostile terms with Pro Veritate; Naude was forced to recuse himself from 
8Rand Daily Mail, 21November1963. 
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the chair while the debate was heard. Proposed by the minister from the Farrarmerc congregation, 
the motion accepted the principle of free-thinking theological magazines but called on ministers 
of the DRC not to go on with the "dangerous" business of Pro V eritate because it could split the 
church. Numerous speakers voiced their opposition to criticism from outside the church, and the 
synod passed a motion which stated: "Owing to the tension and divisions which this newspaper 
has caused, and because of the dangers it poses to the unity of the church, the synod calls on 
members and office bearers not to participate in the Pro Veritate efforts and asks them to support 
our own church newspaper." In another reference to Pro Veritate, a motion was accepted-urging 
members to abide by decisions of the synod and not to criticise these publicly.9 
He believed that the motion on Pro Veritate was the Afrikaner establishment's way of telling him 
that he would be given another chance, and that he still had a big future in the church, provided 
he abandoned his challenge to apartheid. It was a moment of truth for him. He commented later: 
"It was tempting, but for me the decision was clearly taken. I remembered how many 
people had withdrawn from the issue after Cottesloe and I knew there was not the least 
possibility that there would be enough ministers willing to take a stand in public. I knew 
that - I had no doubt in my mind. I was open to conviction if there was any real, valid 
indication that this would not be the case. I remained open to it, but I think, rationally and 
emotionally, knowing the Afrikaner people, and especially realising what had happened 
since Cottesloe, I realised it simply would not happen."10 
On the last day of the synod Naude was called on to state whether he would resign from Pro 
Veritate. He asked the synod for time to consider the request and promised to supply the answer 
within a few weeks. From his later actions it appears that he never had any intention of changing 
9 Acta van die Vierde Vergardering van die Suid-Transvaalse Sinode van die NG Kerk, 
Pretoria, March 1963. My translation. 
10C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
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his mind. He continued to edit the journal and make plans for the formation of the Cl. In an 
editorial in Pro Veritate, on 15 May 1963, he said he would not resign as editor. To resign, he 
said, would create the impression that "here is a minister who is willing to sacrifice or give up his 
deep convictions for the sake of an important position of trust which his synod has conferred on 
him". 11 
It might seem strange that Naude was elected to high office in the DRC at a time when the 
Broederbond, from which he had shortly resigned, wielded such power; but N aude and his friends 
such as DRC ministers Willie Jonker and Ben Marais were convinced that the Broederbond was 
indicating that it had not yet given up on N aude. It was hoping to entice him back into the fold. 12 
Another event at the synod involving the Broederbond also occurred on April 9. There were two 
motions on the agenda calling for an investigation into membership of the Broederbond; when 
the issue came up for debate at the synod the motions were strongly opposed by the Reverend D 
Beukes, the minister in Linden. Beukes, who later went on to become moderator of the General 
Synod of the DRC, was a member of the Broederbond 's executive committee. He declared that 
such an investigation would only divide Afrikaners. Beukes then issued an official Broederbond 
statement at the synod which def ended the organisation and claimed it was working in the 
interests of the Afrikaner and his church. When the issue was put to the vote, the Broederbond 's 
strong influence became clearly evident - the motion to launch an investigation was defeated and 
11 Pro Veritate, 15 May 1963. 
12C F B Naude-Clur interview, W Jonker and B Marais interviews with CClur, 1988 and 
1989. 
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the synod reaffirmed a previous finding that the organLo;ation was "wholesome and healthy, merely 
seeking the progress and best interests of the Afrikaner nation."13 The involvement of the 
Broederbond at the synod points to the extent of the inlluence the organisation had on members. 
It would therefore have been unlikely that Naude would have been elected moderator without the 
support of Broederbonders. It substantiates Naude's argument that the leadership position given 
lo him in the church was a "carrot" lo induce him to end his disagreement with the DRC on its 
stand on apartheid. 
NaudC's election as moderator had surprised most of his close friends, including Fred van Wyk, 
who had been spending a great deal of time preparing for the launch of the Christian Institute. A 
few days after the election he wrote to Naude to inform him of the latest developments with 
regard to the CI: "The fact that both you and Dr Jonker are ... on the moderature is not only a 
miracle, but one that demands that we rethink our position .... I am hoping to write a short letter 
to Bob Bilheimer to tell him that he must accept that we will do the best we can given the changed 
circumstances."14 But while Van Wyk may have been having second thoughts, Naude was 
determined to push ahead with Pro Veritate and the establishment of the Christian Institute. He 
seemed to think it inevitable that he might lose his position as a minister in the church. In a letter 
to Fred van Wyk written in April 1963, Naude discussed the various tactics that were being 
employed by the small group of ministers opposed to the decision of the Southern Transvaal 
synod. The aim was to voice their opposition lo the clamp on external criticism of the DRC in as 
13Acta van die Vierde Vergadering van die Suid Transvaalse Sinode van die NG Kerk, 
1968. 
14AD 1752 (4cb2), letter from Fred van Wyk to C F B Naude, 29 March 1963, 
Department of HLo;torical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Library, Fred van Wyk Papers. 
My translation. 
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many newspapers as possible, and also to promote Pro Veritate. He wrote: "Don't be afraid that 
I might resign - we must go forward!" 15 Naude's letter to Van Wyk indicates that he had made 
up his mind to continue with his course of action and that his election as moderator would not 
sway him. 
A few days after he wrote this letter to Van Wyk the first major expose featuring the Naude 
documents appeared in the Sunday Times, on 21April1963. The report said there was a plan to 
oust "new dealers" in the DRC such as Beyers Naude. The newspaper also published copies of 
the Broederbond notices issued in 1962 which called on Afrikaner churchmen to stop criticising 
apartheid. In the months that followed other reports appeared. One revealed how the 
Broederbond, through its 1-lelpmekaar service, ensured jobs for its members in business and the 
public service. 16 
The reports upset the Broederbond and the government. The week after the first report, the 
prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd attacked the Sunday Times in Parliament, describing it as the 
newspaper which printed the most "untruths". Verwoerd's attack was widely reported on the 
state-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation, whose chairman Dr Pict Meyer was 
also chairman of the Broederbond. The extent to which there was co-operation between the 
government and the Broederbond was evident when the chief of the security branch, General 
Hendrik van den Bergh, himself a Broederbonder, was appointed to investigate the case. In 
October 1963 security police raided the Sunday Times offices in Johannesburg and confiscated 
15AD 1752 ( 4cb2), Van Wyk, Letter from C F B Naude to F van Wyk, 19 April 1963. My 
translation. 
16Sunday Times, 21 April, 5, 12, 26 May, 2 June and 22 September 1963. 
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the documents af1er a two-hour search. Once in possession of the photocopies, the Broederbond 
began to recall numbered documents issued to members, and by a process of elimination identified. 
the leak. 
On Monday 11 November 1963, a security police delegation, led by Colonel van den Bergh, 
called on Beyers Naude. Colonel van den Bergh told Naudc that he had been identified as the 
source of the leak and demanded a full explanation. Naude told him that he had lent the 
documents to Geyser and denied giving the documents to the Sunday Times. The security police 
called on Geyser, who verified Beyers Naude's story. Naude realised it was only a matter of time 
before the whole matter became public. He commented later: 
"It was a terrible, absolutely terrible time. That was the period where I went through hell. 
I deeply regretted it. I understood why Albert Geyser, with his terrible experience at the 
hands of the Broederbond, did what he did. I conveyed to him my deep regret and said 
that it had damaged the whole witness we were going to give."17 
More than a week after the visit by the security police, Naude issued a lengthy statement and 
copies of letters to the media in Johannesburg. The issue dominated the front pages of both the 
Afrikaans and English newspapers for days afterwards. In his statement released on the night of 
Tuesday 20 November 1963 and published the next day, Naude provided copies of two letters_ he 
had sent to the Broederdbond. The first was a copy of his letter of resignation to the 
Broederbond, dated 14 March 1963, giving the reasons for his decision. Some detail of the letter 
is given since it sheds light on NaudC's state of mind with regard to church-Broederbond-race 
relations. Naude refers to a Broederbond circular on 1 August 1962 which calls ministers to task 
for challenging 'traditional views' on race relations in church and State, and for fostering 'liberal-
17C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
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mindedness'. NaudC's letter also reveals his political views at the time - a fundamental 
disagreement with all the apartheid laws: 
"My objection ... is that the basic doctrines of the Broederbond, on grounds of which 
sweeping conclusions are drawn, are based on an interpretation of the Scriptures to which 
I decidedly do not subscribe and which I was not ashamed to say either in my preaching 
or at meetings of my church. By imposing itself on the field of religion and making 
categorical theological judgments, the Broederbond is unlawfully influencing the Church 
in a dangerous manner that is preventing the Church from drawing independent and sober 
conclusions from the Scriptures. 
" ... The manner of leading Broeders towards me, and other clergymen in the organisation, 
left the indelible impression that my conclusions are correct. It is no secret, and you are 
all aware of the fact, that I have very serious misgivings about some of the legislation, 
views and practices of the State and the Church which concern our relations with other 
population groups. From the political stand I wish to mention the Immorality Act, the 
Race Classification Act, the Group Areas Act and the new Bantu Laws Amendment bill, 
all of which contain stipulations that violate the demands of the Bible for neighbourly love, 
justice and mercy. 
"I also wish to mention the impossibility of implementing total apartheid without seriously 
endangering the existence of the Afrikaner people and the injustice perpetrated on millions 
of non-whites. As far as the Church is concerned I want to mention the refusal to allow 
non-whites to attend services in our Church, the fear of making closer religious contact 
with these people and the irreparable harm it inflicts on our efforts to Christianise the 
heathen. 
" ... When I joined the movement I satisfied my conscience with the justification that 
secrecy was necessary because of the plight of the Afrikaner people at the time ... The 
Broederbond creates a rift between minister and minister, church member and church 
member, and Afrikaner and Afrikaner, on matters where there should not be a rift between 
us." 
The second letter, to the chairman of the Executive Council of the Broederbond, was dated 12 
November 1963. In it he admits supplying Broederbond documents to a "fellow theologian" 
because he wanted his advice about conflicting loyalties. He cited as his reasons for breaking his 
secrecy oath his concern about the Broederbond's involvement in church matters: 
" ... And my concern increased after further circulars and study documents were issued by 
the Executive Council from August 1962 onwards ... it was becoming clear that the 
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Broederbond question would be discussed at the Southern Transvaal Synod ... I realised 
... that if I delayed my decision any longer it would impair any clearness of conscience and 
the Christian convictions before the Synod. As I only had a short time at my disposal I 
decided to call on the advice of the fellow clergyman I mentioned before."18 
The Broederbond reacted the following day by issuing its own statement in which it accused 
Naude of dishonesty about the leaks and of breaking his promises. The Broedcrbond quoted from 
another letter that Naude had written to the organisation in June 1963 in which he had promised 
not to break his undertakings to the organisation. The Broederbond also accused Naude of 
removing documents from the home of the area secretary who was out of town at the time. The 
Broederbond statement declared: 
"In his letter of resignation to the secretary of his area, Mr Naude says that he felt 
convinced that further discussion with him would make no difference to his decision and 
would therefore be useless. After Mr Naude's resignation had been accepted and he had 
been congratulated on behalf of the Bond with his election as Moderator of the Southern 
Transvaal Synod ... he assured the executive council in a letter dated June 3 1963, that he 
would not break his undertaking to the Bond, while at the same time he had already 
broken his undertakings ... as he now admits in his letter of November 13 1963. 
"The Bond does not apologise for the fact that it has, since its founding, wholeheartedly 
supported and actively propagated the apartheid policy of our country and is still doing 
so. If this has now become a bone of contention to Mr Naude, the executive council is 
sorry that he waited 22 years to fight in the way he is doing now .... " 19 
The statements were followed by an admission from Geyser that he had leaked the documents to 
the Sunday Times without Naude's knowledge. Many Broederbond members did not believe him, 
as is evident from the tone of the official Broederbond statement. Long-standing critics of the 
DRC's political and theological policies, such as Dr Ben Marais, believed the CI was damaged 
18Translation of CF B Naude statement and letters, as quoted in Rand Daily Mail, 20 
November 1963. 
19Broederbond statement issued 20 November 1963, as quoted in Rand Daily Mail, 21 
November 1963. 
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from the start because of the Broederbond row.20 There are several possible explanations about 
what exactly had occurred between Naude and Albert Geyser. The Broederbond was convinced 
Naude was lying and that he had intended the documents to be published. The other explanation, 
offered by Naude, was that he had genuinely intended the documents to be read only by Geyser. 
He was to regret very deeply the way in which the organisation had been exposed. He said later: 
"I made a mi'itake and I have publicly apologi'ied for it. What I should have done, I should 
have gone to the Broederbond and said, 'This is where I disagree with you, here are my 
reasons and I now want to notify you that I am duty-bound to make this known. You may 
shoot me or you may kill me if you want to, but this is what I feel I must do.' I should then 
have released the information to the public as I saw fit. That was the mistake. I ~hould 
have had the courage to do it on my own. I did not have it."21 
While the implication of the above quote suggests Nau de knew that Geyser intended to make the 
documents public, Naude has always claimed that he did not know Geyser intended to hand them 
to the Sunday Times. If this is true, then the incident can be seen as an example of how Naude 
sometimes allowed himself to be manipulated: Geyser needed the documents in his fight against 
the Broederbond and he used his influence with N aude to gain access to the secret information. 
But if Naude handed the documents to Albert Geyser in good faith, he was probably naive to 
believe the information would remain confidential. 
This episode, combined with Naude's decision to join the Christian Institute, had disturbing 
repercussions on his family. Their large circle of friends dwindled. One of Naude's sisters, Hymne, 
severed all contact with the Naudes. Two of their children, Liesel and Herman, still at school, 
were victimised. Ilse Naude, after years of happy and busy service in her church, was suddenly 
20B Marais interview with C Clur, 1988 and B Marais, "Voorwoord" in CF B Naudc, My 
land van hoop, p 9. 
21 C F B Naudc-Clur interview. 
71 
cut off from her social and church circles.22 Naudc, the main object of attack, was aware of the 
pain his family was enduring but would not alter his course of action. He said later: 
"But if I look back today at that period, I would say however painful it was, it was 
necessary. It was a period in which I personally had to rediscover the deepest roots of my 
life, of my convictions, of my commitment to the whole cause of justice and love in South 
Africa."23 
The open breach between Naude and the Broederbond contributed to the difficulties Naude and 
his supporters experienced in the early days of the CI in reaching out to Afrikaners in the DRC. 
Beyers Naude was aware he had complicated his task, but he was determined to push ahead. His 
drive and ability to withstand controversy are reminiscent of the stand that his father took in many 
of his political battles. Apart from the political and theological factors which motivated Naude 
at this time, his strong personality, and the example of his father, could also be cited as reasons 
for his taking the stand that he did. 
At the outset of the CI, then, what were Naude's political views? From the documents written by 
Naude quoted above it was clear he placed himself outside of the NP camp. Yet he did not fall 
into any other defined political grouping that existed at the time. Although friendly with leading 
Liberal Party politicians such as Alan Paton, who had also been present at Cottesloe as a 
representative of the Anglican church, Naude, as an Afrikaner, still harboured a suspicion of 
"liberalism and humanism".24 His knowledge of the underground ANC, PAC and SA Communist 
221 Naude interview with C Clur, 1988. 
23C F B Naude interview with B Bilheimer, for A cry of reason: an Afrikaner speaks out. 
24Paton, in his autobiography; recalls having a supportive and friendly conversation with 
Naude during the Cottesloe conference - A Paton, Journey Continued, p 216. Naude denied his 
involvement in "false hberalism and worldly humanism" in a letter written to the Broederbond on 
his resignation on 14 March 1963, as quoted in Rand Daily Mail, 20 November 1963. 
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Party was virtually non-exi'itent. He showed no interest in the United Party. I would suggest that 
he still regarded himself as a religious leader of stature in his own NP-supporting community. 
While critical of the practical realities of apartheid, he took particular exception to the DRC's 
biblical justification of apartheid and hoped, through the Christian Insitute, to off er an alternative. 
In setting up the CI, he drew his closest support from people from backgrounds similar to his 
own: Afrikaans and Reformed, and he still identified with this world view. An important founder 
member of the CI, Ben Engelbrecht, who later fell out with Naudc, defined the philosophy of the 
CI and Pro Veritate in the early stages as having a genuine "Reformed Christian view with respect · 
to our church and societal problems".25 
Moves to launch the CI had been gaining momentum since May 1963. Several meetings of the 
provisional committee to establish the Christian Institute were arranged by Fred van Wyk and 
N aude, and it was agreed that the two men would be entrusted with writing the first draft 
constitution. At a meeting on 13 June 1963 the formal decision was taken to establish the 
Christian Institute. An inter-denominational sub-committee was appointed to consider the draft 
constitution and a 16-member provisional board of management was elected, made up of leading 
figures in the English-speaking churches, as well as several prominent Afrikaners, including Albert 
Geyer, Fred van Wyk, A J van Wijk and Beyers Naude. There were only two black members of 
the board. In July, invitations were sent out to all interested parties to attend the launch of the 
Christian Institute at the Methodist Church in Johannesburg the following month.26 
25Beeld, 10 April 1980. 
26AD 1752 (4Cc), Van Wyk, Letter on the Christian Institute issued by Mrs JS Lubbc, 
3 July 1963. 
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On 15 August, about 180 people gathered at the Methodist Church under the chairmanship of the 
Methodist minister, Rev J B Webb, to launch the Christian Institute. According to the constitution 
which was adopted, the aim of the Institute was to serve the church of Christ in every possible 
way. It was to be based on the Word of God and on the conviction that it was desirable and 
necessary to foster Christian unity. Membership was open to any Christian and was not intended 
to "detract from the loyalty of any member to his own Church or creed". The functions of the 
Christian Institute were to search for a deeper insight into the will of Christ for his church through 
study circJes and discussion groups and to strengthen the witness of the church by holding courses 
and conferences. Other functions were to distribute publications, serve bodies which 
complemented the CI, and "render any other services which the Institute may be called to perform 
in the name of Christ". The CI was to be controlled by a board of management and a chairman 
would be elected annually. The CI also set up an executive committee and a board of trustees to 
oversee finances. Pro Veritate was to remain a separate entity not formally connected to the Cl.27 
But the newspaper did become the mouthpiece of the Institute, reflecting the changes which 
occurred within it over the years. 
Beyers Naude was offered the job as director of the CI, which caused further unhappiness with 
him in mainstream DRC circles. Afrikaners who supported the Christian Institute, DRC ministers 
like Ben Engelbrecht, Bennie Keet and Ben Marais, supported Beyers Naude as the best candidate 
for director. In their opinion the CI would have no hope of swaying the Afrikaans churches and 
their members away from apartheid unless it was led by a respected Afrikaner minister. There 
were a few significant figures who could not go along with the formation of the Institute. One of 
27AD 1752 (4Cc), Van Wyk, Constitution of the Christian Institute of Southern Africa. 
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them was NaudC's friend, Willie Jonker. He agreed with Naudc's principles but felt that the 
ecumenical study circle, and not a formal organisation like the CI, was the most effective way of 
challenging the DRC. Dr Jan van Rooyen, minister of the Parkhurst DRC, did not believe the CI 
was being launched in the right way. Van Rooyenwas not happy that Dr Webb, a Methodist and 
a "liberal" opponent of the government, was playing such a leading role in the CI. He felt this 
would discourage Afrikaners from joining and he favoured the launch of an ecumenical movement 
for Afrikaans Reformed Christians only.28 
Several DRC church councils, including Aasvoelkop, passed resolutions calling on Naude to 
reconsider his relationship with the CI and Pro Veritate. The Paardekraal Monument church 
council convened a special meeting to discuss the formation of the CI. It resolved to send a letter 
to the synodical commission of the DRC in the Southern Transvaal, requesting that a special 
session of the synod be convened.29 
In September the examining committee of the DRC met in Pretoria to consider NaudC's request 
that in the event of his accepting the directorship of the Cl, he would be permitted to retain his 
status as minister. The committee ruled against him. During this time, a group of DRC ministers 
in the Southern Transvaal synod, distressed by the possibility of open conflict between Beyers and 
the church, called for "brotherly discussion" to avert the crisis and Naude delayed making a final 
decision.30 The moderature, perhaps fearful of the support Naude might receive at such a 
"brotherly discussion", decided against holding the meeting. A few weeks before this, six DRC 
28 W Jonker interview with C Clur, 1989 and J van Rooyen interview with C Clur, 1988. 
29Star, 30 August 1963. 
30Star, 5 September and 6 September 1963. 
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ministers, led by his brother-in-law Frans O'Brien Geldenhuys, came to sec him to plead with him 
not to leave the church. They were men who had supported the Cottcsloe findings but who 
believed change should come from within the church. Naude described that meeting later: 
"Six of them came to see me in the parsonage, including Frans, my brother-in-law. They 
pleaded with me to change my mind and to slay on in the church. Then I asked them: 'If 
I were to decline the CI job, what guarantee do I have that there would be enough 
ministers who would be prepared lo stand with me, not by me but with me, in order to 
challenge the DRC on our biblical understanding of its prophetic task at this point in 
history?' I said that if there was an adequate number, say ten, I would be prepared to 
stand down. They said they would go home and think about it. 
"A week before I had to make my decision, I phoned Frans and asked him: 'Do you 
remember that discussion we had?' He said, 'Yes.' I said: 'Could you give me any 
indication of where you and the others stand? Is there any indication of any commitment?' 
And then he said to me, 'But Bey, you should know the answer. Do you really believe that 
you will find 10 people to stand by you?' I said, 'Frans, if that is what you feel, then, in 
a certain sense, you have made my decision for me.' " 
Naude's recollection of the tone of his discussions with O'Brien Geldenhuys is corroborated by 
the latter in his own autobiography. In the latter's account, he explains that he believed Naude 
would never have been permitted to retain his status as a minister. O'Brien Geldenhuys opted to 
work for change from within the DRC.31 Naude commented later that he decided that in order 
to "to remain obedient to my Christian calling, if I wanted to also help my own people in a wider 
sphere, I had to accept this directorship. "32 
Naude did not ask his wife's opinion about what he should do, claiming later that he was 
motivated by a desire lo protect his family. In this respect he was still the patriarchal figure who 
made the decisions for the family and expected his wife to follow him.33 Naude announced his 
31F E O'Brien Geldenhuys, In die stroomversnellings: vyftig jaar van die NGK, pp 59-61. 
32C F B Naude-Bilheimer interview. 
33lbid and I Naude-Clur interview. 
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decision to take up the CI work to his congregation on 22 September 1963. His sermon was 
based on Acts 5: 17-42 in which Peter and the other apostles tell the Council of Elders in 
Jerusalem that they "must obey God, rather than men". At the service Naude said: 
"The decisions of synods, presbyteries and sessions, and the consequent reactions, have 
clearly indicated to me that although the synod has not in so many words prohibited 
pronouncements which arc not in accordance with church policy and the traditions of the 
past, in spirit and in practice these decisions come to this: that the God-given right and 
freedom of the minister and member to witness to the truth of God's Word in the spirit 
of the prophets and the Reformers is so restricted that the minister of the gospel in 
principle no longer enjoys the freedom to declare his deepest Christian convictions ... 
"Consequently the choice facing me is not primarily a choice between pastoral work and 
other Christian work or between the church and Pro Veritale, or between the church and 
the Christian Institute. No, the choice goes much deeper: it is a choice between obedience 
in faith and subjection to the authority of the church. And by unconditional obedience to 
the latter, I would save face but lose my soul."34 
Naude's sermon was attacked in an editorial in Kerkbode, at the time edited by Andries 
Treurnicht: 
"We are prepared to accept the sermon as a struggle between a brother and his church 
... but as a church we also struggle with our brother in all love, and especially on points 
where we believe that his stand is without foundation." 
The editorial added that the church could not accept that the choice Naude faced was simply one 
between "faith" and "authority".35 
NaudC's state of mind as he set out with the CI can be clearly understood from this 1963 sermon. 
He was convinced there was no way of swaying the DRC away from its support for apartheid 
from within the church. His Christian principles had finally forced him to leave and try to bring 
pressure from the outside. 
34As translated in C F B Naude, "My Decision", 23 September 1963, issued by the 
Christian Institute. 
35Kerkbode, 9 October 1963. 
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While the /\asvoclkop congregation was deeply opposed to NaudC's decision, there was still a 
great deal of affection for him and this was reflected in the farewell the church gave to him and 
Ilse. They held a special function to bid them goodbye, addressed by Professor N P van Wyk 
Louw, who had been a member of his church and had also served in the same Broederbond cell 
as Naude.36 The church editorial committee issued a farewell newsletter with glowing tributes to 
both. One of the contributions was written by NaudC's friend and the actuary of the Southern 
Transvaal synod, Willie Jonker. He wrote: 
"In the course of years we often spoke together about many things ... I can say one 
thing about him, and that is he is a man who goes his own way. He asked my opinion 
about many things ... but in his haste he never followed my advice. The worst was I could 
never be angry with him for not listening to me, because I knew that he was always trying 
to be honest with himself and with others .... I had to believe he had good reasons for 
ignoring my well-intentioned advice."37 
Naude gave his farewell sermon on 3 November 1963 at which he said: 
"Even if you forget everything else, if you remember only that for the first four years of 
the life of this congregation, God sent you somebody who in the midst of many human 
failings continually tried to summon you and bind you to obedience to God's Word, then 
my ministry here has not been in vain."38 
At the end of the service, the chairman of the Linden circuit called Beyers to come down from the 
pulpit. He handed him a document of dismissal, whereupon in symbolic and dramatic gesture, 
Beyers drew off his black minister's robe. One member of the congregation, Gie Kotze, later 
recalled what happened that morning: 
"He delivered a magnificent sermon and the people were very touched, even those who 
36C F B Naudc, My land van hoop: die lewe van Beyers Naude, p 70. 
37W D Jonker, "Huldigingsuitgawe", Maandbrief van die NG Gemeente Aasvoelkop, 
October - November 1963. My translation. 
38C F B Naudc, "Flame of Fire and Sledgehammer", 3 November 1963, issued by the 
Christian Institute. 
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were against him. When he pulled off his gown, a man sitting in front of me who was a 
big shot in the Railw-ays, and one of the men who blamed Beyers, he sat there and wept 
like a baby. Beyers was loved and so well-liked that even his enemies couldn't take it. "39 
Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the Progressive Federal Party and co-founder of 
the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (Idasa), was a young member of the 
Aasvoclkop church. He later recalled the emotions evoked by Naude's decision: 
"Beyers was highly respected. There was something verging on adoration of him among 
establi<-;hment Afrikaners. He had been mixing with the who's who of Afrikanerdom, and 
he was their unquestioned spiritual and moral leader. It took enormous courage for him 
to leave. It's the kind of courage people don't normally respect or understand."~0 
The views of Kotze and Van Zyl Slabbert gave an indication of Naude's stature in the Afrikaans 
community. His challenge to the establishment was therefore taken seriously. In all his endeavours 
and battles with the DRC in the years to come, he was never given any room to manoeuvre. He 
was clearly regarded as a potentially dangerous enemy and so he was denied any position from 
which he could possibly try to attract fellow-Afrikaners to his view. An example of this campaign 
was the Southern Transvaal synodical commission's decision, in November 1963, to refuse to 
review the removal of his minister status. The commission also adopted a resolution disapproving 
of the formation of the Christian Institute, claiming it would create opposition to the racial and 
ecumenical views of the DRC. Another indication of the hostility towards the Institute came a few 
days later when the general moderature of the DRC issued a statement likewise disapproving of 
the formation of the Christian Institute 4 \ a step which was the beginning of a long battle between 
the DRC and the CI. Speaking later about his early hopes and aspirations for the Christian 
39G Kotze interview with C Clur, 1988. 
4
° F Van Zyl Slabbert interview with C Clur, 1988. 
41As quoted in Star, 18 November 1963. 
79 
Institute, Naudc said: 
"Although I was still not fully aware what awaited me at the Cl, I at least had enough 
awareness of the Afrikaner people and especially the DRC lo realise that it would be a 
long and lonely road." 42 
42C F B Naudc interview with P Randall, 1982. 
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3 A new ministry unfolds, 1963 - 1965 
The Christian Institute was in existence for only 14 years and this story is largely also the story 
of Beyers Naude. It is beyond the scope of this study to detail all the events involving the CI, and 
the focus is on issues that had a direct impact on the theological and political thinking of Naude 
and on the events which he influenced. The one overarching factor motivating Naude during this 
period and beyond was his battle with the DRC over its support for apartheid, and in the. early 
days he sought to retain a foothold in the church by attempting, unsuccessfully, to retain hi.s status 
as a minister and later to at least serve as a church elder. His preoccupation with the DRC was 
matched also by his growing commitment to ecumenicism, and much of the Cl's work in the early 
days revolved around these matters. 
Beyond a plan to encourage Christians to study further and join discussion groups, the CI had no 
definite plan of action, and Naude's only real goal was to to present an alternative to the official 
theology of the DRC. Thus his work broadened out in several different directions in an almost 
haphazard fashion as he responded to new challenges and requests. His open, engaging 
personality meant that he was constantly being influenced by new people who entered his life. His 
political thinking was continually subject to change. 
One of the crucial factors that brought Naude to believe in the usefulness of inter-church contact 
and co-operation, or ecumenicism, was his experiences at the Cottesloe conference, and 
specifically his friendship with the WCC's Bob Bilheimer, who had played such a crucial role at 
Cottesloe. Fred van Wyk was an important intermediary, and there was regular contact between 
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the three when the CI was being established. 1 The offices of the CI were established in Dunwell 
House in Braamfontein, near the Johannesburg city centre, and close to the offices of the South 
African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), where Fred van Wyk still worked as assistant 
director. Van Wyk played an extremely important role in the practical arrangements of the CI in 
those early years, serving on the board of management and board of trustees and helping in the 
running of Pro Veritate, joining the CI as its full-time administrative director in April 1965. 
Naude, on his first trip to the US on behalf of the CI in April and May 1964 - as a guest of the US 
government - met again and consulted with Bilheimer and many other church representatives in 
Atlan.ta, Phoenix, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Rochester, New York, Boston, 
Philadelphia and Washington DC. The trip was important in that it gave him the chance to set up 
contact with organisations and individuals who would assist the CI in the coming years.2 His 
commitment to ecumenicism had been evident from his first editorial in Pro Veritate in May 1962 
when he asserted that churches could not operate in isolation. A year later, under pressure from 
the DRC to give up editorship of the journal, he had again shown his commitment to ecumenicism 
when he said Pro Veritate would only be prepared to cease publication if the DRC joine~ with the 
other churches in South Africa in creating a broad, ecumenicaljournal.3 
From the inception of the CI, Naude took every available opportunity to involve the organisation 
1AD 1752 (4cb), Fred van Wyk letter to CF B Naude, 29 March 1963, Department of 
Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Library, Fred van Wyk Papers. Van Wyk 
mentions that Bilheimer was being kept abreast of developments in South Africa. 
2AD 1752, Van Wyk, (4cb2) Van Wyk-Naude letter, 30 April 1964, and 4cb2(5a) Naude-
Van Wyk letter, 15 May 1964. 
3Pro Veritate 15 May 1962 and 15 May 1963. 
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in international church deliberations. Thus, at the end of May 1964, he cut short his important visit 
to the US to attend the all-Africa Council of Churches' Mindolo Consultation on Race Relations 
in Kitwe, Zambia.4 Naude had shrewdly gauged the importance of the Mindolo conference, which 
coincided with the granting of independence to the former British colony of Northern Rhodesia. 
The mood of a new, post-colonial Africa swept through that consultation in its focus on South 
Africa and other southern African countries still under colonial rule. Mindolo was the first major 
church conference since Cottesloe to examine South Africa's race policies closely. While church 
leaders were divided in their support for measures such as sanctions and the armed struggle to end 
white rule in South Africa, all felt that discrimination on the basis of race could no longer be 
condoned.5 
At Mindolo, Naude began to believe that the English as well as the Afrikaans churches bore a 
major responsibility for the race problems in.South Africa. Writing in Pro Veritate on his return 
to South Africa, he commented: 
"This meeting was of considerable importance ... because ... it brought to light the 
weakness and guilt of the church. While this guilt was firstly seen as that of guilt by virtue 
of silence, ... we would mention another form of guilt: that of ambiguity. With regard to 
South Africa, the Afrikaans churches, if they want to be honest, must acknowledge that 
their guilt in the area of race relations is their silence about many forms of injustice which 
no Christian, in the light of the Word of God, can defend or approve of with a clear 
conscience .... With regard to the English-speakers, there is also a heavy burden of guilt -
the shame of making decisions or policies which carry the message of justice, while in 
practice ... these are so watered down that they present no real challenge to the racial 
attitudes of thousands of their members."6 
4AD 1752, Van Wyk, (4cb2) Van Wyk-Naude letter, 30 April 1964, (4cb2(5a)) Naude-
Van Wyk letter, 15 May 1964 and (4Dc7(b)) Provisional Committee of the All Africa Church 
Conference statement, 19 March 1963. 
5As reported in Pro Veritate, 15 June 1964. 
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This articJe was an early indication of a trend at the CI that would develop fully later. The CI 
would extend its challenge to all the churches in South Africa, not just to the DRC. But in the 
early years, Naude and his colleagues had hoped to concentrate on winning over Afrikaans-
speaking, Reformed Christians, and the tone of Pro Veritate is an indication of this. 
The DRC and the Brocderbond, in all their actions during this and later periods, made it clear they 
would not give Naude any standing in the DRC. In February 1964, the Southern Transvaal DRC 
refused his appeal against the decision to deprive him of his status as a minister. When he was 
subsequently elected as an elder of the Parkhurst DRC in May 1964, two members of the 
Parkhurst church council resigned in protest and lodged appeals against his election with the 
Johannesburg circuit of the DRC. The Parkhurst minister, Jan van Rooyen, refused to take action 
against him. In July 1964 the Johannesburg circuit declared Naude's election invalid, but there 
was an immediate appeal by six DRC ministers to the synodical commission. Among those who 
supported Naude were his old friend Dr Willie Jonker, then chairman of the Johannesburg circuit, 
and the secretary, Dr A J Venter. Others included Ben Engelbrecht, Jan van Rooyen, and Roelf 
Meyer.7 
The DRC's Southern Transvaal synodical commission ref used to hear the appeals that had been 
lodged and referred the matter back to the Johannesburg circuit. The Johannesburg circuit in turn 
referred the matter back to the source of the dispute - the Parkhurst church council. In February 
1965 the Parkhurst council under the leadership of Dr van Rooyen again approved Naude's 
7DDBnC a-1 Buitengewone Sinodalekommissie Vergardering, 11 Februarie 1964, 
Sinodale Kommissie, NG Kerk, Suid Transvaal, Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Archives, 
Pretoria and Star. 11 - 12 February 1964 13 August 1964, Vaderland, 24 June 1964. 
84 
election as an cider. He was inducted at a service in March 1965 after the church council had 
rejected a new complaint against him. The matter was then taken up by two other DRC ministers 
who lodged complaints with the synodical commission. Finally in May 1965 the commission 
declared his election as elder invalid.8 
The dispute over Beyers Naude's election to the church council was an indication of the depth 
of opposition to him in official church circles. As an elder Naude could have been elected to 
attend church synods, and it appeared his opponents wanted to make quite certain that he would 
never again have an official platform from which to air his views. Naude continued to insist that 
his removal from the church council was invalid in terms of church law. 
Throughout 1964 the campaign against Naude, waged in newspapers like Transvaler, showed no 
signs of easing. Under great pressure, a number of the approximately 100 DRC members who 
had initially joined the CI began resigning from the organisation, and the organisation's hope of 
reaching Afrikaners receded even further. Kerkbode also kept up the attack. In January 1964, for 
example, it hit out at the "alarming trend" of having a Roman Catholic (Mrs Margaret Malherbe) 
on the Cl's board of management. Naude wrote numerous letters to the Afrikaans press, 
defending himself against highly critical reports and letters.9 
The criticism of Naude and the CI continued in 1965 in Afrikaans church, media and political 
8DDBnC a-5 Notule van 'n buitengewone vergardering van die Sinodale Kommissie van 
die Suid-Transvaal, 26 May 1965 and DDBnC a-1 Notule van die 13de gewone vergadering van 
die Sinodale Kommissie van die Sinode van Suid Transvaal, 16 November 1965 and various 
reports in Star and Transvaler, May 1964 to May 1965. 
9Kcrkbode, 1 January 1964 and various reports in Star and Transvaler. 1964. 
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circles. /\part from writing letters to the media, Naude had no opportunity to engage ordinary 
Afrikaans congregations or audiences since most DRC ministers were opposed or reluctant to 
invite him to preach at their churches. However, one of his surviving DRC-supporters was Roelf 
Meyer, then minister of the Belgravia congregation; through Meyer's efforts, the church council 
agreed that Naude could address the church youth group, the Kerk Jeugvereniging (KJV). This 
caused a controversy in the Belgravia church and in the broader DRC. It was claimed even that 
Naude's speech would influence the outcome of an upcoming provincial by-election. When Naude 
arrived at the church to speak, several members of the church council had gathered, determined 
to prevent him from addressing the KJV. Two men then grabbed N aude by the arms .and marched 
him outside the church gate. The small number of KJV members who had turned up for the 
meeting departed with Naude and Roelf Meyer to hold the meeting at a private house. The 
Johannesburg circuit of the DRC criticised the incident, but Kerkbode refused to do so. In an 
editorial it declared that the incident could not be seen as a very "happy" one, but went on to say: 
"The fact is that our brother has taken standpoints and has involved himself with an 
institute which our church has spoken out against. We cannot deny someone the right to 
their views or to belong to organisations. But where church channels are searched for and 
are offered with the idea of promoting those ideas, then in our opinion there is reason for 
dissatisfaction and efforts must be made to ensure healthy order is maintained in the 
church."10 
This editorial substantiates the argument that every effort was made to keep Naude from holding 
any meaningful position in the church, and to deny him a platform from which to address DRC 
members. 
From 1965 a new aspect was evident in Naude's thinking. He began to call for the establishment 
of a confessing church movement in South Africa. The event that propelled him into thinking 
1
°Kcrkbode, 17 March 1965. My translation. 
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along these lines was a police raid on the Cl's offices and on his Greenside home in May 1965, 
at a time when he was in Europe on a fund-raising trip. During the raid, the security police 
claimed to be searching for documents relating to "communism and the ANC". The raid came 
three months after Pro Veritate had mentioned a book which was banned for distribution in South 
Af'rica. Police confiscated a few copies of Pro Veritate as well as copies of a critical report on 
South Africa by the British Council of Churches. The English press rose to NaudC's defence, 
accusing the police of becoming involved in a political vendetta and United Party politicians 
demanded an explanation for the raid in Parliament. The then Minister of Justice, John Vorster, 
said the purpose of the raid had been to gain evidence for an alleged contravention of the 
Supression of Communism Act11, but no charges were brought. 
In June 1965, while Naude was still in Europe, the Jeppestown DRC church council demanded 
that the divisions being caused by the CI be considered at a special synod of the Southern 
Transvaal DRC. 12 This request was refused, but the synodical commission finally did hold a 
special meeting to discuss the various controversies surrounding Naude and the CI. With Naude 
unable to defend himself, the meeting approved a report which condemned the CI and any 
minister or church council member who belonged to it. This statement was distributed to all 
member churches in the Southern Transvaal area, and placed new pressure on DRC ministers to 
resign from the CI. On the basis of this report the Johannesburg circuit terminated Naude's 
position as elder of the Parkhurst congregation. 13 
11 Pro Veritate, 15 Jtine 1965 and various reports in Star, May - June 1965. 
12Star, 5 April 1965. 
13DDBnC a-1 Notule van die 13de gewone vergadering van die Sinodale Kommissie van 
die Sinode van Suid Transvaal, 16 November 1965 and DDBnC a-5 Notule van die 14de gewone 
vergadering van die Sinodale Kommissie van die Sinode van Suid Transvaal, 26 April 1966. 
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Naude had been out of the country when the news of the police action appeared in South African 
newspapers and he was concerned about the impact it would have on the CI. He had been 
reflecting over parallels between National Socialist Germany and South Africa and, while still 
abroad, wrote the first in a series of controversial articles for Pro Veritate in which he called for 
the creation of a confessing church movement in South Africa. 
The German confessing church movement was to have an important influence on Naude's 
thinking and so it is necessary to briefly describe it. In the Nazi years the German Evangelical 
Church, which represented the majority of Protestant Germans, collaborated with the Nazi 
regime because of the close historical links between church and state. But there was also a large 
group of pastors who rejected this compromise. In 1933, six thousand pastors joined an 
emergency league to reject the church leadership's support for the Third Reich. "Free synods" 
were held in various centres in Germany where the foundation for the confessing church 
movement was laid. The name "confessing church" came from the desire of the pastors to restore 
the true confession of the Evangelical Church and root out the false doctrine planted by the Nazis. 
These efforts culminated in the holding of a national synod in Barmen in 1934. The synod adopted 
the "Barmen Confession" - a six-point statement which reaffirmed Christ as the highest authority 
from whom all human freedom came and rejected the notion that the church should serve or be 
controlled by the state. 14 
Naude's first article calling for a confessing church movement in South Africa appeared in the July 
14E C Helmreich, The German churches under Hitler: background struggle and epilogue, 
pp 157 - 162, 317 - 343, 463 - 469 and J\ C Cochrane, The church's confession under Hitler, pp 
140 - 180. 
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1965 issue of Pro Veritate. He wrote: 
"It should be clear to anyone who is familiar with the development of the church situation 
in the Third German Reich, and looking at events in our country affecting the church and 
the state, that there are more and more parallels between Nazi Germany and present-day 
South Africa. 
"This parallel is not just found in the methods used in South Af'rica, not just in the creation 
and spreading of slogans in the press and on radio, but also in the general reaction off ear 
on the part of an increasing number of Christians. This fear leads to untenable 
compromises and unacceptable silences, and strengthens the power of an authority which 
... because of the race philosophy underlying its policy, can do no other than to apply 
increasingly stronger measures against anyone - including the Churches and Christians -
who act out of pure Biblical and Christian convictions and condemn unchristian clements 
in our race policies. 
"If I think about all these signs, then it is clear that the time has arrived for a Confessing 
Church in South Africa .... I want to make it clear ... that this has nothing to do with 
establishing a new church ... but that it means that Christians of the various faiths ... 
should call on their churches to take an unambiguous stand and deliver a fearless witness 
based on the Word of God."15 
Naude, in this and subsequent articles, did not elaborate on parallels he saw between South Africa 
in the 1960s and the Third Reich, except for general observations about discriminatory race 
policies in both countries and the "fear" that he believed was being created in the churches. The 
situations in the two countries, in reality, were far from identical - a point he himself conceded in 
a further article on the subject. 16 His first article unleashed a great deal of protest in Afrikaans 
church circles, indicating a raw nerve had been struck. 17 Kerkbode described the Nazi label as 
"misplaced": 
"Those who want to attribute to us the German sins of a quarter of a century ago can do 
so only out of ignorance or with other motives, but such a person has no hope of arousing 
a sincere feeling of guilt in us about sins which we have not committed .... Our church is 
not too proud to confess our failures and sins. But we find unfair and abhorrent the 
15Pro Veritate, 15 July 1965. 
16ProVeritate, 15 November 1965. 
17Pro Veritate 15 October 1965. 
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insinuation that we arc being taken into tow by an evil dictatorship." 18 
In another article, Naude conceded that the situations in Nazi Germany and South Africa were 
not identical, but said that there were certain parallels. He compared Nazi Germany's concern 
with racial purity and discrimination against Jews with the Afrikaner's obsession to maintain a 
racially-pure volk. He described how the German Christians had used the Bible to forbid 
intermarriage between Aryans and Jews - and compared it with the Afrikaner's use of Scripture 
to forbid racial mixing. He also argued that in Nazi Germany there was close identification 
between church and nation, and that eventually the church was expected to serve the ideals and 
aspirations of the people. He warned that letters and articles in newspapers in South Africa 
demonstrated this same tendency of wanting a close relationship between church and "volk'', and 
that writers expected the church to support the political vision of the people. 19 
In the final article on this issue, Naude identified further parallels between the situations in the 
two countries. Highlighting intimidation in Nazi Germany, he asked: 
"Is it necessary to quote examples of the situation in South Africa? ... I think of scores of 
DRC ministers and laymen who have told me that they are frightened to speak up about 
their deepest Christian convictions ... because, if they are white, they will either be 
ostracised or lose their jobs ... or if they are black, face possible intimidation from the 
authorities." 
He also drew a parallel between the "sinful silence" of German Christians on the issue of the 
persecution of the Jews and injustices suff cred by black people in South Africa. He ended with 
the claim that the confessing church in South Africa had already arrived. Its voice was still small 
18Kcrkbodc, 4 August 1965. 
19Pro Veritatc, 15 November 1965. 
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and uncertain, but there was already a new life and spirit in the church.20 
The DRC's attitude to the call for a confessing church was summed up by Kerkbode editor 
Andries Trcurnicht in a SABC radio broadcast: . 
"The intention is to create unrest among the Afrikaner in regard to his church membership 
and the unity of the volk. It is not the first attempt to estrange the Church and the volk or 
to replace the Afrikaans churches, with their particular role in the life of the volk, for 
another religious organisation .... The target is clear - control of the Afrikaners. And to get 
control of the Afrikaner, control of the churches is necessary ."21 
A confessing church community, on the scale of the German model, was never established in 
South Africa. Many individual members of the Christian Institute, both laymen and ministers, did 
oppose the "false doctrine" of apartheid, but their witness cannot be directly compared to the 
German situation where many pastors of the same church united behind the Barmen confession. 
Furthermore, a direct comparison between South Africa in the 1960s and Nazi Germany in the 
1930s and 1940s shows up vast differences, politically and theologically. John de Gruchy also 
asserted that a confessing church never materialised because the German model was both 
impractical and inappropriate for South Africa.22 Naude and Roelf Meyer conceded that the 
confessing church ideal was never fully achieved because the CI "could not muster enough 
support and a clear and strong vision of its aims and goals".23 In some respects, however, the CI 
did fulfil the role of bringing "confessing" clements in the various churches together by giving 
20Pro Veritate, 15 December 1965. 
21A P Treurnicht, Die Afrikaner en sy kerk. My translation. 
22J W de Gruchy, The church struggle in South Africa, p 107. 
23R Meyer and CF B Naude, "The Christian Institute of South Africa: a short history of 
a quest for Christian liberation'', in I Liebenberg, F Lortan, B Nel and G van der Westhuizen 
(eds), The long march: the story of the struggle for liberation in South Africa, p 170. 
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support to individual Christians in their struggle against injustice as well as backing important 
Christian-motivated projects. /\.s De Gruchy put it: "What the CI did ... was to provide resources 
and an ad hoc supportive community for those who were at the cutting edge of the churches' 
witness. J\nd this proved an immense strength to those involved."24 
Towards the end of 1965, Afrikaner hostility towards Naudc and the CI continued and he was 
forced to step down as chairman of the governing body of his daughter's school, Helpmekaar 
Hoer Meisieskool.25 In a final, desperate effort to counter this "organised campaign" as they saw 
it, CI supporter Ben Engelbrecht, Beyers Naudc , Fred van Wyk and another member of the 
Christian Institute, J D Smith, sent a letter to 1 500 DRC ministers in South Africa. The letter 
pointed to a "new development" in Afrikaner church circles: 
"The development which is taking place before our eyes is that a point of view or attitude 
which is held by someone in respect of its permissibility, integrity, acceptability and 
Christian character, is no longer tested against the Word of God, but against a political 
ideology, which no matter how well-intentioned it originally may have been, ... becomes 
in many of the ways in which it is applied, increasingly less able to stand the test of the 
Word of God."26 
Naude's strong contention that the DRC was being corrupted by the political pressure that was 
being applied on anyone who was associated with the CI comes through in this letter, but it failed 
to drum up any significant support from the DRC ministers. 
Before moving on to discuss another aspect of Naudc's work in the mid-1960s, it is necessary to 
24De Gruchy, The church struggle, p 107. 
25C F B Naude, My land van hoop: die lewe van Beyers Naude, p 75. 
26 AD 1752 ( 4da(3)), Van Wyk, Translation, Open Letter to Ministers of the Dutch 
Reformed Church, November 1965. 
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provide some context of political and church attitudes towards the Cl's witness in this period. 
The raid on the CI and NaudC's home in May 1965 had elicited sympathy from the English press 
and the United Party, and the tone of several editorials that appeared at this time was that of 
condemnation for the "organised campaign" being waged against Naude in Nationalist circles. 
With the exception of a slighly more questioning stance displayed by Burg!a, the Afrikaans press, 
led by Transvalcr, was virulently opposed to Naudc. An example of this unrelenting campaign was 
the publication in this newspaper of a list of all DRC ministers and members who were members 
of the CI in September 1965. Exactly how this list was procured and the manner of publication 
caused Kerkbode to word vague ethical misgivings, but it nevertheless approved of the 
publication of this list because it gave "a much clearer view of this contentious organisation" by 
virtue of identifying who supported it. 27 
Until he left the DRC in 1963, Naude's most meaningful contacts had been almost exclusively 
with people from an Afrikaans, Reformed background. With the opening of the CI, he became 
exposed increasingly to Christians from other backgrounds, and many of these people had a 
profound impact on his thinking. The CI, when it started, concentrated on establishing prayer and 
study groups and had an initial membership of about 150 people. By the end of 1964 the figure 
had risen to more than 1 000, but most were white English-speakers. In 1965 the CI decided to 
look for a full-time black fieldworker to increase awareness of the Christian Institute in the black 
community. Young white ministers, such as James Moulder and Danie van Zyl, joined the Institute 
and developed a close relationship with Naude. In the 14 years of its existence, the CI was to have 
a high turnover of staff and board members. Some left when they moved to new jobs and towns, 
27Various issues Star and Transvaler, May - November 1965, Burger September 1965, 
Kerkbode 29 September 1965. 
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but many broke away because they were opposed to the direction the CI was taking or did not 
like its organisational structures. Naudc's style as director dictated the path the CI took. Many 
of NaudC's former colleagues questioned the impulsive way he hired staff and felt he often 
displayed poor judgment of character. There were several unsuccessful appointments over the 
years but Naude also attracted a number of very talented people to the Cl.28 
The composition of the board of management in 1965 reilectcd the mixture of South Africans 
who supported the Institute' s work. The English churches and the Christian Council o( South 
Africa were well represented by people such as Basil Brown and Bill Burnett, while individual 
Afrikaans Reformed ministers still enjoyed a high profile, notably Ben Engelbrecht and Albert 
Geyser. Notable by their absence from the board, however, were any Afrikaner ministers in 
important positions of leadership in their churches. Black representation on the board was 
expanded to include ministers J C M Mabata and S A Mohono, in addition to long-time 
supporter E E Mahabane, but the CI was still largely unknown in mainstream black church circles, 
a reflection of Beyers's own obscurity among these groups. 29 His earliest meaningful contact \vith 
Africans, beyond the handful of black ministers who were members of the CI, was with the 
African Independent (AI) Churches, and from 1965 his dealings with AI ministers became an 
important new dimension in his work. 
The separatist or independent churches had their origins in black Christians' disillusionment and 
28C Clur interviews with D van Zyl, B Engelbrecht, T Kotze, B Brown and H 
Kleinschmidt, 1988. 
29 AD 1752 (4Abl), Van Wyk, List of members on Board of Management, elected 27 
August 1964. 
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unhappiness with the missionary churches, and their desire lo pursue their faith unhindered by 
while control. Broadly, they fell into two categories, the Ethiopian churches which often retained 
much of the doctrine and liturgy of the missionary churches but stressed the idea of "African 
churches for Africans", and the Zionist groups which emphasised the charisma and strength of 
their prophet leaders, incorporated some traditional African ideas and placed great importance on 
the power of the Holy Spirit, faith healing and baptism by immersion. Members of separatist 
churches generally came from the very poorest communities, and their ministers and prophets, 
often with only a few years of schooling, usually eked out a precarious living. 
The Cl's involvement with the AI churches began in December 1964 when a number of 
independent church ministers, led by Z J Malukazi from the Ciskei, asked for help to establish a 
theological school and set up study courses. 30 Naude's involvement with these churches was to 
absorb a great deal of his time, and spanned more than 10 years. In many ways Naude failed to 
reach his goals in helping the indigenous churches. However, his eagerness to respond to their 
unexpected appeal for help was typical of his enthusiastic approach to new projects. Naude and 
the CI were pioneers in recognising the need to reach out to these rapidly-growing churches, 
isolated from mainstream Christianity, which already had millions of followers in the 1960s. His 
daily contact with these black churchmen was also to have a direct impact on his political thinking 
in the years ahead and made him increasingly supportive of black-led initiatives. 
Overseas church organisations were impressed that AI members had enough confidence in Naude 
3
°C F B Naude, Director's report of the Christian Institute, August 1964 to July 1965 and 
Naude, My land van hoop, p 83. 
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and the Cl to ask for help.31 The Al churches' refusal to approach mainstream churches for 
assistance was a reflection on these churches inability to perform this aspect of their Christian 
mi<ision. There was a history of tension between AI churches and missionaries because mainstream 
churches frowned on unorthodox practices. The fact that AI leaders felt comfortable in 
approaching the CI was a testimony to Naude 's non-judgmental, welcoming style. Martin West, 
who spent two years under the auspices of the Christian Institute studying the separatist 
phenomenon in Soweto, believed it was significant that the African independent churches trusted 
Naude sufficiently to approach him: 
"The AI churches had been going for a hundred years at that time and had a reputation 
of being ... very cautious and sceptical about involvement with whites and mission 
churches. They felt inferior and were always worried about being looked down upon by 
the conventional churches. It is quite extraordinary and an enormous tribute to Beyers 
that a number of them were prepared to co-operate with the CI when they were not 
prepared to do so with others .... I attributed this to two factors. Firstly, the CI was not 
a mission organisation, not a denominational organisation, as the AI churches were 
cautious about falling under the wing of a particular denomination. The fact that it was 
an ecumenical body was one of the attractions. The second factor was the political aspect 
- the fact that the CI was non-racial and had got some political flak for being 
non-racial. "32 
Naude felt that to achieve anything with the AI churches it was necessary for them to maintain 
their independence and he agreed to assist them, provided they set up their own organisation with 
which the CI could deal. In Ja_nuary 1965 an exploratory conference attended by about 75 church 
leaders was held in the township of Daveyton, east of Johannesburg. A resolution was adopted 
giving "our fullest confidence to the Christian Institute of Southern Africa and inviting its director, 
the Rev CF B Naude to guide us through every difficulty in the Christian field". Two months later 
31Naude, Director's report of the Christian Institute, 1964 - July 1965. He makes it clear 
that his European fundraising trip of May - June 1965 was primarily devoted to raising funds 
among European churches and missionary societies for the work of AI ministerss. 
32Martin West interview with C Clur, 1988 and KI Brown, "The independent churches 
of South Africa: a progress report", Religion in life, pp 80 - 81. 
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the Cl's board of management officially agreed to help the AI churches, and in June 1965 the 
African Independent Churches Ac;sociation (AICA) was formed in Queenstown in the Eastern 
Cape. The CI and AICA worked out an ambitious programme for setting up Bible study 
correspondence courses. A committee to coordinate assistance efforts was set up, consisting of 
representatives of the CI, AICA, the Christian Council (forerunner of the South African Council 
of Churches) and other black churches. Els te Siepe ran a parallel women's group.33 
James Moulder and later Danie van Zyl took much of the responsiblity for AICA, but the work 
also absorbed a great deal of Naudc's time - solving internal disputes, fundraising and arranging 
conferences. The major problem which was to lead to the collapse of AICA by 1974 was related 
to disputes over money and position. From the start Naude insisted that members of the AICA 
board of management should be given financial compensation for travelling to meetings. For 
people with little or no fixed income, representation on the board was to become very important 
and lead to endless disputes and the formation of breakaway organisations. West remarked: 
"In my view there was a lot of financial mismanagement in AICA, not in a criminal sense, 
but in the way things were organised, which was part of the downfall of AICA. ... The men 
were always fighting over money ... The expenses paid to the men to attend meetings were 
something they could not afford to lose and it added a dimension to AICA politics. It 
wasn't just being thrown out of the presidency or the board of management, it was 
actually the loss of the money. Money was the root of evil in the whole thing ... The 
women ... did more practical things with their money, the men didn't. Much of it was used 
on travelling about and on politicking at a local level... 
"One of Beyers's strengths and weaknesses was that he could never say no. I was there 
often where he would say: 'There is no more money, it's finished, you've used it all up', 
and they wouldn't believe him, and the money would come. Every time he delivered the 
goods it made it worse, he just could not say no. It stemmed out of a positive aspect of 
33Pro Veritate, 15 April 1965, Pro Veritate, 15 October 1966 and M West, Bishops and 
prophets in a black city, p 145. 
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his character, but it became a negative thing."34 
This aspect of Naude's personality, his desire to give and to help to the point of excess, had 
negative consequences in some respects and it was a pattern of behaviour repeated in the CI itself. 
But Naudc's involvement with AICA was significant in that it was his first experience of close 
interaction with a black organisation. His open, sympathetic approach enabled him to develop 
relationships of trust with many of the individuals involved in the separatist churches. Danie van 
Zyl has described this aspect of Naude's personality: 
"I think the one outstanding feature of Beyers is the way in which he was trusted. People 
believed in him and they trusted him. I saw this specifically in terms of the black people 
who really trusted Beyers. Regardless of the conflict within the AICA groups, they all 
trusted him .... Beyers was good at holding things together when it became very difficult. 
He would call them all in and they would sit and talk. They would not resolve a thing, but 
we would say we won't do anything until we have at least met again. And then Beyers 
would be overseas. And in four months' time they would still be there ... Even when 
Beyers had little to do with this whole [AICA] thing, because he got so involved in other 
things, he remained the important figure in the background."35 
34M West-Clur interview. 
35D van Zyl-Clur interview. 
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4 Changing direction, 1966 - 1968 
By the mid-1960s Beyers accepted the fact that the CI had not made progress with winning over 
DRC members and realised that his organisation.would have to find a new direction if it wished 
to become relevant in South Africa. Y ct he had no clear strategy and in the next few years the 
Cl's work would branch out in a random, almost erratic way. However, Naude's actions and the 
Cl's programme must be seen in the context of the political climate in South Africa. The decade 
from the mid-1960s to the mid-l 970s, the core years of the Christian Institute, was also .the era 
of grand apartheid, when very tight political control was exercised by the state. Beyers Naude and 
other staff members were constantly challenged to respond to crises that arose from this situation. 
Some of Naude's closest associates felt that the "mushrooming" of the CI was a fault and that 
Naude failed to consolidate sufficiently. Peter Randall, who worked closely with both the CI and 
the SACC in the late 1960s and early 1970s on the Spro-Cas project, said later: 
"One of the greatest strengths of the CI was that it was constantly grappling at the 
theoretical and practical level with issues as they arose, experimenting with styles of 
organisation. But if I had a major criticism of the CI, it would be ... that at times it seemed 
to be too open to every new influence, to new demands made upon it. I was considerably 
frustrated at times at the Cl's apparent inability to set a clear order of priorities."1 
The style of the Cl's operation reflected to some extent Naude's own personality; he has been 
described as "konsckwent",2 displaying stubbornness and a step-by-step logic that led him from 
one action to another. In the early years he travelled extensively to promote the CI. Early in 
1966, he undertook a four-week trip to the Cape Province where he visited all the major towns 
1C F B Naude interview with P Randall, 1982. 
2P Randall interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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1966, he undertook a four-week trip to the Cape Province where he visited all the major towns 
and spoke at various meetings. Gradually the focus of the CI would swing away from Afrikaners 
and the white community in general to concern itself more with black issues, Naude's method of 
operation never really changed. As head of a v.ery small organisation with limited means of 
communication he had to spread himself very thin, making contact with as many people as 
possible. Extensive travelling, speaking engagements and meetings with numerous groups and 
individuals became the pattern of his life. By September 1966 membership of the CI stood at 
about 1 700 and discussion groups had grown from 33 to 45. Bible study material was also issued 
to many churches. The CI also initiated several public symposia where topical issues were 
discussed.3 
In spite of the Cl's concern about the plight of black South Africans, the CI was still a 
white-dominated organisation which relied on the support of mainly white English-speakers. 
Black membership was small and Afrikaner support was falling. Indeed there was no let-up in the 
opposition from within mainstream Afrikanerdom to the Cl. Opponents continued with their 
insinuations that Naude was a communist - a rumour that was fuelled when it was revealed in 
February 1966 that communist trialist Bram Fischer had sent him a letter while on the run from 
the police. The letter was intercepted before it reached Naude, but this did not deter police from 
conducting a thorough search of his home on the pretext that they were looking for the note. 4 
One major ecumenical initiative in which Naude was involved in the mid-1960s was the 
3C F B Naude, Director's report of the Christian Institute, August 1965 to July 1966. 
4Star, 23 February 1966, and CF B Naude interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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ineffective body, ill-equipped to deal with the critical developments facing the South African 
churches, and it was not taken particularly seriously by the member churches. This troubled 
church leaders, and after the retirement of Basil Brown as general secretary, they searched for a 
successor who had vision, an understanding of the problems facing South Africa and influence 
among the English-speaking churches. In 1966, Bill Burnett, Anglican Bishop of Bloemfontein, 
was appointed the new general secretary. Burnett, assisted by involved lay community leaders 
like Fred van Wyk, took the lead in restructuring the Omncil, later to become known as the South 
African Council of Churches (SACC), while behind the scenes Naudc also made an important 
contribution. The restructuring of the council enabled it to play a greater role in the socio-political 
debate in the years that followed. 5 A sign of the growing co-operation between the Christian 
Institute and the Christian Council (and later by extension the SACC) was the decision to affiliate 
the CI to the Council during 1966, and Naude served on the SACC executive for many years. 6 
In July 1966 Naude and Bill Burnett attended the World Council of Chur~hes conference on 
Church and Society in Geneva, which was to set the debate on Christian involvement in social 
issues for the next decade and where the foundations were laid for the WCC's strong anti-
apartheid stance and its support for liberation movements such as the ANC. Naude was initially 
invited as an ordinary participant, but in June 1966 he was asked by WCC secretary Paul Albrecht 
5The council was renamed the South African Council of Churches (SACC) in 1968, to 
emphasise that it had been established by the churches for the purpose of inter-church co-
operation - J W de Gruchy, The church struggle in South Africa, pp 115 - 116 and R Meyer and 
C F B Naude, "The Christian Institute of South Africa: a short history of a quest for Christian 
liberation", in I Liebenberg, F Lortan, B Nel and G van der Westhuizen (eds), The long march: 
the story of the struggle for liberation in South Africa, p 168 and CF B Naude-Randall interview. 
6C F B Naude-Clur interview and AD 1752 (4cB3) Christian Institute of Southern Africa, 
Minutes of meeting of Board of Management, 27 September 1966, Department of Historical 
Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Library, Fred van Wyk Papers. 
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to act as one of the convenors on the working group dealing with "Action of the Church in 
Society". Naude readily took on the job; the invitation to get involved at a high level at the 
conference reilected his growing status in international ecumenical circles. 7 
In its final statement the WCC conference condemned racism in churches, urged Christians to 
oppose the myth of racial superiority, and demanded that all races have equal rights in society. It 
laid the foundation for the adoption in 1970 of the WCC's Programme to Combat Racism (PCR), 
which was to cause upheaval for member churches in South Africa. At the conferen~e, the 
leadership of the churches had to grapple with the question of Christian participation in 
revolutionary struggles. 8 
Naude placed great significance on the WCC Geneva conference, and it influenced the 
contribution he was to make on crucial issues in South Africa, including the drafting of the 
"Message to the people of South Africa" two years later. While still in Geneva, he gave an 
interview to a newspaper which already showed the influence the conference was having on his 
thinking. He stressed that there was growing consensus in world ecumenical circles for action to 
be taken against not only racial discrimination, but economic injustice.9 His view of the 
conference was spelled out in similar terms later when he reflected: 
"I realised that a very important development was taking place because it was leading us 
to the wider area of social and economic justice, of getting to grips with the deeper roots 
of the situation of racial oppression and injustice in South Africa. It helped me to expand 
7AD 1752 (4Cbl), Van Wyk, P Albrecht letter to CF B Naude, 4 June 1996 and CF B 
Naude letter to P Albrecht, 13 June 1966. 
8AJ van der Bent (ed), Breaking down the walls: World Council of Churches statements 
and actions on racism, 1948-1985, p 15 and De Gruchy, The church struggle, p 117. 
9Rand Daily Mail, 27 July 1966. 
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and widen my thinking of how we would have lo deal with the racial situation."10 
In 1966 Naude also travelled to the Netherlands and extended his contacts in Dutch church and 
political circles. One of his strongest supporters was Professor J Verkuyl, an influential figure in 
the Gercformccrde Kerk in Holland. Verkuyl had spent many years in the former Dutch colony 
of Indonesia as a missionary, where he had been concerned with the problems of racism and the 
struggle for power at the time the Indonesian people were fighting for independence. Verkuyl, 
who had returned to the Netherlands in 1963 and who was then working as general secretary of 
the Netherlands Missionary Council, believed that Naude and the CI were tackling the very issues 
which the world churches ought to be confronting. He was influential in helping to lead his own 
conservative Gereformeerde Kerk out of its isolation, and he helped mobilise support and interest 
for Naude during his Dutch visits. Largely as a result of efforts of men like Verkuyl, Naude was 
introduced to prominent politicians, journalists and churchmen during his trips abroad. Naude's 
fluency in Dutch and his Afrikaner Reformed background all contributed to the favourable 
impression he made among the Dutch churchmen. He so impressed them that the Hervormde 
Kerk promised to donate a sizeable sum for the Cl's work with the African Independent 
churches. 11 
Another of Naude's staunch Dutch supporters was Hervormde Kerk theologian Jone Bos. Bos 
was closely involved in raising funds for i\ICA as part of the Dutch churches' "Korn oor de Brug" 
fundraising campaign to assist South Africans opposed to apartheid. He later remarked: 
"Like most of Beyers's Dutch friends, I was brought up in a Reformed family ... and we 
10C F B Naudc-Clur interview. 
111 Verkuyl, J Bos, and B van Kaam interviews with C Clur, 1988 and Star, 6 July 1966. 
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had a very friendly attitude toward the Boers ... During one of Nau de 's first trips to the 
Netherlands, Professor Verkuyl phoned me and said: ' ... Dominee Beyers Naude will be 
at the synod of the Hervormde Kerk. I am bringing him there and I would like you to be 
there too.' That afternoon a lot of important people, including a man from the Netherlands 
Bible Society, the chief editor of Trouw, and one member of parliament met Naude. They 
were very impressed and said they wanted to help. And that was the start.. .. Verkuyl told 
me that the CI needed money and I was appointed a sort of secretary to an unofficial 
committee to help the CI.. .. In the 1960s Naudc would come to the Netherlands two or 
three times a year and he always came for money and help."12 
In the latter part of 1966, on NaudC's return from Europe, the Christian Institute and the Christian 
Council began to consider holding regional conferences to consider the implications of the wee 
conference resolutions for South Africa. Although co-operation was steadily improving with the 
English churches, there was no contribution forthcoming from the Afrikaans churches, and the 
tension between the CI and the DRC continued to build up. One of the flaws Naude identified in 
the DRC's campaign against the CI was its refusal to subject the Institute to a thorough 
theological examination. In the three years of its existence, and in the context of NaudC's battle 
to retain his status as a minister and remain an elder in the church, the CI had repeatedly asked 
the DRC to substantiate its criticism; in anticipation of the DRC's general synod which was 
meeting that year, the board of management of the Christian Institute in May 1966 issued a formal 
invitation to the DRC to investigate the CI. In his letter to the secretary of the general 
moderature responsible for arranging the 1966 general synod, Naude assured the church that the 
CI "welcomes any investigation by the DRC into the aims and activities of the Christian Institute 
and that there is nothing the Christian Institute desires more than that the NG Kerk should judge 
the Institute on the basis of the only criterion which should bear weight with the Church: 
12 J Bos-Clur interview. 
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Scripture and Confession" .13 
The general synod, which met in Bloemfontein in October 1966, passed a resolution on the CI, 
but based its decision on a report compiled by the general moderature. Taking "note" of Naude's 
letter of invitation, the synod accepted, with only one dissenting vote, a resolution declaring the 
CI an extra-ecclesiastical organisation that acted in competition with the church and professed to 
perform the task "better than the church did itself". The resolution also noted that the CI, by 
including Roman Catholics within its membership, was denying the Protestant confession. The 
synod claimed that the CI opposed the DRC's mission policy, had a "highly questionable church 
concept and view of ecumenicism", and was creating discord in congregations. The synod accused 
the CI of having "heretical tendencies" (du:aalrigting) and instructed office-bearers and members 
of the DRC to withdraw from the CI "out of loyalty to their church". 14 
Naude and three other members of the CI who were also members of the DRC informed the 
church that they would not resign from the Cl. The statement sent to the DRC, signed by Beyers 
Naude, Ben Engelbrecht, Fred van Wyk, and the Cl's publicity officer Dr Bruckner de Villiers, 
declared: 
"It is our deepest desire to remain members of the NGK, the church of our fathers, but 
we do not find it in our hearts and consciences to resign as members of the Christian 
Institute and thus deny the Scriptural truths and principles for which the Institute stands .... 
We find the fact that the NGK could take such a decision a most disturbing indication that 
the Church is in the process of removing itself from the reign of Christ and lapsing into 
13Letter from the director of the CI to Bree Moderafllur, 28 May 1966, as published in 
Handelinge van die tweede vergadering van die Algemene Sinode van die NG Kerk, October 
1966, my translation, and AD 1752 (4Dlal), Van Wyk, Memorandum on "The Christian 
Institute and the NG Kerk", 1966. 
14Handelingc van die Algemcne Sinodc van die NG Kerk, October 1966. My translation. 
105 
the grip of human arbitrariness." 15 
The DRC's decision brought support for the CI from the Christian Omncil. Its statement reflected 
the disparity between the attitudes of English and Afrikaans churches in South Africa and 
expressed "complete confidence in the Christian Institute as a sincere attempt on the part of 
individual Christians of all denominations and races to meet, study and confer together."16 
Kerk bode, on the other hand, welcomed the synod's decision and claimed that the "liberal" 
Institute of Race Relations - probably a reference to Fred van Wyk's involvement - had been 
responsible for the founding of the Cl. 17 
After a formal investigation of the synod's decision, the Parkhurst church council issued a 
statement rejecting that action be taken against Beyers and Ilse Naude, and Ben Engelbrecht and 
his wife. The council said it had based its decision on the DRC's own Church Order, the 
Heidelberg Catechism and the Netherlands Confession, and argued that a member could only be 
censured if he had sinned against God. Formal complaints were laid by DRC members against 
the Parkhurst council, but despite this and accusations that it was guilty of "mutiny'', the council, 
under the leadership of Dr Jan van Rooyen, refused to back down. 18 
The synod's decision had the desired effect of forcing most of the few remaining DRC members 
15AD 1752 (4Dlal), Van Wyk, as quoted in Memorandum on "The Christian Institute". 
16Ibid. 
17Kerkbode, 2 November 1966. My translation. 
18AD 1752 (4dA1) Statement by the DRC Parkhurst church council, February 1967, and 
Star, 20 June 1967 and 14 August 1967, 23 February 1968. 
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to leave the CI, but it also helped marshal support for the CI in South Africa and, perhaps even 
more important, in international church circles. Overseas Reformed churches were in effect forced 
to choose between the CI, which preached against racial injustice and in favour of Christian unity, 
and the DRC, which at its 1966 synod, in accepting a commission sub-report on "Ras, Volk en 
Nasie in die lig van die Skrif', reaffirmed its support for apartheid and the development of racially 
separate DRC churches. 19 
Professor Bennie Keet believed the DRC had made a major error in the strong stand it had taken 
against the CI. He commented at the time: 
"It has been an unwise step for the Synod to force the issue, and it will cause a great deal 
of ill-feeling and harm. The resolution taken by the General Synod of the DRC is quite 
wrong .... The whole objection to the CI is that it wants to work with other churches. I am 
very sorry that the step was taken by the Synod because it tells members of my church 
what to do and think. It is against the freedom of thought of the entire church."20 
Typical of the attitude towards the DRC's decision on the CI in Dutch church circles was an 
editorial in the Dutch newspaper Trouw which said: 
"It is not a theological decision .... It is a political decision in favour of the policy of 
apartheid of the South African government. The synod has set foot on an iniquitous road 
which can only lead to further disaster."21 
The Hervormde Kerk in the Netherlands, the spiritual "mother" church of the DRC, was equally 
disturbed. Cabling for clarification, the board of the general synod of the Hervormde Kerk said: 
"Relations between the Nedcrlandse Hervormde Kerk and the NG Kerk will become so strained 
that it is questionable whether the Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk can continue to recognise the 
19Handelinge van die Algemene Sinode van die NG Kerk, October 1966. 
201752 (4Dlal), Van Wyk, as quoted, in Memorandum on "The Christian Institute". 
21Trouw, 1November1966. (My translation) 
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NG Kerk as a church".22 The extent of Dutch concern about the synod's decision was evident 
when 14 leading academics from the Free University and the Theological Seminary in Kampen 
wrote a letter of protest to the DRC.23 
The strong negative reaction from the Dutch churches and universities had serious implications 
for the DRC. The latter placed a high premium on academic exchange between South African 
universities and Dutch institutions such as the Free University, and valued the opportunities its 
ministers and theologians had to study abroad. During the course of the next decade the.doors 
would close. J\s fewer opportunities arose for white ministers to study abroad, their places were 
taken by ministers of the Dutch Reformed "daughter" churches, and Naude, together with figures 
like Professor Verkuyl at the Free University, were influential in opening doors for these black 
and coloured ministers.24 The DRC's action also led to increasing support for the work of the CI 
from churches in other countries. In the next decade, the budget and operations of the CI would 
expand rapidly, largely as a result of the growing sponsorship from the overseas churches. 
Kerkbode defended the synod's ruling, but Naude warned at the time that the DRC's inability to 
provide scriptural grounds for its decision had damaged its credibility: 
"This decision has placed the church on a road the outcome of which is uncertain. This 
is not in the first place about the Christian Institute, but about a cardinal principle which 
determines whether the church wishes to be and will remain a church. The question is -
what is the yardstick which is recognised by the church as the highest and final authority 
... the Word of God, or the word of a synod?" 
Naude accused Kerkbode editor Andries Treurnicht of basing his attacks on political rather than 
221\s quoted in Star, 5 November 1966. 
231\s quoted in Star, 15 December 1966. 
241 Vcrkuyl-Clur interview. 
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Biblical principles: 
"The editor has used a church newspaper to promote a decidedly party-political view of 
the Chri<>tian Institute, covered by a thin veneer of religion .... Our deepest concern is that 
Kerkbode has been used as the launching pad for the flight from Church to politics. In this 
exercise, Dr Treurnicht has been regularly and faithfully supported by Dr J.D. [Koot] 
Vorster .... It was these two brothers (brothers-in-arms in the ideological struggle they arc 
conducting), who in their ... teamwork in the church, are so close to the views of a current 
political extremism which is being carried further and further into our Church and which 
is going to plunge our Church further and further into misery. "25 
The deci<>ion taken at the DRC's 1966 synod had been intended to block the influence of Naude 
in the church, but increasingly the international church movement, including the Reformed 
churches, sided with the Cl's stand against apartheid. The implication of this was growing 
isolation for the DRC. The DRC had severed ties with the World Council of Churches, but it was 
still sensitive to criticism from the Reformed churches overseas. The DRC was shaken in 1967 
by the strong condemnation of apartheid issued by the Reformed Church of America. In reply, the 
DR C's director of information, Dr Willem Landman, wrote a book asking for "understanding" 
of his church's policies.26 It later emerged that the Department of Information provided financial 
backing for the book, which caused further embarrassment for the DRC.27 
i\.n attempt was made to promote official SA government policy at the 1968 Uppsala assembly 
of the World Council of Churches which focused, among other things, on South Africa's racial 
policies. During the conference South African agents dropped two Department of Information 
"fact sheets" outside the door of each Uppsala delegate, and also left copies of Landman's book. 
Referring to the incident on his return to South Africa, Naude said: 
"This action caused very serious harm to the witness the DRC wished to give through the 
25Pro Veritate, 15 August 1967. My translation. 
26W A Landman, A plea for understanding: a reply to the Reformed church in America. 
27F E O'Brien Geldenhuys, In die stroomversncllings: vyftig jaar van die NGK, p 75. 
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book. Delegates were also deeply upset by the fact that this gave the impression that while 
the DRC had withdrawn from the World Council - and had therefore officially ceased ... 
dialogue -it was now presenting its case through unknown individuals."28 
In an acceleration of the world church campaign against apartheid, the Reformed Ecumenical 
Synod (RES) at Lunteren in September 1968 also considered race issues. The synod, at which 
Naude was present, issued a statement, which was couched in moderate language, but posed a 
direct challenge to apartheid theologians by declaring that Christian unity should be expressed 
through "common worship, including holy communion, among Chrfatians regardless of race". The 
resolutions attracted widespread publicity because they directly confronted the two white South 
African members of the RES, the Gereformeerde Kerk and the DRC, with the need to reconsider 
their race policies. The CI endorsed the Lunteren resolutions, calling on the DRC to do the same; 
the latter put the i.;;sue on the back-burner by appointing the Landman Commission. This delayed 
issuing a report until 1974. The DRC faced more discomfort when one of its "daughter" 
churches, the Sendingkerk, endorsed the Lunteren resolutions. The DRC's refusal to reassess its 
support for apartheid led to tension and conflict with the daughter churches, and Naude became 
drawn into this dispute. 29 
It has been necessary to digress chronologically to trace and explain the consequences of the 
DH.C's conservative stand on apartheid. To return to Naude in 1966: another event related to the 
Cl's operation was the libel suit which Naude and Albert Geyser instituted against Adriaan Pont. 
Pont, a professor of Christian History at the University of Pretoria, was one of the Cl's fiercest 
28Van der Bent (ed), Breaking down the walls, p 15, Rand Daily Mail, 27 July 1968. 
29 AD 1752 (42D), Van Wyk, Christian Institute memorandum on the Reformed 
Ecumenical Synod, 6 September 1968, and P Walshe, Church versus state in South Africa: the 
case of the Christian Institute, p 80. 
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critics, and as early as 1964 he had attacked Beyers Naudc and Albert Geyser during a congress 
on communism held in Pretoria. Pont continued his criticism in 1965 in a series of articles which 
were published in the Hervormde Kerk's journal. He claimed that the CI had openly sided with 
"communist-inspired and directed Pan-Africanism". One article claimed: "The Christian Institute 
is in its deepest essence a carefully planned and well-equipped front organisation - a means 
whereby leftist and communist thoughts are being spread into the South African church world." 
Another article dealt with the Mindolo church conference which Naudc and Albert Geyser had 
attended in 1964. It said that the "fellow-theologians" who had participated in the conference had 
"sold themselves to the Devil" and that they were "traitors to God and their churches, traitors of 
their country and people". Pont also insisted that the Cl's membership drive, based on the 
principle of establishing small "circles", was similar to the "communist cell system" and later 
accused the two men directly of supporting communism. They threatened to sue unless an 
apology was published, but Pont was unrepentant. 30 
The case against Pont began in the Rand Supreme Court on 15 February 1967 and lasted 40 days. 
Naude and Geyser demanded R40 000 damages from Pont. The plaintiffs argued that it was clear 
Pont had been referring to them in several articles when he accused "fellow-theologians" of being 
communists and supporters of sabotage, war and revolution against South Africa. On 9 June 1967 
Mr Justice Trollip awarded Naude and Geyser RlO 000 each plus costs, then the highest amount 
ever awarded for libel in South Africa. Pont's appeal was also later dismissed with costs.31 
30Sunday Times, 3 December 1965, Die Hervormer, "Christenne wat die Christendom 
Haat'', p 8, Pro Veritate, 15 January 1967. 
31 National Archives Repository, TAB 496325927, Batch no 008350740000, Ref 
1705/1966, A Geyser and CF B Naude vs A Pont and various reports in Star, February, March 
1967 and South African Institute of Race Relations, A survey of race relations in South Africa, 
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The Pont issue was, in the greater scheme of things, a distraction for Naude 's work at the CI, but 
Naude and Geyser believed an important issue was at stake and they were vindicated by the 
courts. The conflict is an example of how Naude responded and acted on crises as they occurred. 
His main preoccupation, however, remained challenging apartheid, and the CI increasingly co-
operated with the SACC on this issue. 
One joint SACC-CI project which helped influence the direction of Naude's life was the issuing 
in 1968 of a Christian declaration challenging apartheid, entitled "A message to the peQp}e of 
South Africa". The background to this was that in 1967, following Naude and Burnett's 
participation at the WCC's 1966 Geneva conference, regional church consultations, arranged by 
the Christian Council and the CI, were held around South Africa to discuss the implications of 
the Geneva decision. The meetings culminated in a national conference on church and society held 
in Johannesburg in February 1968. The conference, which had considerable input from the laity 
as well as from theologians, tried to define how South Africa could become a more just society. 
The SACC, also in response to Geneva, established a theological commission to consider "what 
obedience to God requires [of] the Church in her witness to her unity in Christ in South Africa". 32 
The final report, "A message to the people of South Africa", was complied by John Davies, Ben 
Engelbrecht and Calvin Cook, who were also leading members of the CI. The "Message" was 
finally released at a press conference in September 1968. The six-page document sought to show 
that apartheid was contrary to the Christian message and that Christ had made reconciliation 
between people possible and essential: 
1967, p 11 and South African Institute of Race Relations, A survey of race relations in South 
Africa, 1968, p 20. 
32 De Gruchy, The church struggle, p 118. 
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"The Gospel of Jesus Christ declares that God is love; separation is the opposite force 
of love ... apartheid is a view of life and of man which insists that we find our identity in 
dissociation and distinction from each other; it rejects as undesirable the reconciliation 
which God is giving to us by His Son; it reinforces distinctions which the Holy Spirit is 
calling the people of God to overcome; it calls good evil. This policy is, therefore, a form 
of resistance to the Holy Spirit." 
The "Message" did not simply reject apartheid as unchrL<;tian, but warned that the system of racial 
segregation presented a threat to the church itself. Christians could not ignore what was 
happening in the wider society and were "under an obligation to live in accordance with the 
ChrL<;tian understanding of man and of community, even if this be contrary to some of the customs 
and laws of this country".33 
The "Message" was attacked by the Prime Minister, John Vorster, and came in for criticism from 
the DRC, and Baptists who said it confused man's eternal salvation with political issues. Later, 
a radical, black critique of the "Message" emerged that questioned the document for being a white 
initiative which had stopped short of understanding the gospel as a call for the oppressed to take 
their future into their own hands. But at the time the "Message" represented a significant 
challenge to many Christians and churches. 34 
The conflict between Vorster and the drafters of the "Message" signified a worsening of relations 
between the state and the CI-SA.CC. Vorster warned churchmen not to "disrupt order in South 
Africa under the cloak of religion". He declared that if anyone had ideas "about doing the kind 
of thing here in South Africa that Martin Luther King did in America" they had better "cut it out, 
cut it out immediately for the cloak you carry will not protect you if you try to do this in South 
331 W de Gruchy and W B de Villiers (eds), The message in perspective, pp 10 - 14. 
34De Gruchy, The church struggle, pp 120-121 and Walshe, Church versus state, p 62. 
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Africa". In response Naudc and a number of other leading figures in the CI and SACC sent an 
open letter to Vorster, insisting that as long as the government tried lo justify apartheid in terms 
of the Word of God, they as Christians would deny and challenge it. Vorster's reply to this was: 
"It docs not surprise me that you attack separate development. J\11 liberalists and leftists 
do likewise. It is with the utmost despL-;al, however, that I reject the insolence you display 
in attacking my Church as you do. This also applies lo other Church ministers of the 
Gospel ... who do in fact believe in separate development.... I again want to make a 
serious appeal to you to return to the essence of your preaching and to proclaim to your 
congregations the Word of God and the Gospel of Christ.. .. "35 
This public exchange set the tone for the relationship between the government and the 
anti-apartheid church leaders. Increasingly, Naude would play a leading role in this conflict. 
As 1968 drew to a close, the Christian Institute and its supporters became frustrated by their 
inability to attract Christians from the Afrikaans and black communities. As the Cl's board 
chairman Calvin Cook put it in his address to the August 1968 annual general meeting: 
"How frustrating to those who have shown such faith that we have produced so little to 
justify their hopes .... There is a growing suspicion that our influence was like King Log: 
one big splash, then a few ripples, and finally a tranquil pond once more. Despite the 
Institute, South Africa remains the most stable country in Africa: a financiers' dream. 
Again, the close scrutiny of the Institute's affairs showed that the fears of Professor Pont 
were completely unjustified: what he saw in the dark was not even a paper tiger; it was 
a domestic tabby. We seem headed for the limbo that awaits the politically unsuccessful: 
will Beyers Naude end up in some niche alongside of Tielman Roos and Robey 
Leibbrandt?"36 
Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to reflect on the socio-political climate in which 
Naude and the CI was operating. Undoubtedly, the National Party still felt unassailable; Vorster's 
threats to churchmen sounded more as if he were dealing with an annoying side-issue than 
35Soulh African Council of Churches, Pseudo gospels in South Africa, pp 31-34. 
36C Cook, Address to annual general meeting of the Christian Institute, October 1968. 
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tackling a major threat. Legislatively, the government was honing its apartheid policies and the 
thrust was to force surplus urban blacks to return to homelands, in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission, which had investigated rehabilitating black 
"reserve" areas in the 1950s. By the late 1960s the Vorster government had not succeeded in 
signillcant industrial decentralisation and enacted legislation further limiting residential rights lo 
blacks and to encourage migrant labour.37 Despite these failures, the prevailing view in Afrikaner 
nationalist circles was that separate development was the only viable political system for South 
Africa, and that whites had to retain power of the state. But in the midst of what seemed 
unshakable Afrikaner confidence, from the late 1960s Afrikaner unity began to crumble. NJ J 
Olivier broke away from the National Party because he believed apartheid had become "a cloak 
for massive discrimination"38, and hberal Afrikaans writers and poets became part of the Sestigers 
generation. The period between 1966 and 1969 also brought about the first major breakaway in 
Afrikanerdom since 1948. In 1968, Vorster, reacting to the creation of right-wing pressure 
groups which he felt were usurping the right of the NP to speak exclusively for the volk, dismissed 
Albert Hertzog and two other ministers from his Cabinet. In 1969, this conservative group, or 
verkramptes, formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). The HNP was never a threat to the 
NP's supremacy, but as Davenport points out, the "success of the Government's campaign against 
the verkramptes also required constant assertiveness against the liberals ... for it could not be seen 
to lack the courage of its convictions and still hope to stay in power".39 In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, one of Vorster's major "liberal" targets was Naudc and the Christian Institute. 
37T RH Davenport, South Africa: a modern history, pp 341 - 372 
38S Bekker, Ethnicity in focus: the South African case, p 39. 
390avenport, South Africa, pp 383 - 385. 
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5 Challenge of Black Consciousness, 1969 - 1972 
The last chapter concluded with a brief overview of developments in Afrikaner politics in the late 
1960s. At the same time, significant stirrings. were evident in black politics, and the most 
important development was the emergence of the Black Consciousness (BC) movement which 
was to have a major impact on Naude. 
BC stemmed from black university student leadership of the late 1960s and early 1970s ancl found 
support on the campuses of the ethnically-divided homeland universities. At that time, the 
National Union of South African Students (Nusas), which offered a liberal critique of apartheid, 
was permitted to operate on white campuses only, but the exception was the black section of 
Natal University (Wentworth) where medical student Steve Biko was enrolled. Biko became 
involved in Nusas in 1966 but he began to question the unequal and artificial integration of 
student politics in a movement dominated by whites. Biko engineered a black walkout from the 
Nusas conference in Grahamstown in 1967. He also attended the Nusas conference in July 1968, 
again held in Grahamstown; at the same time the multi-racial United Christian Movement (UCM) 
was holding a meeting in nearby Stutterheim, and Biko also attended this conference where he 
began to canvas support for the creation of a black student grouping. By late 1968, Biko and his 
friend since boyhood, Barney Pityana, had formed a black student caucus. The South African 
Students Organisation (SASO) was officially launched in December 1968 at Mariannhill as a 
breakaway from Nusas. In July 1970 SASO convened its first General Students Council at the 
University of Natal, and it had defined its position as encouraging black people to rely entirely on 
themselves in the struggle for liberation. In July 1972 an umbrella Black Consciousness 
organisation, the Black People's Convention (BCP), was launched in Pietermaritzburg and the 
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inaugural conference of the BPC was held at Hammanskraal in December 1972. BC sought to 
unify black people, infuse them with pride and fight for their freedom. BC strongly rejected white 
superiority and political control. There was an understandable loathing of official white authority 
for policing the apartheid system, but there was an equal resentment of white "liberals" who were 
regarded as being patronising of blacks and enjoying the fruits of the apartheid system which they 
claimed to oppose. 1 
Biko was unquestionably the chief architect of BC in South Africa; its chief motivation.at the 
earliest stage was to break free from the bonds of white control. Most Nusas liberals were highly 
critical of SASO, accusing its founders of falling into line with apartheid ideology. Biko was often 
on the defensive in those early days, as was the case in his presidential address to SASO in 
December 1969 when he defended the creation of the all-black student movement. He said the 
"idea of everything being done for the blacks is an old one and all liberals take pride in it; but once 
the black students want to do things for themselves suddenly they are regarded as becoming 
militant".2 Biko and his colleagues gradually developed a policy and a programme, by reflecting 
on their own experiences and by borrowing from foreign sources. American proponents of black 
power such as Frantz Fanon, Eldridge Cleaver, Stockley Carmichael and Charles Hamilton all 
influenced Biko's writing, while James Cone's contribution to Black Theology also had a marked 
1G M Gerhart, Black power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology, pp 257 - 263, 
D Hirschmann, "The black consciousness movement in South Africa", The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, pp 1 - 4, M Mangena, On your own: evolution of black consciousness in South 
Africa/Azania , pp 11 - 32 and S Biko, "The definition of black consciousness" (appendix in 
Mangena, On your own), pp 153-154 and B Pityana interview with C Clur, 1997. 
2S Biko, "SJ\SO: its role, its significance and its future" in S Biko, I write what I like, p 
17. 
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impact on the local Black Theology movcmcnt.3 In 1970, Biko wrote that the "first step is to 
make the black man come to himself...to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing 
himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supremc ... This is what we mean by an 
inward-looking process. This is the definition of Black Consciousncss".4 
Mention has already hcen made of the United Christian Movement (UCM), but it is necessary to 
provide greater context because both Biko and Naude interacted with this organisation, and the 
UCM also had an influence on the development of the BC movement. The UCM, which was 
headed by white Methodist minister Basil Moore, was founded in 1967 by a small group of 
whites who were attempting to unite Christian students of all races in the study of the social 
implications of the gospel and in working for change in South Africa. With an approach to 
worship that orthodox white denominations considered too "free and easy" and a theology that 
was "avant-garde", the UCM soon drew a black following at homeland universities where Nusas 
was barred. The University of Fort Hare had not allowed the official establishment of the UCM; 
however, students organised a mission in July 1968 at which Moore, who was smuggled on to 
campus, and Steve Biko spoke. At this meeting students had an opportunity to develop 
relationships across campuses and began to consider educational and political issues, and these 
developments provided a boost to SAS0.5 
Also in 1968 a UCM delegation headed by Moore travelled to the US and on its return Moore 
published a position paper on Black Theology. A Black Theology project was set up which 
3Gerhart, Black power in South Africa, p 275. 
4Biko, "We blacks", in I write what I like, p 43. 
5J W de Gruchy, The church struggle in South Africa, p 154 and B Pityana-Clur interview. 
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focused on black experience and Black Consciousness in relation to the gospel of Jesus Christ, 
and several publications on the new ideas were L<;sued. Advocates of Black Theology believed that 
white colonialL<;ts and mL<;sionaries had succeeded in destroying African culture and economic and 
family life in the process of "civilising" and "converting" the indigenous people. Although they 
rejected traditional Western Christianity, they did not reject Christ. They found signs of hope in 
the gospel, in Christ's identification with the poor, the suffering and the oppressed. The task of 
Black Theology was to "Africanise" Christianity, to relate it to the history of black people and to 
help people recognise that they were equal in God's eyes. The Black Theology issue was formally 
raised at SASO's 1970 congress when students were called on to support it, and following this 
there was close interaction between SASO leaders and Black Theology proponents.6 
There is some difference of opinion on how much influence Black Theology exerted on the BC 
movement. Barney Pityana plays it down, but Gail Gerhart says that BC thinking was taken on 
ardently by many black churchmen "under the rubric of black theology" before the Vorster 
government began to crack down on both movements. 7 Bonganjalo Goba asserts that Black 
Theology had a major impact on BC. Goba notes the foundation Black Theology laid for future 
church opposition to the apartheid state, and this view is soundly backed by the events of the 
following years.8 Leaders of Black Theology in the early 1970s who were involved in the BC 
movement, and who began to work with black churchmen at grassroots level, became targets of 
state action. In 1970, the Vorster government demonstrated its antagonism by banning UCM 
7B Pityana-Clur interview and Gerhart, Black power in South Africa, p 294. 
8B Goba, "The influence of three political movements on the church's role in the South 
African liberation struggle", South African Outlook, pp 45 - 46. 
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literature and confiscating Moore's passport. The white church leadership was also alarmed at the 
radicalisation of the UCM. The Methodist Church showed its disapproval by transferring Basil 
Moore from the student chaplaincy at Rhodes University in Grahamstown. When he joined the 
staff of the CI in 1971 he was deprived of his ministerial status.9 The action against Moore, not 
unlike the treatment the DRC had meted out to Naude, struck the latter as typical of how the 
English-speaking churches were not prepared to extend their thinking as the direction in the battle 
against apartheid changed. 10 The growth in the BC movement coincided with mounting State 
harassment of the UCM, and in 1972 the organisation decided to disband. Moore played an 
important role in developing the Black Theology debate and he was also influential in helping 
Naude and other white people adjust to the new political reality.11 
All of the other events and activities in which Naude was involved in the period between 1969 and 
1972 took place against the backdrop of the developments in the BC movement and the UCM, 
and Naude was profoundly influenced. If one asks why Naude was so open to these new 
influences, the answer is that in this period he began to regard blacks as equals. Many of Naude's 
colleagues have identified his involvement with the black AICA churchmen as a significant factor 
in his new openness to black people and black-led initiatives. Cedric Mayson, a former Methodist 
minister who worked closely with Naude in the CI in the 1970s, commented later that "a central 
theme in everybody who made that change, including Beyers, was that they got to know black 
people". Mayson suggested that Naude's first real face-to-face contact was with AICA 
9Pro Veritate, 15 April 1972. 
10C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
11 P Walshe, Church versus state: the case of the Christian Institute, p 95. 
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ministers12 • Barney Pityana, who was introduced to Naude through his SASO and UCM 
involvement, also identified Naude and the Cl's involvement with AICA as the starting point for 
his growing acceptance of black initiatives. 13 
Naude's knowledge of black people was enhanced by his continuing involvement with the African 
Independent (AICA) churches. Naude's CI colleagues were often driven to despair by the high 
priority he gave to this work. Many former CI workers have cited instances where Naude, instead 
of attending to pressing CI business, would be locked in inconclusive meetings with.AICA 
representatives trying to resolve a leadership feud, or else negotiating with garages and mechanics 
for a new car for a black minister. One of the AICA leaders who developed a close relationship 
with Naude was Bishop Harry Ngada of the African Methodist Episcopal Church. Ngada worked 
for the CI for four years and later for AICA as a literacy worker before founding his own 
Spiritualist Churches Association. Ngada said: 
"I first met Beyers in 1967 when he helped me to get a scholarship to study at my 
church's seminary .... He became a precious friend, in some instances he was like a father, 
even a grandfather. If you went to Beyers with a problem you were sure, if he had a way 
of helping you, he would .... After I completed my studies I was stranded in the sense that 
the church couldn't pay me a stipend because the African Independent Churches and their 
members are poor in the true sense of the word. I was in a desperate situation, with a wife 
and two children and a mother to support. Through Beyers and Brian Brown, who was 
the Cl's administrative director, I was offered work with the Cl. I worked there for four 
years and carried on with my ministry. The source of my strength during my involvement 
with all the struggles of this country came from Beyers and the CI. I don't think a day 
would pass without Beyers attending to an AICA problem. He dedicated his life to it. He 
always said that the African Independent Churches were an important part of the church. 
"Most Christians in South Africa are members of these African Independent Churches and 
they have been ignored. Through his base at the CI he tried his best to help .... He has been 
a father to us, in good times and bad. If the history of AICA is ever written, then Naude 
12C Mayson interview with C Clur, 1988. 
13B Pityana-Clur interview. 
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should be described as the spearhead, because he introduced the idea of unity to the AI 
churches. "14 
The CI had always maintained AICA's records and budget because the organisation lacked 
administrative skills but by 1972 Naude felt that this arrangement could not continue. Dissatisfied 
with AICA's inability to spend its funds wisely and influenced by the prevailing sentiment in the 
Black Consciousness movement and by the wishes of overseas donors who wanted AICA to have 
financial autonomy, Naude moved to reduce AICA's dependence on the CI. Recommending that 
AICA hire a qualified bookkeeper and other administrative staff, the CI handed financial .control 
over lo the organisation in January 1973. By the end of the year the organisation had virtually 
collapsed and the college had been closed down as money via the CI dried up. 15 
Another CI worker who was closely involved with the AICA work was Methodist minister Brian 
Brown. Born in Cape Town, Brown had studied accountancy for four years before entering the 
ministry. He joined the CI in the late 1960s and became one of NaudC's closest colleagues and 
friends, serving the CI until its closure in 1977. Of his and NaudC's involvement with the 
independent churches, Brian Brown later commented: 
"I think AICA is a success story on one level and a disaster on the other. The success 
story is that the CI had created an image of openness and sensitivity which enabled people 
to come to Beyers and seek a relationship which had either not been sought, or had been 
sought and denied, within the historic churches .... The AI churches were as a result of this 
in a large measure put on the map ... they became part of the body of Christ and even in 
my time we stopped talking about separatist sects and talked about the Independent 
churches." 
14H Ngada interview with C Clur; 1988. 
15AD 1752 (40) CF B Naude, Memorandum on the relationship between AICA and the 
Christian Institute, 1972, Department of Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand 
Library, Fred van Wyk Papers, and M West, Bishops and prophets in a black city, p 161. 
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Brown said part of AICA's problcm was that it was a community's "first attempt at togetherness" 
and divisiveness had been the pattern all along". He partly agreed with a criticism that Naudc was 
not firm enough when it came to requests for money: 
"We were in a situation of professing a Christian ideal, which was to allow democracy 
to prevail, and doing so in the context of a society where white paternalism had always 
determined black responses. Beyers was trying to break away from that. The kind of 
strength of response which could be called correct and responsible in healthier societies 
was so easily viewed as either paternalism at best or racism at worst in the context of the 
CL And if I am to defend ourselves and damn our~elves, we did not want to be racists and 
so we yielded in terms of financial disbursements when we were not always happy that 
they were being properly used. So the criticism of Beyers is legitimate but it has to be seen 
in the context of the bedevilment of interpersonal relationships in South Africa,.by the 
history of white domination and by the enduring reality of racism, and it was in that vice 
that we were crushed."16 
By the late 1960s many of the initiatives of the Cl were in decline. The Cl's Bible study groups, 
which had been one of its central features in the early years, were showing signs of stagnation. 
In 1969 there were some 55 groups, and by the next year this number had risen to 78, but 
members felt that the groups amounted to a great deal of talk but no concrete action. The aim 
of the groups had been to encourage inter-racial and interdenominational contact between 
Christians, but the major problems were apathy, the distances between white and black residential 
areas, and intimidation by official church and state structures. The centralised structure of the CI, 
with major initiatives being taken by staff rather than by members, contributed to the decline. It 
was an aspect of the Cl's ministry that never lived up to expectations. 17 
16B Brown interview with C Clur, 1988. 
17 AD 1752 ( 4D) Cl memorandum: "Evaluation of the Christian Institute of Southern 
Africa", August 1970 Department of Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Library, 
Fred van Wyk Papers and AD 1752 ( 4C) Minutes of the CI Board of Management meeting, 18 
February 1969. 
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Another sign of the change in the character of the CI was the steady decline in Afrikaner 
membership. Initially between 40 to 50 ministers of the DRC had joined the CI; by 1969 there 
were none left. Subscriptions to Pro Veritate by Afrikaners were also falling. 18 
The wanmg iniluence of Afrikaners was also seen in the departure of several prominent 
Afrikaans-speakers from the staff of the Cl. Important staff members Ben Engelbrecht and Fred 
van Wyk left in 1970. Founder member Albert Geyser also withdrew. Van Wyk, who returned 
to the SA Institute of Race Relations as director, continued to serve on the Cl's board of trustees 
for several years. It seems there was a general concern that Naude was becoming "too radical" 
and men like Van Wyk and Geyser fell away, not because of the pressure from the DRC which 
had seen earlier followers fall by the wayside, but because they disagreed with Naudc on political 
issues. 19 
The parting between Naude and Engelbrecht was not cordial. Engelbrecht said his decision to 
leave the CI and join the University of the Witwatersrand's faculty of divinity, which Albert 
Geyser headed, was prompted by dissatisfaction with the changes that were occurring within the 
CI. Engelbrecht appeared to have clashed with Naude from the start; Engelbrecht was unhappy 
that Naude, and not he, was the first editor of Pro Veritate, and that he assumed full editorship 
only after the CI had been in existence for a few years. He also said later that he felt Naude had 
not behaved consistently and that he had exaggerated South Africa's problem to overseas 
18Argus, 23 August 1969 and B Engelbrecht interview with C Clur, 1988. 
191 van Rooyen, B Engelbrecht and M Marais interviews with C Clur, 1988. Engelbrecht, 
in a letter to Beeld, 10 May 1980, draws a clear distinction between the activities of the CI before 
and after 1970 and finds the Cl's mission before this period to have been morally justified. 
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churchmen. He said: 
"It seemed that Beyers Naude developed more and more in the direction of radicalism. 
When I left I never ever looked back. I just closed the door behind me and didn't want to 
have anything to do with Pro Veritate and the CI. Looking back I think that I was quite 
right. After my departure from the CI everything became so radical: the viewpoints, the 
way they acted. It was throwing down the gauntlet to the state."20 
Engclbrecht's statements give an insight into the feeling of disappointment among some of 
Naudc's Afrikaner friends who felt he had betrayed their original mission. The late John Rees, 
who was to follow Bill Burnett as the next general secretary of the SACC, and who observed 
many of these reactions, commented later: 
"They accused him of having started the CI with one aim in mind, and then changing it 
when he was unable to succeed with his original goal. They were not being totally fair 
since it was a very difficult job to change whites, but that is how they perceived it. Naude 
evoked strong reactions and there were some who hated him. But his role as the 
conscience of Afrikaners was still crucially important. Afrikaners were quietly beating 
tracks to his door all the time. Even though some of them disliked him so much they still 
used to call him 'Oom Bey' ."21 
The departure of these Afrikaner supporters from the CI reflected that state of flux in the 
organisation. But it was not only the CI that was undergoing great change. The SA Institute of 
Race Relations was experiencing a crisis of its own, especially after the Vorster government had 
forced the closure of the Liberal Party; by the late 1960s the Institute 's director, Quintin Whyte, 
conceded that the organi-;ation need to reassess its aims and direction.22 Van Wyk returned to the 
SAIRR in 1970 lo replace Whyte and was confronted with the same challenges as the CI with 
regard to the BC movement. Under Van Wyk's leadership, and in11uenced by a group in the 
20Argus, 23 August 1969 and B Engelbrecht-Clur interview. 
211 Recs interview with C Clur, 1989. 
22P Rich, "Liberals, radicals and the politics of black consciousness, 1969 - 1976", African 
Studies Seminar Paper, p 5. 
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Institute who favoured a cautious line, he continued to emphasise attracting support from 
traditional white liberals, such as supporters of the Progressive Party. Paul Rich has argued that 
Van Wyk's view of the BC movement was that it was similar to the racist ideology underpinning 
apartheid and Van Wyk refused to bend to it.23 Van Wyk's support for more conservative politics 
supports the contention that, like Engelbrecht and some others, he moved away from the CI 
because of political disagreements with Naude. 
The departure of Ben Engelbrecht from the CI signalled a gradual change in the character.of Pro 
Veritate. Naude had been the first editor, followed by Engelbrecht, who had always been primarily 
responsible for the production of the journal when he had worked for the CI. He was replaced by 
another Afrikaner theologian and long-time worker at the CI, Bruckner de Villiers. Although he 
also came out of the DRC, De Villiers had broader and more progressive political and theological 
views than his predecessor and under his editorship the journal's circulation steadily increased to 
the Cl's growing membership of mainly white English-speakers. When De Villiers left after two 
years his place was taken by another former DRC minister, Roelf Meyer. Abandoning its 
theological emphasis, Pro Veritate began to devote more attention to social issues and current 
affairs. The journal also followed the progress and course of the BC movement, by giving 
prominence to the Black Theology and BC ideas. Throughout its life, Beyers Naude contributed 
regularly to Pro Veritate and the articles he wrote are a valuable source for charting the changes 
in his political thinking over the years.24 
23Ibid, p 14. 
24Various copies of Pro Veritate, 1963 - 1977 and Report on Pro Veritate by Roelf 
Meyer, for the Annual General Meeting of the CI, 9 September 1972. 
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One of the most important new influences in Naude's life in the late 1960s was Theo Kotze, who 
in 1969 became director of the Cl's newly establi'ihed Cape Town regional office. Kotze had been 
the Methodi'it mini'iter of a successfol parish in Sea Point in Cape Town. As a member of the CI, 
he developed a close friendship with Naude. Kotzc's involvement in the CI deepened after he 
agreed to head the Cl's Bible study group in Cape Town and to serve on the Cl's board of 
management. It was decided that the CI should open a Cape regional office and the funds for the 
project were raised from the Methodist Church in the USA 25 
A development which affected the CI was the launching of the Study Project on Christianity in 
an Apartheid Society, known as Spro-cas, in March 1969. Sponsored jointly by the SACC and 
the CI, it was to play a decisive role in advancing Naude's thinking on political issues. Spro-cas 
was meant partially as an answer to the criticism that the "Message to the people of South Africa" 
had not spelt out an alternative to apartheid. Spro-cas set out to examine various aspects of South 
African society, including political, social and economic, and spell out strategies for change. 
Naude believed that with the issuing of the "Message to the people of South Africa", a new note 
of hesitancy had crept into the attitude of the government and the DRC. The CI decided to spell 
out alternatives which were more just and Christian than those of apartheid. The CI became the 
moving force behind Spro-cas because member churches of the SACC were still hesitant to take 
a leading role.26 
The "slowness" of the SACC to react also highlights the tensions that existed between the CI and 
25AD 1752 (4E(a)), Van Wyk, Christian Institute memorandum: Budget 1969 to 1970. 
26C F B Naude interview with P Randall, 1982 and P Randall interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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the council. The more cautious approach of the SACC was partly dictated by the SACC's 
relationship with its own member churches, whose support for programmes which challenged 
apartheid varied a great deal. An example of these conflicting styles was the reaction to the 
appointment of Peter Randall to head Spro-cas.. Randall came from a liberal English-speaking 
background, and although he had a Methodist upbringing, he had no claims to being a practising 
Christian. He nevertheless was keen to take on the challenge presented by the Spro-cas project. 
There were members of the SACC who were unhappy with the choice of Randall as director of 
Spro-cas because of his lack of Christian commitment. Naude, however, insisted that he was the 
best man for the job. For someone who had practised his faith so piously, Naude's openness on 
this point might have surprised many. But he had come to accept and work with people of 
different backgrounds and religious convictions. Naude commented later: 
"There were people who said, 'Kindly find a committed Christian for Spro-cas.' And I 
said if you can find such a person who has the same capability of handling this effectively 
from a purely academic viewpoint, then bring him, let him do the job. If not, then I am not 
bothered by such nonsense .... To me the important thing was the intrinsic value, the 
capability of a person, and his commitment to our goal."27 
Spro-cas was intended to advance the church's critique of apartheid, contained in the "Message" 
which had been based on five biblical principles: faith in human dignity, acknowledgement of 
individual responsibility, commitment to uplifting the oppressed, working for constructive social 
change and building a shared society. The guiding idea behind Spro-cas was to use this biblical 
commitment to social renewal in order to present alternatives to apartheid in crucial areas of 
society - economic, educational, church, legal, political and social. Six study commissions were 
set up to analyse these areas and propose alternatives. Randall set out to recruit experts from 
27C F B Naude-Clur interview and J W de Gruchy, "The relationship between the state and 
some churches in South Africa, 1968 - 1975, Journal of church and state, p 439. 
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various fields, and 130 people were drawn into the Spro-cas studies, which issued reports over 
five years. 28 
An immediate problem was black reluctance .to participate. Randall approached numerous 
important black figures to serve on the commissions, but the prevailing suspicion of white liberal 
initiatives made it very difficult for him to attract more than a small number of black panellists. 
In spite of this, the BC movement had a profound effect on Spro-cas, and especially its successor, 
Spro-cas 2, and the CI. Naude later said: 
"Even though the number of black participants was not as high as we would have wanted, 
the discussions we had in the different commissions revealed very clearly the nature and 
depth of the differences in the English-speaking churches between a reformist and a more 
radical stand. It also became very clear that for us to gain acceptance with the black 
community we would have to move forward and to take a more radical stand."29 
The recognition shown by Naude, Peter Randall and others of the need to adopt a more radical 
approach did not always accord with the findings of the Spro-cas reports. As Peter Walshe has 
pointed out, the Spro-cas project was limited by its origins and the composition of the study 
commissions, and contained many contradictions. The Spro-cas Economics Commission report, 
for example, attempted to envisage a more equal economic order but only hinted at the need for 
structural changes to the capitalist system and did not present the proposal of Black 
Consciousness critics.30 The Political Commission also revealed in its report the dominance of 
white thinking. The commissioners were concerned about the lack of political rights for black 
South Africans, but they rejected a black majority government. Instead they favoured a 
federal-style government in South Africa, with "proportional representation", "regional 
28Pro Veritate, 15 August 1969. 
29 CF B Naude-Randall interview. 
30Walshe, Church versus state, pp 104 - 105. 
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autonomy" and pluralism as a "necessary counterweight to the power of government and as a 
necessary base for a free society".31 
Biko, criticising Spro-cas as a white liberal initiative, remarked at the time that the Spro-cas 
commissions were "looking for an 'alternative' acceptable to the white man. Everybody in the 
commissions knows what is right, but they arc looking for the most seemly way of dodging the 
rcsponsibilit y". 32 
Spro-cas had no immediate impact on socio-political change in South Africa, but it defined many 
of the issues that would dominate public debate in the next decade. Spro-cas also helped the CI 
and Naude to understand the new challenges confronting the church in South Africa. However, 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s the Institute was still battling to make the adjustments and the 
transitions this involved, and was coming under pressure from its overseas donor bodies to take 
a stronger, more active stand against apartheid. Referring to this in his 1969 director's report, 
Naude said: 
"We are deeply grateful for the moral and financial support which we receive from ... 
[overseas] bodies and groups and we are aware, sometimes with trepidation, of the 
expectations they hold of our witness and work. In the past two years, partly because of 
the increase and strength of the militant Black Power and anti-apartheid groups 
throughout the Western world ... the feeling against South Africa, because of our racist 
policies, has been steadily mounting, and calls for violent action have been made from 
within Christian groups who sec no other way to resolve a situation of serious 
discrimination." 
Naude was still hesitant about adopting a radical course in 1969 and he said that "despite criticism 
31 P Randall (ed), A taste of power: the final co-ordinated Spro-cas report, p 99. 
32As quoted in Z Mbali, The churches and racism: a black South African perspective, p 
50. 
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from some overseas groups of our being too conservative (and exactly the opposite indictment 
from many whites in South Africa) we will have to pursue the course of obedience to God and 
his Word as we understand it through Christ".33 
At thic; time there was alc;o growing concern in DRC circles about NaudC's inlluence and relations 
with churches overseas. When the Gereformeerde Kerk in the Netherlands met in synod at 
Lunteren in March 1970, tensions between the DRC and the CI came to a head. An important 
issue to be debated was the resolution on racism adopted by the Reformed Ecumenical Synod two 
years earlier. Representatives from the DRC and Gereformeerde Kerk in South Africa, and a 
representative from the black NGKA were invited to attend the Lunteren synod. Pro Veritate 
editor Dr Bruckner de Villiers was present as an observer. At Lunteren numerous Dutch speakers 
spoke out strongly against Christian collaboration with apartheid. The DRC delegation used the 
public platform to criticise the CI and Naude. During his address to the synod, DRC actuary Koot 
Vorster claimed that the CI was misappropriating funds intended for the African Independent 
churches and further suggested that Naude was immoral for allowing himself to be addressed as 
"dominee" when his church had defrocked him. This attack was rebutted by De Villiers, who was 
permitted to speak because of the severity of the accusations that had been made. To demonstrate 
that the DRC was "reasonable", Moderator Kosie Gericke intimated that his church was prepared 
to enter into dialogue with the Cl. In this climate, in which Dutch churchmen thought they 
detected a slight softening in the attitude of their South African sister church, a decision was taken 
not to condemn the policy of apartheid outright, for fear of jeopardising future talks. The synod 
adopted a moderate condemnation of racial discrimination without any direct reference to South 
33C F B Naude director's report of the Christian Institute, 1969. 
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Africa. Mindful that the white DRC might use this resolution as "proof" that the world did not 
condemn apartheid, the synod also sent the South African church a letter containing a plea to 
reconsider its racial policies and to begin negotiations with the Cl.34 
Although in Holland the DRC had seemed willing to meet with the CI, Gericke promptly denied 
this on his return to South Africa. Frustrated by these developments Naude wrote in Pro Veritate: 
"There is a serious contradiction; the Gereformeerde Kerk in the Netherlands has formally 
taken notice of the undertaking of the DRC to a discussion, while Dr Gericke immediately 
denies it. It can only give the impression that leaders of the DRC are willing, when 
confronted overseas, to make certain promises in order to prevent criticism from members 
of sister churches, but they are then anxious to evade the responsibility of giving a hearing 
to the Christian Institute." 35 
Increasingly the world church community was moving in the direction of wishing to take active 
steps to oppose apartheid and the Cl's commitment to this was gaining it strong support in the 
ecumenical community. This was evident when Professor Verkuyl visited South Africa shortly 
after Lunteren as a guest of the CI and the SACC. He was accompanied by Jone Bos, secretary 
of an inter-church aid agency in the Netherlands. The two men were members of a new Dutch 
organisation, known as the Kairos working group, which promoted awareness of South Africa's 
race policies in the Netherlands and lent moral and financial support to the Cl. Kairos, which had 
been formed at the request of Naude, was headed for the first few years by Professor Verkuyl and 
was important in mobilising support for the CI in the Dutch church community.36 
Numerous colleagues and friends have identified Naude's responsiveness to change as one of his 
34As reported in Pro Veritate, 15 April 1970. 
35Pro Veritate, 15 March 1970. 
36B van Kaam and J Verkuyl interviews with C Clur, 1988. 
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most notable character traits. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when shifts took place. Very often 
an ambiguity seemed to creep into what Naudc was saying and doing. In seeking to win people 
over to his side Naudc would avoid long debates on issues that could cause conflict. This often 
led people to believe that he actually agreed with them when he did not do so fully. A 
complicating factor was the reactionary political climate in South Africa. Statements and projects 
that were considered moderate and even conservative in overseas or black circles were often 
considered revolutionary and subversive by white South Africans, and seized on by the Vorster 
government. Naude sought to play down issues that would further alienate white South A(ricans, 
and this sometimes gave the impression of contradictory behaviour. Kor Groenendijk, head of the 
Kairos group in the Netherlands for many years, said: 
"Everybody had his own idea of Beyers. People would visit him and speak to him and 
come back and say that Beyers agreed with them. What usually happened is that Beyers 
would listen to people and not say very much, he would be kind and not disagree. They 
did not understand his understatement or the fact that he was often in a difficult position 
in South Africa."37 
As was argued in the previous chapter; an issue which became a crucial test for Naude and the 
church community in South Africa was the World Council of Churches' decision to create a 
practical programme to combat racism. The Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) was proposed 
at a consultation held at Notting Hill, London, in 1969 and was endorsed by the central committee 
of the WCC at Canterbury later that year. The idea was to tackle racism in all spheres of life and 
to give active aid and support to oppressed communities. This included support for the idea that 
Christians were entitled to use force as a last resort to end injustice. The SACC, affiliated to the 
37K Groenendijk interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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wee but still largely dominated by whites, expressed strong reservations about these proposals.38 
The opposition from South Africa did little to sway the WCC. In August 1970 the central 
committee of the wee agreed to set up a special.fund to provide humanitarian aid for liberation 
movements as part of the PCR programme. The PCR consisted of many other, less controversial 
projects but the main media focus was on the special fund. In the first year $200 000 was 
distributed to 19 organisations, with most of the money going to liberation movements fighting 
racism and colonialism in the southern African region. Beneficiaries included the PAC and /\NC 
(representing South Af'rica), ZAPU and ZANU (then Rhodesia) and SWAPO (then South West 
Africa).39 
In South Africa the programme was attacked by the government and government-supporting 
churches and media. Naude, in his first reaction, again anxious to shake off any suggestion that 
the CI supported the use of violence, also expressed reservations about the WCC's plans.40 The 
issue was prominently reported in the press, but there was no reflection of the views of black 
Christians, which began to concern Naude. Pro Veritate, in a special issue, published in full the 
decision of the WCC, as well as all available points of view. At first the CI opposed the grants, 
but there was evidence that Nau de and his organisation had begun to give more thought to the 
matter. In a perceptive article on the PCR's special fund he wrote: 
"I venture to suggest that this decision ... will be a catalyst, a parting of the ways, not 
only for the world churches, but also for the churches in South Africa; the consequences 
38J W de Gruchy, The church struggle in South Africa, p 129 and E Adler, A small 
beginning: an assessment of the first five years of the programme to combat racism, p 15. 
39lbid. 
40Star 5 September 1970. 
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of this decision cannot yet be foreseen. 
"Tl)e general reaction of whites, who have, with saintly indignation, raised their hands to 
the heavens, as if they have no part in the guilt ... as if they have no injustices to right, no 
involvement in the situation which has led to this decision - this reaction has widened the 
gulf between them and the world community .... 
"In the middle of all the storm ... there has been a great silence ... the silence of the more 
than 18 million voices of the black population of South Africa .... Those of us who have 
had the opportunity and the privilege of contact with some of these non-white leaders, 
know and understand: they dare not speak out about their true feclings."41 
Nau de, after consultations with blacks and white CI colleagues, had begun to reconsider his 
position. It would be many years before his new views on the black liberation movements would 
crystallise; his willingness to consider why black people had resorted to an armed struggle was 
an important pointer to the change he was undergoing. 
The Vorster government reacted extremely negatively to the PCR and ordered South African 
churches to withdraw from the SACC. Vorster also bitterly attacked Naude, saying he owed the 
country an "explanation" for his stand.42 The SACC member churches all criticised the WCC's 
Programme to Combat Racism, but the SACC elected to stay in the WCC, believing it important 
to keep open the lines of communication. The churches' stand angered the government, which 
then blocked a proposed meeting between the SACC and WCC representatives to discuss the 
PCR. The state also refused visas to any foreign visitor from the WCC, ending a long tradition 
of close contact between South Africa and the Council.43 
41 Pro Veritate, 15 October 1970. 
42 As quoted in Rand Daily Mail, 2 October 1970. 
43De Gruchy, The church struggle, p 133. 
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The controversy resulted in the government taking a hard line against critical clergy. In January 
1971 Pro Veritate published a list of seven South African ministers whose passports had been 
seized and 17 foreign church workers whose residence permits had been withdrawn or who had 
been refused entry to the country. 44 Several of the people who came under state pressure were 
members or workers attached to the CI. In February 1971 the Cl's group worker, Anglican 
minister 01lin Davison, was deported. Cosmas Desmond, then a Catholic priest working for the 
CI, had his passport confiscated and was later banned for five years and placed under house arrest. 
Action against churchmen continued in 1972 and two ministers who had taken up posts with the 
CI, Basil Moore and David de Beer, were among those banned. In April 1972, Pro Veritate listed 
well over 100 cases of severe action against church people. 45 
In the midst of the WCC controversy, the DRC held its general synod in October 1970. Four 
years had elapsed since the DRC's general synod had ordered its members to withdraw from the 
CI, and the small number of DRC members who still belonged to the CI faced disciplinary action 
for their "disobedience". Before the synod met, Naude and 33 fellow CI members wrote to 
members of the synod appealing to them to reverse the 1966 decision.46 The Parkhurst DRC, still 
under the leadership of Jan van Rooyen, also made representations explaining why it had not acted 
against Naude and others in the church who were still CI members. A number of other church 
councils, critical of the Parkhurst stand, tabled resolutions attacking Parkhurst for failing to 
adhere to church discipline. Conscious of the attention of the world Reformed community, 
especially aiter the promise to enter into dialogue with the CI at the Lunteren synod, the church 
44Pro Veritate, 15 January, 1971. 
4~Pro Veritate, 15 April 1972. 
46Pro Veritate, 15 November 1970. 
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leadership appeared anxious to avoid another protracted debate on the CI. It came as no surprise 
to Naude when the synod shelved the CI debate by referring the issue to a permanent commission 
on current affairs. A special three-man committee was appointed to investigate the representations 
made by the Parkhurst church council and the CI members. 47 Nothing further came of the 
proposed DRC-CI talks. 
Although Naude had by the early 1970s come to regard the Black Consciousness movement as 
central to the struggle for justice in South Africa, this recognition had not come easily. For.many 
years he shared the suspicions of many white liberals that the BC movement amounted to "black 
apartheid".48 However, a speech given in May 1971 showed that he was developing new political 
perceptions of the situation in South Africa, although he still harboured fears about Black 
Consciousness, or Black Power, as it was then commonly known. Speaking in Pietermaritzburg 
on the topic of black anger, Naude reminded his audience that he was talking under the shadow 
of real demonstrations of black anger - violence had erupted at the Gelvandale township outside 
Port Elizabeth, and black homeland leaders had also expressed frustration and anger at white 
selfishness: 
"From every quarter of our country many voices are heard which prove how rapidly 
(almost overnight) and how widespread the concept of black power has grown .... Think 
of SASO [the South African Students' Organisation], the black counterpart of Nusas, 
already operating over a fairly wide field .... Think of the new mood amongst African 
clergy as reilected in the call for black clergy to stand together for the ideal of a united 
black church .... 
"More and more Coloureds are rejecting the Afrikaans language as the language of the 
47Handelinge van die derde vergadering van die Algemene Sinode van die NG Kerk, 
October 1970 and Rand Daily Mail, 26 October 1970, Star, 26 October 1970 and Pro Veritate, 
15 November 1970. 
48 CF B Naude, "Apartheid", Ster, 13 November 1970. 
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oppressor; more and more young coloureds arc calling for closer links to be forged with 
the African and Indian communities in the solidarity of a common black front against the 
white. The circle is now complete: white power has created its counterpart of black 
power, white identity has now led to the emphasis on black identity and white separate 
rights have now developed an impetus for black separate rights. The Frankenstein creation 
is now slowly turning against its creator. 
"In such a situation it is inevitable that white power, privilege and prestige must assert 
itself in order lo curb any dangerous growth and to contain the possible development of 
bitterness and anger which could so easily lead to violence ... Black anger as a reaction 
against white supremacy is like a rumbling volcano which could erupt at the most 
unpredictable moment in the most unpredictable way." 
N audc went on to predict further rapid growth in popular support for Black Consciousness 
organisations and institutions. Referring to the challenges this presented to liberal white 
organisations and white people like himself, he predicted that these organisations would find 
themselves in a dilemma; he realised blacks would increasingly go it alone, saying that this 
estrangement was inevitable unless such organisations "are willing to change their understanding 
and methodology". 49 
This address, which Peter Randall collaborated in, represented a milestone for Naude, and he 
correctly forecast many developments. In his political development, Naude was influenced by 
numerous people, both inside and outside the CI. Former CI worker Danie van Zyl explained this 
later by saying: 
"Beyers began from a conservative point of view. In the early days I don't think he would 
have supported universal franchise ... Yet he had an intuitive f celing for the needs of the 
oppressed. Very often it was as if it was this that led him, and he had to fit his intellectual 
patterns and plans to fit that feeling. I saw him again and again latch on to ideas that other 
people had raised, and sometimes I said: 'But Beyers, you are just taking over somebody 
else's thought.' Until I discovered that it was not that at all: he was seeking to work out 
intellectually that which he somehow already felt intuitively .... I saw it in his dealing with 
SASO. He had a real feeling for the needs of those students, although at that stage I don't 
49 C F B Naude, "Black anger and white power in an unreal society'', Edgar Brookes 
Lecture at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 19 May 1971. 
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think his political or social philosophy was at that level at all .... I remember the address 
he gave on black power, which he had worked on with Peter Randall. At the time I said 
to Peter: 'That's not Beyers's thinking, he's not there yet.' But afterwards, looking back 
at it, in a sense Naude was there without having thought it through .... Maybe this is why 
in a true sense people have called him a prophet in South Africa .... Because he has got this 
feeling about where people are and what their needs are ... and he could feel with them and 
have the courage to change."50 
Naude's acceptance of the BC philosphy was gradual. As argued earlier, one of the individuals 
who influenced him was Basil Moore, who joined the CI in 1971 to run AICA's theological 
course, but after his banning in 1972 he left the country. Commenting later about his gradual 
acceptance of black theology and Black Consciousness, Naude said: 
"There were a large number of significant people who helped me to change .... In the 
Spro-cas studies we entered into discussions and dialogue with the leaders of the Black 
Consciousness movement who told us why they could not participate officially .... That in 
tum led to very meaningful debate amongst ourselves about where we were in relation to 
the demands made by the BC movement. We spoke about this with the leaders of the 
UCM, with Basil Moore, for instance. We had fascinating discussions about the place of 
the Christian church, and how it could be reconciled with the demands of the BC 
movement. That stimulated my understanding of the Christian faith and challenged me. 
I was aware a totally new dimension had entered the life and future of South Africa. 
In the beginning, much about Black Consciousness was strange; it was totally new and 
I had to re-evaluate. I had to ask myself to what degree this could be seen to be in conflict 
with the basic truth and assumptions of the Christian faith and to what degree this was due 
to the fact that we as Western Christians had certain traditional concepts, both theological 
and political, which we took for granted as being the only valid ones. Here were people, 
coming from a different background and perspective, telling us that from their experience 
as black Christians, they saw South Africa's future to be totally different. This required 
extensive re-evaluation of my understanding both of the reality of what was happening in 
the country and of the role which the church had to play. 
"I was being re-educated, with every new phase of life and development in the country; 
every new crisis was a reassessment and a re-evaluation. I think the reason why problems 
arose with some of the others in the CI is that they were willing to go up to a certain point 
but not willing to go any further. I felt I had to approach as honestly and objectively as 
possible the challenge which was being presented and ask: What is the validity of this? Am 
I prepared to face this honestly, and if so what is my response?"51 
50 D van Zyl interview with C Clur, 1988 and P Randall- Clur interview. 
51C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
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The general reaction of the white church establishment was one of suspicion and disdain. Writing 
about racism in South African churches, minister Zolile Mbali remarked that while the DRC 
rejected Black Theology, the exception to Afrikaner's mistrust was Naudc. He wrote that while 
white people were "ignoring possible black reaction to the Programme to Combat Racisim, the 
Christian Institute together with some of the staff at SACC were beginning to take note of Black 
Consciousness leaders". 52 
NaudC's support for Black Consciousness and for black liberation did not mean that he had ceased 
to regard himself as an Afrikaner. Many people who became involved with him in the struggle 
against apartheid have been struck, and some even irritated, by this commitment. According to 
theologian Charles Villa-Vicencio, Naude believed emphatically that the white Afrikaner ought 
to be part of his new vision for South Africa. He said later that he detected in Naude an almost 
"disturbing attachment to his own, 'die eie', he clings to it in a way I cannot quite comprehend. 
He is an international man, but his roots are deep in the Afrikaner community. This is not 
necessarily a contradiction, but if it is, it is a disturbingly powerful contradiction. He is an 
Afrikaner to the nth degree". 53 
Elia Thema, a black minister from the NGK.A who has had a long association with Naudc, said 
that Naude never tried to be anything other than an Afrikaner. According to Thema, Naude 
"would always say, 'I am not trying to be a black man, I don't have that experience ... I am crying 
for my Afrikaner people. I am trying to say to them that they will never have a future unless they 
52 Mbali, The churches and racism, p 58. 
5
'C Villa-Vicencio interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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arc prepared to live with others.' This is what Naudc always tried to do."54 Nau de would often 
remind people of his own roots. An article he wrote for Ster in November 1970 setting out why 
he was opposed to apartheid began: 
"I am writing as a Christian and as an Afrikaner: A'i a Christian who, though realising 
numerous shortcomings and failings in my Christian witness, nevertheless knows that 
obedience and loyalty to Christ's word ... towers above other love and loyalty. But I also 
write as an Afrikaner who, on account of my love for my people, wants to try to direct 
their attention to the catastrophic results of a racial policy which is threatening the future 
and continued existence of the white man (and particularly the Afrikaner) on account of 
its moral unacceptability and practical unfcasibility - and the continued application of 
which will cause more damage, harm and mi'iery to the Afrikaner than to any other South 
African population group."55 
Despite, or perhaps because of, Naude's commitment to the Afrikaner, his actions in the 1970s 
were motivated by concern about the oppression of the black majority - and in his opinion the 
Black Consciousness movement represented the best way to tackle oppression in South Africa. 
The Cl's commitment to BC became evident as the Spro-cas project entered its second phase. 
The individual Spro-cas commission reports had largely based their recommendations for change 
on the assumption that whites and white institutions would be prepared to make the necessary 
adjustments, but increasingly Beyers Naude and Peter Randall recognised that the future of the 
country depended on black initiatives.56 
When overseas sponsors began inquiring about a follow-up project to the Spro-cas studies, Peter 
Randall and Beyers Naude discussed the issue with various organisations. It was decided that 
Spro-cas should adopt an action programme designed to translate the recommendations of the 
54E Thema interview with C Clur, 1987. 
55Naude, "Apartheid" in Ster, 13 November 1970. My translation. 
56Randall (cd), A taste of power, p 6. 
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Spro-cas reports into concrete deeds. The new programme, Special Project for Christian Action 
in Society, became known as Spro-cas 2 which was formulated with the help of BC leaders such 
as Biko and Bennie Khoapa. Two programmes were created, a white consciousness programme 
and a black community programme, and in this process there was close consultation with the CI 
and Naudc.57 Spro-cas 2 was officially sponsored by both the CI and the SACC but the latter was 
more cautious about the radical nature of the project. Again it was the CI that provided the main 
support, with Naude acting as chief fundraiser. The foreign funding of Spro-cas was criticised 
both by government supporters who saw it as foreign interference and by some opponents of the 
government who felt it was dangerous to become reliant on this source. The 1969-1973 Spro-cas 
budget came to just over R200 000. Apart from a R22 000 donation from Anglo American's 
Chairman Fund, most of the big grants came from the Dutch, German and Scandinavian 
churches. 58 Naude later said that everything possible was done to secure local donations, but 
because of the shortfalls, the CI increasingly relied on foreign donors. It was this aspect of the CI 
which made it vulnerable to state attacks later in the 1970s, and Naude had been aware that this 
might happen. 59 
Peter Randall was appointed director of Spro-cas 2, and the main focus was on trying to bring 
about change in the fields of education, labour, church and social issues. The decision to create 
separate black and white programmes had been taken in the prevailing political climate and out 
of a recognition of the different needs and problems of the divided communities. The goal of the 
white community programme, run by Peter Randall and with former student leaders Horst 
57P Randall-Clur interview. 
58Randall (cd), A taste of power, p 129. 
59C F B Naude-Randall interview. 
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Kleinschmidt in Johannesburg and Neville Curtis in Cape Town, was to help white people 
recognise their own often racist attitudes, to help them change their values and to work for a 
redi~tribution of power in South Africa. The black community programme, based in Durban and 
headed by black social worker Bennie Khoapa, aimed at helping blacks become aware of their 
identity and power. The idea was to enable the black community to analyse its own needs and 
problems and to develop black leadership and potential.60 One of the people who influenced the 
direction of Spro-cas 2 was Rick Turner, who had served on the Spro-cas Political Commission. 
Turner, who in 1973 released a radical Spro-cas discussion booklet on politics named "The eye 
of the needle" which was banned, is credited by Paul Rich as having developed the notion of 
"white consciousness"; Turner argued that it was wrong to simply dismiss whites as racists and 
liberals, none of whom could be trusted by the BC movement. He believed white radicals, who 
were different to hberals, could make a useful contribution to undermining the apartheid system61 
and his views were supported by Kleinschmidt and Curtis. 
The white programme had little impact beyond symbolic actions, such as when in December 1972 
eight pilgrims led by CI member the Reverend David Russell embarked on a walk from 
Grahamstown to Cape Town to protest against the policies of migrant labour and the pass laws. 
They were joined on the final stage of their pilgrimage by Roman Catholic Archbishop Denis 
Hurley and by Beyers Naude. Later the men addressed a crowd of several thousand which had 
gathered at the Rondebosch Common to adopt a six-point Charter for Family Life, which called 
on the Government to allow black workers to live in the cities with their families. A Family Life 
60Pro Veritate, 15 January 1972. 
61 Rich, "Liberals, radicals and politics", pp 8 - 12. 
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Office was established to continue to promote this cause, but it was disbanded because of an 
apathetic response. 62 
In spite of the poor response to this campaign and other projects, the CI launched a new white 
programme in 1973, the Programme for Social Change (PSC). The programme's organisers 
hoped to create a coordinated base for whites working for change and through publications and 
conferences tried to promote alternatives to the existing social order. The results of the 
programme were disappointing and by mid-1975 it was disbanded. Naude, who served .on the 
PSC's advisory committee, said later: 
"We were aware of the fact that we were trying to achieve the impossible. There was no 
naivety, no utopian idealism .... We were fully aware that we would be up against a stone 
wall of either indifference or prejudice in the white community .... But the black community 
\Vas challenging us and saying: 'Your first and primary task is towards your own white 
people.' So we said: 'Okay, we accept the challenge, we will try.'"63 
While the white programmes were stuttering along, Spro-cas 2's other sponsored project, the 
Durban-based black community programme (BCP) showed better results. At the start of its life 
in 1972, the BCP identified more than 70 different black-controlled organisations, in its desire not 
to create duplicate bodies, but rather to support existing ones such as SASO and the Black 
People's Convention. It also hoped to create networks through which black trade unionists, 
political leaders, students and churchmen could communicate and to act as a catalyst in advancing 
Black Consciousness. The programme had attracted several important BC leaders, including 
Khoapa, Pityana, Bokwe Mafuna and Biko. It seems odd that at the time when the BC movement 
was gaining political clout, leaders of this calibre were prepared to be involved with an initiative 
62Walshe, Church versus state, p 131. 
63 CB F Naude-Clur interview. 
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sponsored by a white-run organisation. This was made possible by the way in which Beyers Naudc 
and Peter Randall worked - they provided the BCP with the resources and then left them to do 
their job without interference. By 1973 the BCP became an autonomous black company with its 
board of directors, and although hampered by .continual state harassment and banning of its 
members, produced numerous important BC publications. 64 Sam Nolutshungu has said of the 
BCP: 
"It was politically important from the start, since it published most of the material 
produced by and about the Black Consciousness movement, and provided employment 
for key SASO militants after they left university and a framework within which they. could 
continue to work towards their political objectives .... It also provided a model of 
politically minded, public action independent of white South African liberal patronage and 
hostile to official policies and plans. "65 
One area where the co-operation between the BCP and Spro-cas was particularly successful was 
in the field of publishing. A publishing company, Rav an Press, had been formed by Peter Randall, 
Beyers Naude and Danie van Zyl to handle Spro-cas reports and papers, and it was used by the 
BCP for their publications. These included an annual survey Black Review and a quarterly 
magazine Black Viewpoint. The popularity and success of these publications brought increasing 
attention from the government in the form of bannings of the publications and the writers. By 
March 1973 all the leaders of the BCP had been banned, which made circulation of their 
publications illegal.66 
64M S20, Black community programmes brochure, Black Community Programmes 
collection, 1972 - 1977, Unisa Documentation Centre for African Studies and Walshe, Church 
versus state, pp 140- 149. 
65S Nolutshungu, as quoted in P Randall, "Spro-cas revisited: the Christian contribution 
to political debate", in C Villa-Vicencio and J W de Gruchy (eds) Resistance and hope: South 
African essays in honour of Beyers Naude, p168. 
66Walshe, Church versus state, pp 152 - 153. 
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Naudc in the early 1970s was leading the CI into accepting and working closely with BC leaders, 
but there is evidence that not all BC adherents accepted the bona fides of the CI and Naude. 
Ref erring lo the generally hostile reaction of white liberals to the emergence of the BC 
philosophy, Thcmba Sono acknowledged that Naudc and the CI were among a small group in the 
white liberal spectrum who reacted differently. He said "these ... respondents were wise enough 
to adopt a charitable and paternalii;tic attitude to the movement, and simultaneously to keep firing 
harsh salvos at the apartheid government; accusing it of having created this black consciousness 
phenomenon - some called it the apartheid monster". Sono, however, also pointed out that BC 
leaders were outwardly unmoved by the help offered: "I say outwardly because whenever a 
financial crunch loomed it was not unusual for some prominent member of SASO to approach 
these liberals for some 'guilt' money." But in spite of accepting financial help, Sono argues that 
BC leaders continued to question a coalition with a white, powerless group. 67 
Sono also refers to the troubled relationship between SASO/BCP's relationship with Spro-Cas 
and the SA Institute of Race Relations, and refers to a resentment that fundraising was done by 
these groups "in the name of working with black communities and multiracial groups for 'social 
change'". Sono goes on to say that there were accusations that little of this money found its way 
into black coffers. Sono's comments illuminate a troubling dimension that existed in Naude's 
relationship with his BC colleagues. Naude, who was an excellent fund-raiser, was often 
approached to help financially, but among some BC adherents there appears to have been a 
resentment of his power in this regard. Barney Pityana commented: 
"When we started SASO in 1969 we had no money to start anything and we felt able to 
go to the CI to seek funding support to start the things we felt needed to be done. The 
67T Sono, Reflections on the origins of black consciousness in South Africa, p 67. 
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only other avenue was the SACC, and we had a problem, in fact we had a fight with 
(general secretary) John Recs. He had not understood the political force of what we were 
doing. He wanted to control." 
Pityana contrasted the behaviour of Recs and Naudc, saying the controlling tendency was not 
apparent in the latter. However, Pityana confirmed Sono's contention that the SASO leadership 
did not feel they had lo be terribly grateful for help: 
"We didn't want to be dependent on white people for funding and Beyers knew that. We 
were very angry with funders who would only channel money through Beyers and we 
always resisted that. Where Beyers was useful, and it did not mean that we accepted his 
role and his ability to get funds, but whenever we got stuck we could go to him and we 
would say 'we need money for this', and he would find money to do it because he believed 
in us and what we wanted to do. And he didn't expect us to accept that he would 
necessarily always raise funds on our behalf. But we never did receive large sums of 
moncy."68 
By the very nature of the BC philosophy, relations with an organisation like the CI could never 
be easy, but Naude had earned a grudging acceptance by and even the respect of the BCP 
workers, including Steve Biko. Speaking about Biko, Naudc said: 
"I learnt so much from him about the feelings and the aspirations of the black 
community .... We supported the actions of the Black Community Programme, and gave 
our blessing when the Black People's Convention was formed .... The point we wanted to 
make to the white community was to say: 'The time has arrived where the future initiatives 
of the country can no longer remain in white hands. It has to be an initiative emanating 
from the black community, and we as whites ... must find a new role - a supportive, 
complementary role, to get rid of the old spirit of paternalism, of white liberalism, to say 
to the black community: Over to you.' To the vast majority of whites that attitude was 
treason: treason in the real sense of the word. And that is why the government increasingly 
began to take action against the Christian Institute."69 
This chapter has sought to explain the BC movement and why, in spite of seeming contradictions, 
Naude was sympathetic and open to its influence. Part of Naude's fascination, particularly as a 
68B Pityana-Clur interview. 
69C F B Naudc interview with B Bilheimer for A cry of reason: Beyers Naude. an 
Afrikaner speaks out. 
147 
media figure, is the incongruity of a man who looked and spoke like a typical middle-aged 
Afrikaner and who insisted that he saw himself as an Afrikaner, seeking common ground with 
young black radicals. What deepened the irony is that these young BC leaders' ideology for 
liberation was grounded in a rejection of help from whites. Two issues need closer examination. 
Having rejected Afrikaner nationalism, could Naude still assert his close identification with the 
Afrikaner people? In his autobiography, and in various statements and interviews over the years, 
Naude, while rejecting apartheid, continued to sympathise with his father's involvement in the 
Afrikaner's struggle for political freedom. In spite of his conflict with the Broederbond, Naude 
writes that the organisation had "in its time" made a positive contribution "to help the Afrikaner, 
to develop his language and culture, to overcome the Afrikaner's old sense of inferiority". Naude 
draws a comparison between the struggle wRged by men like his own father and the generation 
of BC leaders. This prompts the second question: was it the fact that Naude had maintained a 
sympathy for the original struggle waged by Afrikaner nationalists that predisposed him to being 
sympathetic to a similar movement in the black community? Naude, in his autobiography, certainly 
draws parallels between the struggles of the Afrikaner and black people in South Africa. Referring 
to his father's fight against Milner's policy of obliterating Afrikaans, he says what happened to 
black people in the BC struggle was "precisely the same" and adds that "if there is one group in 
South Africa which should understand the black community's striving for independence and self-
rcliance, then it is the Afrikaner". 70 
7
°C F B Naudc, My land van hoop: die lewe van Beyers Naudc, pp 76 - 77. My translation. 
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6 Escalating conflict with the government, 1972 - 1974 
The period 1972 to 1974 was significant for Beyers Naudc in that it hrought his conilict with the 
government to the point where he and his Christian Institute colleagues were prepared to defy 
the law hy refusing to give evidence hefore the Schlchusch Commission. In the political sphere, 
the NP government continued to maintain a tight grip as apartheid policies were extended; self-
government first granted to Transkei was conferred on other territorial homelands such as the 
Ciskei and KwaZulu. Control of urban blacks was centralised in the form of administrative 
boards. The Vorster government permitted some criticism of its policies by co-opted homeland 
leaders such as Chief Matanzima of the Transkei, yet it was intolerant of both liberal and 
especially radical critics. In February 1972 Vorster appointed a select committee, which included 
NP and UP members, to investigate a range of organisations, including Nusas and the CI; 1 and 
the UP's participation in the Schlebusch Commission was a major factor in the ultimate split of 
the party in the mid-1970s. The state began to take strong action against white radicals and BC 
leaders from 1973, banning a number of SASO and BPC leaders as well as some CI staff 
members. This action occurred after a wave of strikes in Durban in January and February 1973; 
the labour disputes were not directly linked to any political organisation, but the government's 
bannings served to demonstrate its determination to take a tough line against radical dissent.2 
In May 1972 Beyers Naudc became the first South African invited to preach at the seat of the 
Church of England, Westminster Abbey. He visited several European countries on that trip but 
1T RH Davenport, South Africa: a modem history, pp 374 - 379 
2G M Gerhart, Black power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology, p 297. 
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the time spent in Britain had the greatest impact. Apart from delivering the Westminster sermon, 
he met leading politicians and government leaders. Well aware of the importance of these 
meetings and speaking engagements, Naude concentrated on two key issues which would often 
dominate debate on South Africa in the years to come: the question of violence and international 
trade sanctions against South Africa as a means of forcing political change. Both these topics had 
been placed on the agenda by the World Council of Churches (WCC). The "violence issue" 
stemmed from the WCC's Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) which, since 1970, had given 
monetary support to liberation movements in Southern Africa, and the question of a trade 
embargo became contentious after the wee voted in 1972 to withdraw its funds from 
corporations which invested or traded with South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia and 
Portuguese African territories.3 
In the early 1970s Beyers, like most white South African liberals, was still opposed to sanctions. 
During his trip to Britain he pleaded with a group of British peers, members of parliament, 
businessmen and industrialists to use their financial leverage to help black South Africans improve 
their economic position.4 In spite of his caution, sections of the Afrikaans press distorted Naude's 
message. Vaderland, for example, said in a headline that "Beyers Naude calls for a boycott of 
South J\frica".5 His viewpoint at the time was far more conservative and was summed up in an 
interview he gave on his return to South Africa: "Give our blacks a better share of South Africa's 
wealth. It will stem the tide of economic resentment towards us and help us economically."6 
3SJ\ Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of race relations in South Africa 1972, p 48 
4Rand Daily Mail, 6 May, 8 May, 9 May 1972 and Star, 6 May and 8 May 1972. 
5Vaderland, 8 May 1972. My translation. 
6Sunday Express, 21 May 1972. 
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Naude had often expressed his views on the issue of violence. A-; early as 1966 he had warned 
that unless negotiations were begun with recognised black leaders, the confrontation in South 
Africa would eventually become a violent one. He had also frequently called for the churches to 
take the lead in a non-violent campaign againstapartheid, citing the example of Martin Luther 
King. And, while opposing force in all its forms, he had also pointed out that the church was often 
sc lcctive in its condemnation of violence. 7 Dealing with this issue during his sermon at 
Westminster Ahhey, Naude said that while it might give partial or short-term answers to racial 
injustice and oppression, violence raised more problems than it solved.8 
NaudC's frequent references to the potential for connict in South Africa also provoked a strong 
negative reaction. In September 1972 Vaderland published a series of negative articles about him 
and the CI which took particular exception to a warning he had given that if black anger 
eventually erupted in violence, then whites, and particularly Christians, would be to blame for 
consistently ignoring black demands and suffering.9 
On the recommendation of Professor J Verkuyl, in October 1972 the Senate of the Free 
University of Amsterdam decided to award Naude an honorary doctorate. The university 
conferred the honour in recognition of his public challenge to racism in South Africa and of his 
Christian witness in establishing and running the CI. Such honours were only conferred in the 
7Dagbreek en Sondagnuus, 16 October 1968, Star, 14 May 1968 and CF B Naude sermon 
in Utrecht at the Peace Week Programme, 19 September 1971. 
8Star, 8 May 1972. 
9Vaderland, 20 September 1972 and Rand Daily Mail 20 September 1972. 
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Netherlands with the concurrence of all the country's universities. 10 But while he was honoured 
outside his country, at home he was under pressure from the state. 
The Nau des had received numerous death threats since 1960 when he had taken part in the 
Cottesloe deliberations, and these forms of intimidation had become a permanent feature of their 
lives. Right-wing thugs were more active in Cape Town, and Theo and Helen Kotze suffered 
continual harassment as part of the broader intimidation of anti-apartheid organisations and 
activists, mostly carried out by a two-man group called "Scorpio" .11 More troubling w.as the 
government's mounting attack on the CI and other multi-racial bodies. A new level in this battle 
was reached in February 1972 when Vorster announced that he intended appointing a 
parliamentary select committee to investigate the objects, activities and financing of organisations 
suspected of "subversion". The organisations against which he was convinced a "prima facie 
case" existed were the University Christian Movement (which disbanded the same year), the 
National Union of South African Students, the South African Institute of Race Relations and the 
Christian Institute. 12 The prime minister's decision was to lead to one of the most serious 
confrontations involving Christians since the Cottesloe crisis, and once again Naude was in the 
midst of the storm. 
The Cl's initial objection to the committee was that its investigations would be conducted by 
party politicians operating in complete secrecy under the cloak of state security. At first Naude 
10Pro Veritate, 15 October 1972, Star, 11September1972. 
11P Walshe, Church versus state: the case of the Christian Institute, p 93 and Pro Veritate, 
15 October 1972. 
12SAIRR, A Survey 1972, p 52 and Star, 7 February 1972. 
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had been willing to co-operate, albeit reluctantly, with the select committee. But he became 
increasingly disturbed by the secret nature of the inquiries - and this would later form the basis 
of the decision taken by him and other CI staff members not to give evidence before the inquiry. 
Naudc, in a telegram, urged the government to appoint a public judicial inquiry, but the 
government went ahead with its appointment of a select committee. National Party MP Mr Jimmy 
Kruger, who would later become Minister of Justice and Police, was appointed chairman. Four 
months later Kruger requested that the committee be broadened into a commission of inquiry 
with wider terms of reference and powers to investigate any organisation or person connected in 
any way with the suspect bodies. It was decided that the commission would sit in camera and that 
the foll evidence would not be published. No information about the proceedings could be divulged 
by witnesses or other persons present during the inquiry. Members of the organisations under 
investigation would not be entitled to view evidence which had been submitted against them, nor 
would they be permitted to cross-examine witnesses, lead their own evidence or call their own 
witnesses. Participation by counsel would be limited to advising clients of their legal rights. When 
Jimmy Kruger had to step down as chairman on being made a deputy minister he was replaced 
by Alwyn Schlebusch, after whom the commission came to be commonly named. Chairmanship 
would later pass into the hands of a politician who had been a deacon in Naude's church council 
in Potchefstroom, Mr Louis le Grange, future Minister of Police. 13 
One unforeseen consequence of the commission of inquiry was the conflict it created in the 
opposition United Party (UP), which was a factor in the party's collapse. UP leader Sir de Villiers 
Graaff was uneasy when the commission was announced and urged the government to appoint 
13 SA Institute of Race Relations, A survey of race relations in South Africa, 1973, pp 24 
- 25. 
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a judicial commission rather than a select committee. When this request was ignored, three UP 
members nevertheless agreed lo serve on the commission along with six National Party MPs, on 
the grounds that it would give the party a "watchdog" role, "to sec that there would be fair play, 
and to keep ourselves informed on vital matters affecting law and order". Mrs Helen Suzman, 
then a member of the Progressive Party, sounded a warning at the time, arguing that the UP was 
making a mistake by serving on the committee. She said if the UP refrained and left it to the 
Nationalists, it "would make it clear what a farce the whole thing is going to be". 14 
The first target of the Schlebusch Commi-;sion was the National Union of South African Students 
(NUSAS), whose members agreed under protest to co-operate with the inquiry. In an interim 
report issued in February 1973 the commission recommended that no action should be taken 
against Nusas as a body, but it named eight student leaders as a threat to the security of the state. 
The same night the students were issued with five-year banning orders under the Suppression of 
Communism Act. The United Party said it had not been consulted about the bannings. Describing 
bannings as "odious", it called for the students to be brought before the courts. Sir de Villiers 
Graaff defended the commission's findings against the "small clique which was exploiting 
NUSAS"; the banned students were never charged and the UP continued to serve on the 
commission. 15 
1428.1.19: "The United Party and the recent banning of people associated with student 
organisations" notes based on a speech made by Sir de Villiers Graaff at Rondebosch on 8.3. 73, 
United Party Archives, Sir De Villiers Graaff, Schlebusch Commission, SAIRR, Survey, 1972, 
p 53 and H Suzman, In no uncertain terms, p 131. 
1528.1.19: "The United Party", Sir de Villiers Graaff, 8.3.73 and SAIRR, Survey, 1973, 
p 27. 
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During 1973 there were calls, stemming from the Schlcbusch O)mmission's work, for the 
establishment of a Parliamentary commission on internal security, and the creation of such a bi-
party commission was supported by UP MPS J Marais Steyn, who served on the Schlebusch 
Commission. There followed a wave of internal in-fighting and in August 1973 Marais Steyn 
defected to the NP. Throughout these months there were calls from some UP party members and 
the English press for the UP to leave the commission, but Graaff declined. 16 He appeared to think 
the UP could still influence the final report of the commission, even though the UP had admitted 
it had not been consulted on the student bannings. In reply to a letter of protest from a University 
of the Witwatersrand lecturer in September 1973, Graaff said: 
" ... our commissioners have signed an interim report...but no final report has as yet been 
presented. I believe they owe a duty to themselves and to the public to continue their 
work and to produce that final report which will justify their findings in the interim 
report. .. There are vital differences between us and the government which we shall 
continue to fight" .17 
Among those banned were several people who had been involved with the CI and Spro-cas, 
including Neville Curtis and Rick Turner, who was assassinated a few years later. Shortly 
thereafter eight leading members of the black South African Students Organisation and the Black 
People's Convention were also banned, including Spro-cas BCP workers Barney Pityana and 
Steve Biko. The director of the BCP, Bennie Khoapa, was banned a few months later. 
The action against NUSAS confirmed the Cl's view that the Schlcbusch Commission was a 
vehicle enabling the government to take arbitrary action against its opponents. When the 
16lbid, pp 2 -7. 
1728.1.19: Letter De Villiers Graaff to W F Harris, 18 September 1973, Sir de Villiers 
Graaff. 
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Commission began to turn its attention to the Cl, Naudc and several other staff and board 
members decided not to give evidence. A statement, adopted at a CI board meeting in March 
1973 with 17 votes in favour and four abstentions, affirmed support for CI members who refused 
to cooperate with the commission, saying the banning of the student leaders confirmed the Cl's 
impression that "the appointment of the Parliamentary select committee is calculated to permit 
punitive measures being taken under the guise of democratic procedure .... We reaffirm our 
conviction that the investigation ... should be undertaken through a judicial commission which can 
ensure impartiality .... " 18 
This statement of defiance signalled a new phase in the conflict between the CI and the state, but 
CI members and Naude himself felt strongly that their decision was primarily a Christian and 
moral stand and not a political one. In arriving at their decision, the CI members had raised the 
issue of the right of Christians to resist an unjust government. Drawing on the works of 
theologians such as Karl Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr and John Knox, Naude and four other leading 
CI members drew up a document entitled "Divine or civil obedience?" which argued on the basis 
of the Scriptures for their right to resist unchristian governmental authority in the name of Christ. 
On the ground that the prime minister and chairman had shown prejudice against the organisations 
before the inquiries began, and because of the secretiveness of the commission and the subsequent 
state action against student leaders, the document argued that the government's clampdown was 
unchristian. 19 
18As quoted in SA.IRR, Survey 1973, p 29. 
19 B Brown, T Kotze, R Meyer, C F B Naude and J E Phakati, Divine or civil 
disobedience?, pp 8 - 13. 
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Naudc regarded the Schlcbusch Q)mmission as the turning point for the CI. The battlclines were 
clearly drawn between the CI and the government. And for the first time black people began to 
support their stand.20 The launching of government commissions to investigate its opponents had 
the effect of putting Naude and the CI on the defensive. In many respects the CI was unable to 
set its own agenda and had to concentrate on reacting to pressure from the government. But it 
also used the commission to challenge the state's authority and this ensured a great deal of 
publicity for the Cl. NaudC's CI colleague Brian Brown commented: 
"While the Schlebusch 01mmission was the extraneous factor impinging upon our 
programme, by deliberate choice the CI chose to make it an issue. It became a matter of 
not just responding to the Schlebusch Q)mmic;sion, but asking: 'What is legitimate action 
against an organisation? Can there be a non-judicial action which is just? Is the rule of law 
being violated by the commission?' .. .It gave us a vehicle, a platform, and using that 
platform in order to do what no manner of writing at that time would have achieved. 
And we saw in that process that the editorial stances of the liberal press changed.As 
the significance of the event dawned, we found that the English press, which had after all 
been supportive of the United Party, began to criticise their participation. Suddenly we 
found that participation was causing the United Party more problems than the Cl... Our 
stand was ultimately a prime factor in the dissolving of the United Party. We survived 
Schlebusch, they didn't. They were utterly discredited by their participation and it led 
to a split which was so weakening of an already weakened party that politically its 
life was doomed."21 
Brown's comments about the UP's difficulties are borne out by the increasing pressure it came 
under at the time. English newspapers became more critical of the UP's involvement with the 
commission. An example is an editorial in the Rand Daily Mail in September 1973 which urged 
the UP to quit the commission.22 
It was not just the UP which was having difficulties with the Schlebusch Commission. A decision 
20c F B Naude interview with P Randall, 1982. 
21B Brown interview with C Clur, 1988. 
22 Rand Daily Mail, 28 September 1973. 
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on whether or not to co-operate with the commission had caused dissension within the SA 
Institute of Race Relations, but early in 1973 the Institute, led by Fred Van Wyk and with the 
support of leading and influential members such as Ellen Hellman, agreed to cooperate. The 
decision caused a split within the organisation and some young members, said they would not 
appear before the commission.23 
In April 1973 the Schlcbusch Commission had released another of its reports, this time into the 
activities of the ecumenical Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre, situated west of Johannesburg. 
Expressing disgust at the centre's sensitivity training programme, the government deported Eoin 
O'Leary, who headed the centre's Personal Responsibility and Organisation Development 
(PROD) project.24 
In August 1973 the Cl's executive, which consisted of Beyers Naude, Theo Kotze, Brian Brown, 
Oshadi Phakati and Roelf Meyer, issued a formal statement refusing to testify. In all, nine people 
from the CI who were subpoenaed to give evidence before the commission refused to do so, and 
four individual SAIRR members also refused to testify. 25 
Naude and six other CI members appeared before the Schlebusch Om1mi-;sion in the old Raadsaal 
building in Pretoria on 24 September 1973. When it was Naude's turn to appear he refused to 
take the oath, but handed in the document in which the CI members had set out their reasons for 
23P Rich, "Liberals, radicals and the politics of black consciousness, 1969 - 76", N'rican 
Studies Institute seminar paper, p 15. 
2401mmission of inquiry into certain organisations: third interim report, 11 April 1973 and 
SAIRR, Survey, 1973, pp 33 - 36. 
25SA Institute of Race Relations, A survey of race relations in South Africa,1974, p 39. 
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refusing to testify, "Divine or civil disobedience?". 
Naude had planned to fly overseas the day after he had appeared before the Schlcbusch 
Qnnmission. After checking in his baggage at Jan Smut Airport he realised that he had forgotten 
to note the expiry date on his passport and discovered it was no longer valid. When he explained 
his predicament to officials he was handed an undated letter from the Secretary of the Interior 
notifying him that his passport had been withdrawn. There was condemnation in the English press 
and from overseas church circles where Naude was known. The DRC defended the govern{I1ent's 
action and, replying to a call from the Gereformeerde Kerk in the Netherlands to intervene in the 
issue, the moderature declared government had acted "completely within its jurisdiction and in 
the framework of the laws of the country. We cannot think of a valid reason whereby you can 
expect us to interfere in the matter".26 
Within a few months, the passports of all those who had refused to testify were confiscated by the 
state. A series of police raids on the offices of the CI and Spro-cas followed, and financial records 
and other documents were seized. All those who had refused to testify before the Schlebusch 
Commission were charged under the Commissions Act, which carried penalties of a maximum 
fine of R200 or six months' imprisonment. Most of those who had been charged felt they would 
rather go to jail than pay the fines, and so began the saga of the Schlebusch trials which, with the 
long series of appeals and counter-appeals, dragged on for more than two years. The first person 
to be convicted was CI staffer Ilona Kleinschmidt, and when she lost her appeal and opted for jail 
26As quoted in Star, 3 October 1973. 
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instead of paying her fine, it was mysteriously paid by an unknown person. 27 
NaudC's trial, which began on 13 November 1973, became the focus of much media publicity, 
symbolLl"iing as it did the clash between Christians.opposed to apartheid and the state. There was 
also widespread interest from the international church community and there were fundraising 
efforts in several overseas church movements to foot the bill for the CI trials. Even the Church 
of England, which generally took a more conservative stand than the Dutch churches and WCC 
movement on issues such as sanctions, gave support to Naudc. The issue was raised at the Church 
of England's synod of November 1973 by the Archbishop of Canterbury and a fund was 
established to assist him.28 The trial was attended by Dr G 0 Williams, representing the British 
Council of Churches, and by Professor Antony Allott for the International Commission of Jurists. 
The International Commission later published a book giving a full transcript of the proceedings 
and Allott discussed the legal and moral issues involved. 
Naudc pleaded not guilty to a charge of contravening the Commissions Act when he appeared 
before magistrate Mr L M Kotze. Defence attorney Mr JC Kriegler, later to become a judge of 
the Constitutional Court, admitted that Naudc had refused to take the oath or to testify before the 
Schlebusch Commission, but argued that on grounds of conscience there was "sufficient cause" 
for his refusal. Over the next four days the story of Naud.s's life unfolded as the defence attempted 
to justify his plea of not guilty. The evidence described his personal journey of faith which had 
27 AD 1752 ( 4Da23) "Summary of action taken against the CI and Spro-cas between 
August 1973 and January 1974", Department of Historical Papers, University of the 
Witwatersrand Library, Fred van Wyk Papers. 
28V Austin, The Church of England as an international actor in Southern Africa: 1970 -
1980, p 222. 
160 
resulted in his decision to leave the DRC and to join the Cl. It also dealt in detail with his beliefs, 
the principles of the gospel, the attitudes of the church in South Africa and the history and nature 
of the Christian Institute. As the trial progressed it became clear that this was the way Beyers 
Naude had chosen to respond to the Schlebusch Commission. He was prepared to give a full 
account of his work - and to answer any questions put by the state - at this, a public hearing. 29 
When Naude was called to the witness stand he described his background, the nature of the CI 
and all the factors which had led him to challenge the DRC. He described his decision to leave as 
a minister of the DRC the most difficult of his life. His attorney then asked him to read the sermon 
he had delivered in September 1963 in which he announced his decision to accept the directorship 
of the CI. The defence then tried to show why the Schlebusch Commission could not be regarded 
as a "neutral" inquiry, and why its secret method of operation had violated the rule of law. N aude 
explained that he objected to the secret nature of the commission, and that his opposition to 
secrecy had deepened because of his experiences with the Afrikaner Broederbond. His 
understanding of the Scriptures had brought him to the conclusion that: 
"through the grace of God I should try for the rest of my life to do everything in the open 
and in public. This is not to say ... that there are no circumstances and situations in which 
a person should not act confidentially, certainly there are many such situations in which 
confidential information is given, in which confidential relationships exist which a person 
would honour. But secrecy as a principle cannot be endorsed or supported by a 
Christian." 
During the final stages of Beyers Naude's evidence he was closely questioned by the magistrate. 
Writing for Rapport, Rykie van Reenen said the court case was suddenly transformed into a 
29 A Allott, "State law and the Christian conscience in South Africa, in Christian Institute 
News Digest, June 1974 and A Allott, "The legal background" in International Commission of 
Jurists (eds) The trial of Beyers Naude: Christian witness and the rule of law. 
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conversation "between two Christian Afrikaners who were trying to reach each other across a 
gulf". 30 The magistrate noted that the State President had a legitimate constitutional right to 
convene a secret enquiry and that Naude, by refusing to testify, was challenging the authority of 
the government. Naudc said: 
"It is of greatest importance that we should realise for the Christian in any case, all 
authority is given by God, that God gives this authority to the State to govern, he also 
gives the authority to the Church to ... witness. The test is applied to both the Church and 
State to obey this authority with God gives." 
The magistrate asked Naude whether he did not hold a great deal "against" the Afrikaans 
churches. Naude replied: 
"I do not hold anything against the Afrikaans churches. I have something against the 
unbiblical points of view in our Afrikaans churches, in which it is my calling and duty as 
a Christian to bring to their attention everything which is in conflict with the Scriptures 
.... and in particular to the church to which I belong, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde 
Kerk."31 
In November 1973 Naude was found guilty as charged. The magistrate rejected the defcnce's 
argument that Naude had "sufficient cause" to refuse to testify before the Schlebusch 
Commission. He also rejected another more technical argument that the Schlebusch Commission 
had not been legally constituted since the State President did not have the right to impose secrecy 
on the commission. Naude was sentenced to a R50 fine or one month's imprisonment, with a 
further three months conditionally suspended. Leave to appeal was granted and payment of the 
fine was deferred pending the outcome of the appeal. The initial appeal to the Transvaal Supreme 
Court succeeded on technical arguments, but this was overturned by the Appeal Court in 
December 1974.The case was referred back to the Supreme Court, but the two judges could not 
30Rapport, 18 November 1973. 
31As translated by International Commission of Jurists (eds) The trial of Beyers Naudc, 
pp 18 - 131. 
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reach agreement and so the matter was ref erred to a full bench of three judges. On 9 October 
1976 Mr Justice Hiemstra, although expressing his doubts about the composition, modus operandi 
and impartiality of the Schlehusch Commission, ruled against Beyers Naude. 32 
Many of Naude's CI colleagues faced similar charges for defying the Schlebusch 0Jmmission. 
Most received suspended sentences and in some cases the charges were withdrawn. The intense 
pressure that was being exerted on opponents of the state was evident in further charges being 
laid against Naude and his colleagues. On 28 November 1973 Naude, along with Peter Randall 
and Danie van Zyl, as co-directors of Ravan Press, were charged under the Suppression of 
Communism Act for quoting a banned NUSAS leader in one of their publications. In 1974 they 
were acquitted in the Johannesburg Regional Court.33 
The Schlebusch Commission and the trials were an indication of the steps which the government 
was prepared to take to justify its actions against its white opponents. It displayed greater severity 
when it came to deal with black organisations. By the end of 1973 the staff and publications of 
the Black Community Programme had been banned, as had all important black student leaders. 
The CI estimated that by the end of 1973 altogether 28 whites and 186 blacks (including 
Coloured and Indian people) were banned. By January 1974 some 40 young leaders were being 
held without trial under the Terrorism Act, and later that year another 13 BC leaders were 
detained after they had attempted to hold a rally to celebrate the victory of Frelimo in 
32 SA Institute of Race Relations, A survey of race relations in South Africa, 1975 , p 33 
and SA Institute of Race Relations, A survey of race relations in South Africa 1976, p 127. 
33SJ\IRR, Survey, 1973, p 38, Survey ,1974, p 42 and P Randall, Not without honour: 
tribute to Beyers Naude, p 37. 
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Mozambique. 34 
The CI began to reconsider seriously its role in a predominantly black society. The influence of 
Black Consciousness leaders working in the Black Community Programme had brought Naudc 
to realise that blacks needed to be brought into the mainstream of the Cl's work. But the Cl's 
history as a largely white-run organisation made it difficult for the organisation to adapt. It made 
a concerted if belated attempt, and an increasing number of black people were elected onto the 
Cl's board of management and appointed as staff members. In 1973 the Reverend Manas 
Buthelezi of the Lutheran Church became regional director for Natal - but his appointment was 
short-lived after he was served with a banning order.35 
Another new black staff member in the CI was nurse and social worker Mrs Oshadi Phakati, who 
was appointed community programme organiser for the Transvaal and Free State in 1973. Phakati 
was to have a close but troubled relationship with Naude. During her years with the CI, Oshadi 
Phakati launched several community development projects in the Pretoria area, setting up self-help 
literacy programmes, day-care centres, and first-aid and home-nursing projects. Strongly 
committed to the BC philosophy, Phakati tried to use community projects to raise people's 
consciousness about the nature of their predicament. Explaining why she felt it worthwhile to 
work for a white-dominated organisation, she commented: 
"I felt the Cl's policies did not go far enough, but I thought it would be possible to use 
the Cl's resources to reach people ... .! took the initiative most of the time, but the CI was 
always willing to support me. If the CI made some contribution it was that they did not 
34CI News, December 1973 and P Walshe, Church versus state in South Africa: the case 
of the Christian Institute, p 174. 
35Ibid, pp 162 - 163 and CF B Naudc-Randall interview. 
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try to directly control what we were doing. We had our own programmes, but you could 
fall back on the CI for many things, including moral support.. .. Beyers was a very good 
fundraiser and a generous person, and he did not control too much. In fact, sometimes I 
thought he lacked control. I always said that Beyers and Brian Brown made a good team. 
Beyers could say yes too much, while Brian could say no and stick to it. But he could also 
say no too much and then you needed Beyers's iniluence."36 
By 1974 some of the old faces in Spro-cas and the CI had begun to disappear and move on to 
other work. One of these was Peter Randall, who went on to run one of the most successful 
spin-offs of Spro-cas, Ravan Press. Naude believed that it was probably Randall's involvement 
in Ravan that resulted in his inclusion on the list of banned people in the crackdown of 0.ctober 
1977.37 
Naude was himself moving closer to a new group of people in the CI who, in their political views 
and actions, were regarded as more radical. One important figure was Horst Kleinschmidt, who 
had initially worked for the Spro-cas 2 project. Kleinschmidt joined the CI after he had left 
student politics, "not because I felt the great image of Christianity looming in my face, but because 
it was the group which I felt closest to politically". Kleinschmidt, friendly with both Theo Kotze 
and Peter Randall, became in 1975, at the age of 29, Naude's administrative assistant. Shortly 
after this he was detained under the Terrorism Act for almost three months. He fled South Africa 
in April 1976 and later headed the International Defence and Aid Fund in London, where he gave 
strong support to the ANC.38 
36 0 Phakati interview with C Clur, 1988. 
37C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
38SAIRR, Survey, 1975, pp 64- 65, Star, 17 April 1976, Vaderland, 15 April 1976 and 
Transvalcr, 15 April 1976. 
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Kleinschmidt, speaking of his involvement with Nau de, recalled: 
"I was made Beyers's assi'itant because he needed an administrative aide in the office who 
would support him. He had been through a long list of people who had been his deputies, 
hut who in the end clashed with him quite seriously. There were some disastrous people. 
Many of them were also very nice people, but there were always problems. That is 
something you need to say about Beyers. His openness, his acceptance of people and of 
people's faults has often made him make unwise choices about the people he was going 
to work with. There were real organisational problems and I also had some difficulties in 
working with him .... There arc many examples of what looked from the outside like 
Beyers's lack of consistency, yet today I feel that I can relate to these more 
philosophically." 
Klenischmidt said an example of this was Naude's willingness to lend CI-owned cars to SASO, 
BCP and AICA members although many vehicles were damaged in accidents. CI staff finally 
challenged Naude on this and a new CI policy was adopted on the use of cars. Kleinschmidt 
recalled that he was charged with implementing this policy and on one occasion clashed with a 
black theological student when he refused to lend him a CI car. The student appealed to Naude. 
Kleinschmidt continued: 
"Beyers then told him that it was true that the CI had changed its policy and that cars were 
no longer available, but he then offered him one of his own cars. Beyers gave him the car, 
and he got as far as Uncle Charlie's [to the west of Johannesburg] before he crashed it.. .. 
I felt very angry about that and when I challenged Beyers, he said something that I had 
never heard him say before .... He described how difficult it was for him to say no when 
he had to come to terms with his guilt as a white person who, for so many years, had been 
part and parcel of oppressing blacks. For him the dividing line of keeping a good and 
honourable relationship with black people was something that he still had to learn about.. .. 
But this reflected on one extraordinary part of Beyers, and that in my experience was his 
infinite ability to say: 'I have been wrong and I will have to learn what is the right thing 
to do.' Beyers had a remarkable ability and facility to change."39 
Naude's facility to change has been discussed in the prev10us chapter, as has a certain 
"inconsistency" in his behaviour which sometimes annoyed colleagues. John Rees sought to 
explain this behaviour as a consequence of Naude not wanting to disappoint people. He said: 
39H Kleinschmidt interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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"The SACC's Dependants' Omfcrence was caring for about 900 families al one stage and 
we could only afford to give them R25 a month. There would be people who would come 
and make representations for more, but our hands were tied. They would walk straight 
upstairs and get money from Beyers. That was very difficult and sometimes caused people 
to play us off against one another. 
"Beyers never wanted to disappoint. He would agree with one group of people in one 
meeting, but then he would do the same thing at a meeting with people with an opposing 
view. Beyers did not want to take sides, he always fudged the issue, and some regarded 
this as duplicitous. My view was that he found it very difficult to say no and he never liked 
a confrontational situation. I don't think he deliberately set out to hurt anybody, but he 
was never totally aware of the consequences of what he did. He became so concerned 
with a particular goal that its effect on another matter became peripheral. And when you 
pointed it out to him he was genuinely repentant.... Like so many African giants, he had 
his strengths and weaknesses. A lot of Beyers's weaknesses were transparent, but because 
of his greatness in other areas people tended to overlook them."40 
The year 1974 saw a new political climate emerge in southern Africa, with the collapse of 
Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, the stepping up of guerilla wars in South West 
Africa (Namibia) and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the resurgence of the South African liberation 
movements. South Africa became rapidly militarised and it was in this context that Naude became 
involved in the issue of conscientious objection to compulsory military service. The issue was 
raised at the SACC's annual conference held in August 1974 at Hammanskraal near Pretoria. The 
63 delegates represented 10 million members, 8,5 million of whom were black. Accommodation 
at the seminary enabled all the delegates to be housed together for the three-day conference, and 
this helped white representatives to develop a greater awareness of the concerns of their black 
colleagues. Several South African churchmen had attended the All-Africa Council of Churches 
conference in Lusaka in May 1974 where they had been challenged on their stand towards the 
liberation movements and this also heightened expectations at the SACC meeting.41 
40J Rees interview with C Clur, 1989. 
41 J W de Gruchy, The church struggle in South Africa, p 138. 
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Naudc was moved by the submissions of several black delegates who criticised the churches' 
stand on the growing strife. They declared that while the churches had all roundly condemned the 
World Council of Churches for giving aid to the liberation movements, they were silent about 
white participation in the conflicts on the country's borders which they saw as violence being used 
to maintain a discriminatory society. On the first day of the conference, the Reverend Douglas 
Bax, a white Presbyterian minister, asked whether the time had not come for the SACC to 
challenge young men to consider conscientious objection to military service. Bax then drew up 
a resolution on the issue which was to be presented to the conference the following day. He 
decided to ask Naude to second it to give it more "impact". Naude, then strongly attracted to the 
pacifist ideas of Martin Luther King, agreed immediately.42 His ready agreement to back an issue 
he had not fully considered was typical of his impulsive, responsive style. The issue was to cause 
antagonism between the SACC and the government and its allies, including the DRC, which 
regarded the resolution as unpatriotic and even anti-Afrikaner. 43 Naude's personal support for 
the motion provided further fuel for his critics. 
The resolution consisted of a preamble and several items which were debated and voted on one 
by one. The preamble maintained that South Africa was an unjust and discriminatory society 
which was a threat to peace. Since Christians were called to "obey God rather than men'', they 
could not accept military service blindly but had to consider whether the cause was just. Defence 
of an unjust society was ruled out. The preamble also focused on the need for consistency by 
42 D Bax interview with C Clur, 1988 C F B Naude speech on the Hammanskraal 
resolution, 6 September 1974. 
43 J W de Gruchy, "The relationship between the state and some churches in South Africa, 
1968 -1975", Journal of church and state, p 442. 
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asserting that it was hypocritical to deplore the violence of "terrorists or freedom fighters while 
we ourselves prepare lo def end our society with its primary, institutionalised violence by means 
of yet more violence". It questioned the basis upon which chaplains were seconded to the military 
forces "lest their presence indicate moral support for the defence of our unjust and discriminatory 
society'', and raised the issue of ministering to the "other side". The resolution deplored all 
violence and asked member churches to consider "whether Christ's call to take up the Cross and 
follow Him in identifying with the oppressed docs not ... involve becoming conscientious 
objectors". After a fierce five-hour debate, the preamble was carried by 35 votes to 10 and the 
resolution as a whole by 48 votes to nil. 44 
Naude was aware that the resolution would provoke an outcry. He said later: 
"The whole question of violence had been a constant theme through all the years and I 
had been doing a lot of private thinking about it. When Douglas Bax came with the motion 
I was immediately willing to support it. But I warned him. I said: 'Douglas, do you 
realise the storm that this will create?', and he said: 'I think so.' But I doubt whether 
Douglas realised the measure of anger which would erupt, especially on the part of the 
government."45 
The media gave great prominence to the issue and it soon became a raging controversy. Even 
before the conference had debated the resolution its contents were reported in the Rand Daily 
Mail. The Hoofstad newspaper announced in a front-page story that Beyers Naude had urged 
young men to refuse to serve in the Defence Force. This was followed by similar reports in other 
Afrikaans newspapers. The SABC in radio broadcasts referred to the "evil influence of the World 
Council of Churches" and in one of its daily commentaries said about the Hammanskraal decision: 
44SACC National Conference, 1974, motion on Conscientious objection and Ecunews, 
August 5 1974. 
45C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
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"In the past we have described the South African Council of Churches as unrepresentative 
and un-South African. It has now revealed itself as a menace to the security ... of this 
country .... The stand taken by the council is an offence to the common sense as well as 
the sentiment of the ordinary South African Christian."46 
The English press and white opposition parties also opposed the resolution, claiming that the 
country's borders had to be defended. Prime Minister John Vorster warned that "those who play 
with fire ... must consider very thoroughly before they burn their fingers irrevocably". The 
adoption of the Hammanskraal resolution coincided with a debate in parliament on the Defence 
Further J\mendment Bill in parliament to extend the period of citizen force service. After the news 
of the SJ\CC resolution, then Defence Minister P W Botha introduced a further amendment 
containing harsh new penalties (a fine of up to RlO 000 or 10 years' imprisonment or both) for 
anyone who incited any person to avoid military service. When the law was finally enacted by 
parliament, maximum penalties had been reduced to RS 000 or six years or both, and the only 
party which had voted against it was the small Progressive Party.47 
Naude perceived that just as in the debate about the WCC Programme to Combat Racism, the 
press and the government ignored the views of the black majority when they condemned the 
Hammanskraal resolution. A-; Naude pointed out in a speech soon after the conference, it was 
because of the strong black representation at Hammanskraal that the resolution had been adopted: 
"I believe that in this resolution we are listening to the voice of authentic black Christian 
conviction and concern, not only because ... more than two-thirds of the delegates were 
black, but because of the convictions and feelings so clearly expressed in the discussion 
in the conference as a whole. 48 
46Transcript of SJ\BC Current Affairs, 5 August 1974. 
47SJ\IRR, Survey, 1974, p 62. 
48C F B Naude, speech on Hammanskraal, 1974. 
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Hammanskraal presented an important challenge to the English-speaking churches, and although 
opposition was expressed by many rank-and-file white churchgoers, the resolution was later 
supported at many church synods. However, an effort to take the debate further at the SACC's 
1975 conference, in the form of another resolution written by Douglas Bax and seconded by 
Naudc, was blocked by more cautious figures in the SACC such as John Recs. Member churches 
of the SACC rather reluctantly began to examine the issue of conscientious objection and military 
chaplaincy at subsequent synods. Most member churches asked the government to reconsider the 
position of the conscientious objector. But little concrete action was taken beyond this by 
English-speaking churches and in the early 1980s it was NUSAS students that took up this battle 
when they launched the End Conscription Campaign.49 
The issue of conscientious objection had been firmly placed on the agenda of the churches and 
would assume increasing importance as militarisation and conflict increased in South Africa. 
Naude and the CI and some leaders in the SACC felt that it was not enough simply to criticise 
apartheid or condemn the violence of those who opposed the government. In a sermon delivered 
shortly afterwards, Naude declared: 
"As a Christian community we are commanded by Christ not only to identify ourselves 
with those in suffering and distress, but also to take active and positive steps to prevent 
as far as humanly possible such suffering .... We are called not only to be peacelovers but 
even more - peacemakers. This is the crucial challenge which the situation of confrontation 
and conflict on our borders presents to us. Are we satisfied that it should develop into a 
dangerous, massive clash of open violence, bloodshed and warfare on and within our 
borders or are we willing to seek active ways and means to discover true peace which can 
only be founded on justice? What are we prepared to do to find peace?"50 
490 Bax-Clur interview, De Gruchy, The church struggle, p 145 and J Frcderickse, The 
unbreakable thread: non-racialism in South Africa, p 214. 
5
°C F B Naudc address at the service of United Christian Witness re the Defence Further 
Amendment Bill, St Mary's Catholic Church, Pietermaritzburg, September 15 1974. 
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At the same time that Naude was trying to get this message across, the Afrikaans press practically 
accused him of treason. As one columnist put it: "What inspired you to support a motion which 
amounts to telling a democratic country to sit back and allow communist-inspired murderers and 
men of violence to overrun it?"51 
By contrast with the attacks were the honours and awards conferred on him. In 1974 the 
University of the Witwatersrand decided to award him the honorary degree of doctor of laws. In 
his citation, Professor E Kahn described Naude "as an international figure, the embodiment of the 
liberal spirit in this land".52 
The same year, at the University of Chicago, Naude, together with prominent Russian dissident 
Andrei Sakharov, was awarded the Reinhold Niebuhr Prize for human rights. Naude's passport 
was briefly returned in November 1974 to enable him to receive the award personally and he 
made use of the concession by travelling first to the Netherlands. It was the last time for many 
years that he was permitted to travel abroad, and the opinions he expressed about his country's 
political future once again fuelled controversy in South Africa. He was interviewed by Dutch 
television, and featured prominently in press reports and in several radio broadcasts. In various 
interviews and addresses, he made it clear that the government should prepare the way for 
eventual black rule and begin negotiations with the country's legitimate black leaders both in exile 
51 Rapport, 4 August 1974 
52Graduation Programme, University of the Witwatersrand Graduation Ceremony, April 
1974. 
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and in prison.53 
Naude addressed these fasucs in a speech at the Hervormdc Kerk synod in Driebergen. Quoting 
John Recs who had been present at the All-Africa Council of Churches conference in Lusaka in 
May 1974, Naude said the ANC had warned that guerilla warfare would reach South Africa 
within two years. At a press conference shortly afterwards, Naude was asked whether the CI 
would continue to act as a buffer between the races in the event of open confrontation. He replied 
that it would be impossible for any organfaation to remain neutral and that the CI would side with 
the oppressed. These statements were distorted in reports. Quoting from a Dutch source, Beeld 
said that Naude had "sided against the whites", that he predicted terrorism in South Africa and 
that the CI supported the "freedom fighters". The SABC then announced that Beyers Naude and 
the CI supported violence, and this was followed by a public attack on him by Prime Minister 
Vorster. But after Dutch church leaders publicly refuted these reports and Naude had issued 
numerous statements to the contrary, Beeld admitted that it had misquoted him. 54 While Beeld 
had exaggerated Naude's views, in one sense its report was correct: Naude was siding against the 
white, apartheid-supporting establishment. 
Naude may have been misquoted but he had correctly understood that South Africa was on the 
brink of violent confrontation. He had also come to demonstrate a far greater commitment to 
black liberation and sympathy for the liberation movements, a view which he also made public 
during his visit to the United States. An important shift in his public utterances was that he no 
53Beeld, 11 November and 15 November 1974. 
54Beeld, 19 November 1974 and 25 November 1974. 
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longer condemned outright those who had resorted to violence, or the "armed struggle" as a 
means of fighting to end apartheid. Yet he continued to believe that another way to violence had 
to be found. Accepting the Reinhold Niebuhr award, Naudc once again noted how often the 
institutionalised church had closed its eyes to immense human suffering and abuse of human 
rights: 
"I do not think that Christ gives us the right to judge or condemn those who, in finding 
themselves in such situations of tyranny and oppression, have come to the conclusion 
that, having tried all else, there is no option left to procure liberation ... through 
violence." 
But he added that violence was not the way of God and he looked forward to a time when, 
drawing on the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, con11icts could be resolved 
through means other than violence. He then referred to the CI and reaffirmed his organisation's 
commitment to fighting for the "fundamental rights of every human being". 55 In this speech 
Naude had placed himself and the CI unambiguously on the side of the black majority and he and 
his colleagues would soon face the wrath of the NP government for doing so. 
55C F B Naude, "Christian involvement in the struggle for human rights and justice", 
address in reply to receiving the Reinhold Niebuhr Award, 1974. 
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7 Final years of the CI, 1975 - 1977 
In the final years of the Cl Naude fully committed himself to black liberation. Both he, in his 
public utterances, and Pro Veritate were stridently critical of the government. Naude had 
concluded that pressure for change could only be effective if it came from black South Africans, 
and so he largely abandoned his role of being a voice of pressure in the white community. In 1975 
the Schlebusch Q1mmission had declared the CI to he a danger to the state, and from 1976, as 
the government sought to put a lid on black foment with bannings, detentions and other forms of 
repression, it targeted the CI and the small group of whites who associated themselves with the 
BC movement and student uprisings. 
By January 1975 Beyers Naude felt it was only a matter of time before the state acted against the 
CI and used the long-awaited Schlebusch Commission report to justify its move. As a result of 
earlier reports by the commission, the government had enacted an "Affected Organisations Bill", 
aimed at cutting off foreign funding to organisations involved in anti-apartheid activities. 1 The CI 
began to make contingency plans in the event of being declared an "affected" organisation. A new 
printing company was set up to put the organisation's publishing initiatives on a better business 
footing, Pro Veritate was streamlined, and Naude renewed his call for the CI to raise a greater 
part of its income from South African sources.2 
1SA Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations, 1974, pp 25 - 26 and p 62. 
2AD 1752 (4Ab14), CF B Naude director's report of the CI, August 1973 to July 1974 
and (4Ab.15) Minutes of the meeting of the CI board of management, December 7 and 8 1974, 
Department of Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Library, Fred van Wyk Papers. 
175 
He also wrote to CI members, warning them to expect the worst from the Schlebusch report. 
Summarising the most recent pronouncements of the Cl's board of management, Naude outlined 
the organisation's support for the struggle for liberation in South Africa: 
"Steadfastly adhering to its policy of non-violence in working for radical social change, 
the Institute seeks to idcntif y itself with the oppressed. Distinguishing between aims and 
methods used to achieve those aims, the Institute upholds as consistent with the Gospel 
the goal of a just and non-discriminatory society .... As members of the Board of 
Management we recognise that to spell out our alignment with the oppressed and with the 
aims of resistance to oppression is to incur the hostility and malice of those who defend 
exploitative power and privilege in South Africa."3 
The full extent of this hostility was spelt out in the report on the CI, tabled in Parliament in May 
1975. It found the CI to be a danger to the state, and in addition contained a scathing attack on 
Naude. It claimed that Naude and the CI were promoting violence and revolution in South Africa, 
their main objective being to use racial conflict in order to replace the existing order with a 
"black-dominated socialist system". The CI was "linked up" with the World Council of Churches 
and was "a completely political body with a political destination". Foreign organisations exerted 
undue influence on the CI through financial aid. 4 
Minister of Justice and Police Jimmy Kruger, referring to "that celebrated Calvinist Beyers 
Naude", declared the report had "torn the mask of Christianity" from the CI. The Cape Times 
judged it to be "about the worst document of its sort we have ever set eyes on, when judged by 
the criteria of unsubstantiated assertion, guilt by association, unveiled innuendo and jumping to 
conclusions". Naude and the CI board chairman Colin Gardiner described the Schlebusch 
3C F B Naude letter to CI members, 3 February 1975. 
4Final report of the commission of inquiry into certain organisations. Christian Institute 
_of Southern Africa. 
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Commission as a "patchwork of outright lies, half-truths and facts taken out of context".5 
The report, which contained a long, personal history of Naude, contained numerous factual 
errors, contradictions and made many personal comments. Although irrelevant to their 
investigation, the commissioners referred to Naude's involvement in the Broederbond exposes, 
commenting that "this incident placed a question mark against Dr NaudC's integrity in the minds 
of Afrikaans-speaking persons". The comment also sheds light on the attitude the commissioners 
had to Naude as they set out on their investigation. 
This negative attitude was also evident in the description of his break with the DRC. Claiming that 
he had founded the CI as a "substitute" for the DRC, the report stated: 
"From then on Dr Naude turned to the outside world for support for his ideas and 
philosophy, and at home he also sought contact with organisations such as the Separatist 
churches and others. In the process he began to turn against his own Church, and did not 
scruple, for instance, to use his version of the so-called unfrocking process to which he 
was supposed to have been subjected to make propaganda for the aims of his Institute. 
"His opposition to his own Church is evidenced by the fact that, although he had laid 
down his status as a minister of the Church in terms of Article 11 of the Church Law, he 
claimed, to suit his own ends, that he had been deprived of it, and according to 
evidence he still wears his vestments when preaching a sermon, which 
according to the testimony of experts, is censurable because it is open defiance 
of the authority of his own Church." 
The irritation of the commissioners that Naude still regarded himself as a minister was shared by 
critics in the Afrikaans press. Vaderland, in its reports over the years, always made a point of 
referring to him as "Mr". 
5Cape Times, 4 June 1975, H Suzman interview with C Clur, 1994 and TR H Davenport, 
South Africa: a modern history, p 387. 
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The report claimed that since the CI was transparently a "political body'', it had not been 
necessary "to make an analysis on the principles of canon law or the ecumenical or religious 
claims of the Institute and its offshoots". This reluctance to examine the theological basis of the 
CI did not prevent the commissioners from making a bold assessment of Black Theology, which 
Peter Walshe has described as a "virtuoso display of wilful ignorance". The Cl's former Natal 
director Manas Buthelezi found the most positive aspect of the report the "revelation concerning 
to what extent the white man can fail to grasp the depth of the black man's soul".6 
The commissioners suggested that Black Theology was communist-inspired, and that it was 
nothing more than the "theological arm of black power" which had been imported to South Africa 
from the United States. The commission's "expert evidence" on this issue referred to "vertical" 
and "horizontal" Christian relationships, asserting that hberation theology - "vertical in kind" - had 
become distorted by its over-emphasis on the social demands of the gospel. In keeping with the 
secret nature of its inquiries, the commission did not name this "well-known authority". The 
commissioners were not consistent in this practice and selectively named witnesses when it suited 
them, such as the Reverend E Maqina, a black minister involved in one of the many AICA 
disputes who, in his evidence, suggested that the CI had misappropriated AICA funds. 
In arriving at the finding that Naude approved "the use of violence against the existing order ... 
while condemning armed defence against terrorists", the report quoted selectively from CI 
documents and from newspaper reports. The most important "evidence" which the commissioners 
6P Walshe, Church versus state in South Africa: the case of the Christian Institute, p 176 
and M Buthclezi, "Black Theology and the Le Grange-Schlebusch commission", speech at the 
Cl's annual general meeting, 5 September 1975. 
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used to enforce this claim consisted of inaccurate newspaper reports of his speech in the 
Netherlands in 1974. The commissioners quoted the early reports, but they made no mention of 
the subsequent apologies which Beeld had carried. 
In its conclusion, the report linked the spread of the "black power" concept to the University 
Christian Movement and to Spro-cas, and claimed the latter two groupings planned a revolution 
in conjunction with the Black Community Programme. Describing Black Consciousness (BC) as 
a process where "innocent black people are misled and recognised black leaders and institutions 
are undermined", it said the objectives of Spro-cas 2 had been "taken over by the Christian 
Institute itself". While the commissioners failed to understand that the BC movement was a 
significant attempt by blacks to fight for political change on their own, they had, correctly 
although somewhat misleadingly, made the connection between the BC movement and Christian 
"radicals" such as Basil Moore and Beyers Naude who had supported black programmes. It is 
correct that there was a Christian support for the BC movement, particularly from Black 
Theology adherents, 7 but this was interpreted by the commission in an extremely negative light 
and was twisted to infer the Christian basis was merely a way for the communists to get a foot in 
the door of the revolutionary programme. The report asserted that the CI, Beyers N aude and Pro 
Veritate were conditioning "public opinion to accept a possible, even an inevitable, violent change 
in the existing order''. The Cl's methods were "characteristic of revolutionary socialist technique" 
and the commission found certain CI activities a danger to the state."8 
7J W de Gruchy, "The relationship between the state and some churches in South Africa, 
1968 - 1975, Journal of Church and State, p 449. 
8Final Report, pp 120 - 165. 
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Two days after the Schlcbusch report was tabled in parliament the government declared the CI 
an "affected" organisation. Yet the blow administered by the state produced an immediate 
resurgence of support for the CL The South African Council of Churches and various individual 
churches reaffirmed their commitment to the CI, and the Southern African Catholic Bishops' 
Conference called on members to make donations to the organL<;ation. Services of dedication were 
held and many local donations were made to the CI. Internationally, church groups to protest and 
offer support included the Dutch, German and American church councils. 9 In contrast to this, the 
DRC fully endorsed the Schlebusch findings. Assessor Koot Vorster expressed the hope.that on 
the basis of the report action would at last be taken against Naude by the DRC's Parkhurst 
church, a step the church council refused to consider. 10 
The Cl's membership, which had declined to 900 people, climbed back to about 3 000. But the 
support was not forthcoming for long and after the publicity surrounding the CI began to die 
down, so did the donations. The CI had to work hard to maintain the morale of its members amid 
mounting state surveillance, raids, detentions and bannings. But Naude believed the state action 
introduced the Cl's most significant phase. 11 Although the Cl's resources were extremely limited 
- it had been forced to cut its budget and its staff and projects - the staff who remained were 
steadfastly committed to their mission. At this time, too, the CI began to change its focus, 
concentrating on the issue of economic exploitation, which it saw as providing the foundation of 
injustice in South Africa, and on concrete ways of showing solidarity with those fighting for 
liberation. 
9SAIRR, Survey, 1975, p 35. 
10Rand Daily Mail, 30 May 1975 and Transvaler, 30 May 1975. 
11C F B Naude Director's report of the Christian Institute, August 11974 to July 311975. 
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The government's actions forced Naude to the conclusion that it was almost impossible to use 
I 
reason and moral persuasion to convince it to abandon apartheid. He concluded that the most 
effective way of bringing about change was to support black people in their fight against 
oppression. The CI, in turn, began to experience greater demonstrations of support from the black 
community. Manas Buthelezi noted that black people were beginning to relate to the struggles of 
the CI: "Black people can understand this theology because they have always lived it."12 
An article in an SACC journal provided this assessment of the Cl's position after it had been 
declared an affected organisation: 
"What is clear by now is that the CI will have enough funds to maintain a vigorous, if 
somewhat curtailed existence. And that, for the moment, means the CI has won its battle 
with the authorities. For the significance of the CI has never lain in its projects needing 
heavy funding, but in its prophetic witness in South Africa as a focus of Christian 
opposition to apartheid. Even on a reduced budget, the CI can and will continue to 
perform this function - as it did very effectively in its early years before its activities 
expanded. Only outright banning is likely to silence the voice of the CI."13 
During these difficult times the CI reviewed its methods of operation. Leading members felt that 
the CI should shed its "corporate" image and become more reliant on grassroots structures. This 
coincided with a feeling - particularly among Cape members of the CI - that there was insufficient 
shared responsibility and that too often Naude and the small group around him took all the 
decisions. Nau de was receptive to this criticism and agreed that the Cape region of the CI be 
charged with the task of revising the Cl's constitution.14 
12 M Buthelezi, "The Significance of the Chrisitian Institute for Black South Africa", 
speech given at CI rally, 26 October 1974. 
13Ecunews, 2 June 1975. 
14Letter from CF B Naude to M Nash, 23 July 1976. 
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The Cl's constitution, which was finally approved in 1976, :emphasised and embodied the principle 
I 
of decentralisation of the CI regions. The central aim of the CI, as outlined in the constitution, 
was "to witness to Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord, to seek the coming of his Kingdom on earth, 
to serve the Church in its vocation as the Body of Christ". In accordance with this, the CI would 
promote activities and relationships which strengthened the church in its struggle for Christian 
liberation in southern Africa. The constitution stressed a commitment to building up small 
communities of people who would, through the witness of their lives, show solidarity with the 
poor and the oppressed, and try to obey God in their lives. The groups, it was hoped, would 
contribute to public debate, stressing the biblical demand for social justice, and memberswould 
also strive to bring about change in South African society through "non-violent action". On an 
administrative level, the work of the Transvaal region was to be separated from the director's 
office, leaving Naude free to concentrate on his "prophetic ministry", which included reading, 
writing, speaking and overall co-ordination. 15 
In the months after the Schlebusch report was released, N aude gave a series of public addresses 
in which he expressed the fear that South Africa was on the brink of violent confrontation. In a 
speech in Pietermaritzburg in August 1975, he warned whites to take heed of mounting black 
anger. Looking to the future, he said: 
'°There are only two forces which will determine the nature and speed of social change in 
South Africa. On the one hand, the Nationalist Party, if it is able and willingto face the 
challenge of the fundamental change in the ... sharing of political power and wealth .... On 
the other hand there is the rising tide of black hopes, aspirations and demands ... .I retain 
serious doubts of whether the development towards a shared society would take place 
without serious confrontation which could include some form of violence. 
"If stronger and more concerted support for creating fundamental and rapid peaceful 
15Christian Institute Memorandum: "Proposed Restructuring in Transvaal", 1975. 
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change could be forthcoming from a larger number of bodies ... then I believe that the 
transition, though very turbulent, might be reasdnably peaceful.. . .It is ... the 
obligation of all those individuals who truly love their country to do everything in their 
power to prevail upon the whites to see the light, before the white community pays dearly 
and unnecessarily for its refusal or blindness to heed and change."16 
Naude's analysis proved to be quite accurate of what was in store for South Africa. He had been 
able, in simple terms, to explain how a new deal for South Africa had to contain the ingredients 
of white willingness to share power and black pressure for that power. The use of violence, he 
now believed, would be hard to avoid. His political vision was not shared by any other white 
leader in South Africa. It can be argued that he was able to see so clearly what path the country 
had to take because he really understood the Afrikaners who ruled the country. His exposure to 
blacks during the CI years had given him an understanding of the yearning of blacks for liberation. 
He put the CI and himself firmly in the liberation camp because he thought that their demands 
were just and that the realising of those demands was inevitable. 
Mentioned has already been made of the support for the Schlebusch findings from the DRC. 
Assessor Koot Vorster's statement showed that the passing of the years had done nothing to 
reduce the level of animosity felt by many Afrikaner leaders towards Beyers Naude. Their dislike 
was also connected to his concern with the affairs of the church and his increasing identification 
himself with the problems faced by many ministers from the DRC's "daughter" churches, the 
black N G Kerk in Afrika and the coloured Sendingkerk. Related to this was the great bitterness 
over Naude's stand on the cutting of ties between Afrikaans churches and overseas churches and 
universities. The matter came to a head in 1974 when the Free University of Amsterdam began 
16C F B Naude, "A glimpse into the future of South Africa", address delivered to the 
Convocation of the University of Natal at Pietermaritzburg, 22 August 1975. 
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to question seriously its close association with the Pptchefstroom University for Christian 
National Education and the Gereformeerde Kerk. For 20 years there had been a regular exchange 
of staff and students in terms of a cultural agreement. For the Free University the question came 
increasingly to be posed whether this agreement should end because of Potchefstroom 
University's strong commitment to the government's race policies. In an exchange of 
correspondence between the two universities, it was clear that Potchefstroom was not willing to 
compromise in its support for apartheid. 17 
The Free University handed all this correspondence to Naude and asked his views on the issue. 
On the basis of the principles which the Free University had spelt out with regard to racial justice, 
Naude declared he had no option but to re.commend the agreement be terminated. When the Free 
University announced the termination of the cultural agreement, it said that the letters received 
from the rector of Potchefstroom, Professor H J J Bingle, in which he defended apartheid, had 
played the decisive role in its decision. Beeld described Beyers's role in the matter as a 
"tragedy".18 
It was not just the Gereformeerde Kerk, but also the DRC, which found itself increasingly in 
isolation, often self-inflicted. In 1974 the DRC delivered an ultimatum to the Hervormde Kerk in 
the Netherlands to end its support for the WCC's Programme to Combat Racism. When the 
Hervormde Kerk refused to do so and again called on the DRC to reconsider its race policies, 
17C F B Naude, "Memorandum insake die huidige kultuurverdrag tussen die Vrije 
Universiteit van Amsterdam en die Potchefstroom Universiteit vir CHO", 24 September 1974. 
18Beeld, 11 October 1974 and Star, 11 October 1974. 
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the latter announced the "severing of the close bonds" b~tween the two churches 19 
I 
It was in this context that there was resentment over Naude's open support for the rebellion which 
was occurring locally within the DRC "family" of churches. For decades the white DRC had 
controlled the racially segregated "daughter" churches through a firm grip on educational 
resources and church buildings and tight financial control. In 1974 at the DRC's general synod 
the church reaffirmed its support for apartheid when it adopted a policy document on the issue 
of race relations and the Scriptures. Although the original document had been critical of some of 
the harsher aspects of apartheid, such as the migrant labour system, the final report supported, 
on the basis of Scripture, "autogenous separate development", provided that it was carried out 
in a "fair and honourable way, without affecting or injuring the dignity" of any person.20 
The daughter churches began showing signs of resentfulness towards the white church. 
Influenced by Black Consciousness and Black Theology, leading churchmen began to ask why 
white ministers who worked as missionaries in their churches refused to accept full membership 
and why black ministers were never invited to preach in white pulpits. They also questioned the 
basis of separation which prevailed in the family of churches, encapsulated in the reference to 
"daughter" churches, and the DRC's determination to support apartheid at the cost of sacrificing 
relationships with other churches both inside and outside South Africa. In 1974, meeting in synod, 
the Sendingkerk cautiously criticised apartheid and called for mixed worship. The NGKA, which 
was in a very vulnerable position because of its almost complete financial dependence on the white 
19Walshe, Church versus state, p 187. 
2
°Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Human Relations and the South African Scene in the 
Light of the Scripture, Official translation of the report Ras, Volk en Nasie en Volkverhoudinge 
in die lig van die Skrif, approved and accepted by the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed 
Church, October 1974. 
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church, took the challenge a step further at its synod in Worcester in the Cape in 1975. The 
I 
significance of the occasion was underlined by the presence of Beyers Naude and CI colleague 
Roelf Meyer, who had been invited as observers. Naude, who had been warned by an anonymous 
caller that he would be killed if he attended, spoke to the synod on the need for reconciliation in 
South Africa. Representatives of the DRC protested against the presence of Naude at the synod, 
but the Reverend Ernest Buti, the first black minister to be elected as moderator of the NGKA, 
dismissed these protests and warmly welcomed Naude and Roelf Meyer.21 
The decisions taken at the NGKA synod, which reflected the influence of Black Theology, were 
to prove of great significance. Apartheid was condemned as unscriptural and rejected as immoral 
and unchristian, and a call was issued for unity of the Dutch Reformed churches. All tribal 
divisions within NGKA seminaries were to be dismantled. Ministers of the white DRC would no 
longer be permitted to serve the NGKA as missionaries, but were welcome to join as full members 
of the black church and work as brother ministers. The white church was in turn asked to open 
its doors to black ministers. The synod, ignoring the protests of white DRC representatives, also 
voted to join the South African Council of Churches.22 
In a veiled reference to Naude and Roelf Meyer, Kerkbode criticised several of the Worcester 
decisions and suggested that "certain people" were trying to create a rift between the DRC and 
its daughter church.23 This attack reflected the concern about the open support the CI had begun 
receiving from many African and Coloured ministers. For years many black Dutch Reformed 
21Walshe, Church versus state, p 189. 
22SA Institute of Race Relations, A survey of race relations in South Africa, 1975, p 31. 
23Kerkbode, 2 July 1975. 
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churchmen and theological students had played down their sympathy for the CI, since involvement 
could have cost them their careers. With the change in the political and theological climate in 
South Africa, black ministers became more willing to take a public stand, and some were now 
open in their support for the CI. The bond was further strengthened by staff appointments to the 
CI, such as that ofNGKAminister Reverend Lucas Mabusela in 1975. Naude also began to have 
a close relationship with Ernest Buti's son, the Reverend Sam Buti. He helped Sam Buti and many 
of his colleagues continue their studies abroad. Buti went on to produce a critical study of the 
DRC's relationship with its black churches.24 
N aude, just as he had once believed that his white colleagues could benefit from a better 
education, believed that one of the keys to the hberation of the black churches lay in further study, 
and he used his overseas contacts, particularly with Dutch supporters like Professor Verkuyl, to 
I 
create opportunities for black ministers to study abroad. He was also influenttal in persuading the 
Dutch universities to extend the length of time South Africans could studJ abroad and, where 
I 
i 
there were only a limited number of places at these universities, to accepJ black and coloured 
students rather than white, apartheid-supporting ministers. Many in the new 'eneration of leaders 
emerging in the Sendingkerk and the NGKA in the late 1970s and the 1i980s, such as Allan 
i 
Boesak, were products of the Free University of Amsterdam, the UniveJsity of Kampen and 
i 
leading universities in the United States. Although many abroad and in Sout~ Africa contributed 
I 
I 
to this education effort, the influence of Beyers Naude and the CI was centrrl. Naude's constant 
i 
promotion of the South African issue - particularly in the Netherlands I- made it easier for 
sympathetic people overseas to raise the necessary funds to sponsor bla k students and their 
24S P E Buti, Black ex erience and the stru le for liberation in the elationshi between 
the white Dutch Reformed Church and the Black Dutch Reformed Churclj. 
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families.25 As NGKA minister Elia Thema put it: "Naude could be called the f~ther of the external 
/ I 




Nau de was also involved in the emergence of the Broederkring (BK), tqe forerunner of the 
Belydendekring, which consisted mainly of black and coloured but also a fef white ministers of 
! 
the DRC who wanted to bridge the racial divisions in their church and striv1 for unity. Although 
the BK was largely a black initiative, the CI played an important role in its establishment and 
I 
Naude was one of its founder members. Naude and Sam Buti deposited t~e first R50 into the 
BK's bank account in 1974.27 
Naude was also close to the Reverend Hannes Adonis, lecturer and ministe~ in the Sendingkerk. 
I 
Adonis recalled: i 
I 
"When I was a minister in Philippi, I invited Beyers to preach '1 my church and to 
conduct Holy Communion. Some weeks after that the congrega~ion invited a white 
minister from the NGK to preach. After this minister left the pulpit\ he refused to shake 
I 
my elder's hand because he was 'Coloured'.A week later the your).gsters of the church 
came to me and said that no white minister should ever be allowed Jn our church. I tried 
to explain to them that their demand was a form of racism and I said tp them: 'What about 
Beyers?' They said: 'We don't have a problem with Beyers. He is nqt a white man. He is 
just a man.' "28 1 
! 
But not all DRC ministers conformed to this racist mould and many rejecte~ apartheid theology. 
! 
i 
One such individual was Naude's brother-in-law, Frans O' Brien Geldentjuys. But he believed 
25 Z E Mokgoebo, Broederkring: A calling and struggle for prophe~ic witness within the 
Dutch Reformed Church Family in South Africa, p 120, H Adonis, J Verkjuyl and B van Kaam 
interview with C Clur, 1988. I 
26E Thema interview with C Clur, 1987. 
27Mokgoebo, Broederkring, pp 119 - 132. 
28H Adonis-Clur interview. 
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Naude had been wrong to leave the DRC, and he elected to stay in the church and try to change 
it from the "inside" and he struggled for many years to achieve this amid mounting isolation. By 
the rnid-1970s the DRC was sensitive to this isolation and the leadership in the church was thus 
very amenable when the government offered it secret money to promote the church's message 
abroad. Geldenhuys did not know that the funding - which lasted four years - was part of the 
Department of Information's secret programme to promote the government's policies abroad. 
The scheme ended in 1978 when the press exposed the "Information Scandal" and gave details 
of the secret funding that had been used for numerous propaganda projects. The following year 
the DRC's role in accepting funding was also revealed. The exposes deeply shook O'Brien 
Geldenhuys. In his memoirs, published shortly before his death in 1982, he reflected on that 
episode, saying that he had a" a clear conscience about the manner in which I carried out my task. 
But the further away I stand from events, the clearer it becomes: I lived a lie for four years." He 
had been shocked to discover the extent of the secret projects and felt that his church had been 
used as part of the state's propaganda machine. O'Brien Geldenhuys began to face the fact that 
his church was not prepared to budge from its close relationship with the government and he 
eventually resigned as chief executive officer and director of ecumenical relations of the DRC. 
O'Brien Geldenhuys gives a clue to a symbolic role which Naude began to fill - to some he had 
become the forgotten conscience of the DRC: 
"Shortly after Cottesloe Naude and I met at a friend's farm near Pretoria and talked things 
out. We walked through the veld. What next? What was the best way to promote the 
insights of Cottesloe? Bey felt that he had to make use of the opportunity and found the 
Christian Institute. He hoped ... to retain his status as a minister and thought it would 
still be possible to take part in synods and church decisions as an elder. 'You can forget 
about that, Bey,' I told him. 'The church will never accept it if you establish an 
organisation alongside it. I pref er to stay and work from within the church.' ... Twenty 
years later I resigned as chief executive officer of the DRC, with the bitter realisation that 
I had not succeeded in moving my church from its complacent stand in favour of 
apartheid in church and politics. I thought back to that day in the veld outside 
189 
Pretoria and asked myself: Who was right - Bey pr 1?"29 
I 
O'Brien Geldenhuys's reflection accords with Naude's own account of the troubling early 1960s; 
in an earlier chapter he is quoted as describing the soul-searching that· he engaged in with his 
brother-in-law and other colleagues; it was Naude's view then that it would not have been 
possible to change the DRC from "within".30 O'Brien Geldenhuys's admission of failure suggests 
this could have been Naude's fate had he elected to remain a DRC minister. 
The black student protests which started on 16 June 1976 in Soweto were to profoundly change 
South African politics, and Naude was intimately caught up in these events. The SACC, the CI 
and the SAIRR, through their black staff members, had been told that the situation in Soweto -
where grievances focused on the government's insistence that some subjects at black schools be 
taught in Afrikaans - was becoming increasingly unstable. The SAIRR warned the government 
to take action, but its pleas fell on deaf ears. 31 Police killed seven and injured 18 in Soweto and 
after the first shootings rioting spread throughout the township. Police reinforcements were called 
in and army troops were placed on standby as buildings and vehicles were burnt. Horrified by the 
bloodshed, the CI called on the government to suspend immediately the compulsory use of 
Afrikaans in black schools. Only hours after word of the violence in Soweto had filtered through 
to the Cl's offices, Naude sent a telegram to the moderator of the DRC, Dr D Beukes, pleading 
with him to intervene and urge the government "to immediately terminate the instruction of school 
29F E O'Brien Geldenhuys, In die stroomversnellings: vyftig jaar van die NG Kerk, p 76. 
3
°CFB Naude-Clur interview. 
31SAIRR, Survey 1976, p 57. 
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subjects through the medium of Afrikaans". 32 
Demonstrations and violence quickly spread to other townships on the Witwatersrand and around 
the country as government properties, especially beer halls, administration offices and schools, 
were burnt down.33 On 18 June church leaders gathered at the SACC's headquarters in Diakonia 
House to listen to an assessment of the situation from Soweto leaders and consider emergency 
action. Naude was struck by the sense of helplessness which descended on the meeting, of the vast 
chasm which separated the white churchmen from their black brothers, as the litany of unresolved 
grievances and resentments poured out. The church leaders called for a day of prayer and the 
SACC, in co-operation with the CI, launched an emergency fund, the Asingeni Fund, to help the 
victims of the violence. On the same day Naude and SACC general secretary John Rees were 
served with notices issued by the chief magistrate of Johannesburg forbidding them from 
"interfering with the present situation of unrest". Naude issued a statement saying he completely 
rejected "any suggestion or inference that I have at any time interfered with the present situation 
of unrest in the Witwatersrand area, as the contents of the letter of the chief magistrate of 
Johannesburg implies - or in any other area of our country. I pray that I may be given the strength 
in this hour of national crisis, in obedience to God, to exercise my Christian ministry, both pastoral 
and prophetic, to all the people of our land".34 
The Soweto uprisings marked a watershed in the country's history and a full analysis falls outside 
32Copy of telegram from CF B Naude to Rev Beukes, Moderator of the NGK, 16 June 
1976. 
33SAIRR, Survey, 1976, pp 51 - 87. 
34C F B Naude, handwritten statement, 17 June 1976. 
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the scope ofthis study. What is clear, however, is that th~ authorities' suspicion that Naude and 
I 
Rees had had any influence on the events in Soweto was incorrect. The Soweto uprising had 
occurred after a buildup of youthful anger over repression, and was sparked by the Government's 
insistence on teaching some subjects in Afrikaans in black schools. TRH Davenport has described 
the riots, which later also spread to Coloured areas, as "the rejection by a rising generation of 
African and Coloured youths of a social system and a political philosophy"35, and Gail Gerhart has 
traced SASO's influence in building up the national school student movement, the South African 
Students' Movement (SASM), as one factor in the Soweto uprising. She argues that "events OQ 
June 16 resulted from the intersection of student tensions over the Afrikaans issue with SASM's 
renewed efforts to build a national following", and that if there had been any accommodation by 
the Vorster government on the Afrikaans issue, "South Africa might have been spared the 
cataclysm of violence and confrontation that swept black schools and townships"36• 
The harsh police crackdown and State measures which followed throughout 1976 and 1977 
showed the National Party still firmly in control, although there were signs that the divisions in 
Afrikanerdom over the policy and implementation of apartheid were growing. The economic crisis 
in South Africa which resulted from the uprisings, in the form of withdrawal of foreign capital, 
and a small, but increasingly questioning voice to the left of the NP, all contributed to the 
breakdown in unity. An example of this dissension was the official response to the State-
appointed Erika Theron Commission into the position of coloured South Africans, which released 
its findings in June 1976. Most of the hberal proposals, for the reintegration of the coloureds into 
35Davenport, South Africa: a modern history, pp 389 - 392. 
36G M Gerhart, "The 1976 Soweto uprising", seminar paper, pp 8 - 9. 
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the mainstream political system, were rejected, but many \!merging Afrikaans verligte academics 
I 
sided with the Theron commissioners.37 The Verwoerdian dream of massive social engineering 
was failing and from the late 1970s there were signs of halting, ambivalent moves to reform by 
the National Party. 38 
The uprisings touched almost every facet of South African life, not least the churches. The DRC 
deplored the loss of life and called for a "worthy plan of action in which the example of the Lord 
can be followed", but made no attempt to analyse the issues which had caused the violence. The 
leadership of the DRC, in the hands of Koot Vorster, brother of the prime minister, had not yet 
shown any openness to the verligte spirit which had begun to be introduced in some Afrikaner 
academic circles, with the University of Stellenbosch at the centre of this movement. In contrast 
to the conservative DRC leadership were academics in the DRC who, from the late 1970s, 
reopened the debate on racial issues. From 1980 onwards, these theologians began publishing 
books and articles which challenged the DRC's support for apartheid.39 
The English-speaking churches, in their reaction to the Soweto uprising, in statements which 
emanated from numerous meetings and synods, identified the system of apartheid, complete with 
its security apparatus, as the cause of the problem.40 But for South Africa's black community 
these protests were simply not enough. Increasingly Christians were being challenged to do more 
37C R Hill, Change in South Africa: blind alleys or new directions?, pp 130 - 131. 
38H Adam and K Moodley, The opening of the apartheid mind: options for the new South 
Africa, p 40. 
39D Bosch, A Konig, W Nicol (eds), Perspektief of die Ope brief, pp 24 - 25. 
40Walshe, The church struggle, pp 173 - 175. 
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than merely issue statements calling for peace. In the next decade, as black ministers took the lead 
I 
in the South African Council of Churches and in many of the member churches, they would 
identify themselves closely with the liberation struggle, and churches became polarised as white 
English-speaking church-goers disagreed with the SACC's increasing role in political affairs. 
Exceptional in their beliefs was the small group of white Christians, some in the SACC and some 
in the CI, who believed they understood the challenge. Naude, recalling the confusion and surprise 
of fellow churchmen during the Soweto uprising recalled: 
"Afterwards, we tried to say to them: 'Brothers, now do you realise what we have been 
trying to warn you about for so long? Whether we like it or not we have to take a 
decision. Either we have to side with blacks in their struggle for liberation or 
otherwise we are going to become irrelevant. At the moment we are not on the side of 
liberation.' "41 
Opting for the "side of liberation" brought Naude face to face with the issue of economic 
sanctions as a means of forcing change. It brought him into close contact with the chief minister 
of KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Buthelezi's rejection of the government's offer of 
independence for KwaZulu at a Sharpeville Day rally in March 1976 received strong support from 
the CI, and Pro Veritate published his address in full. Naude and Buthelezi met on several 
occasions to discuss the political situation. Until then Naude and the CI had refrained from calling 
for economic sanctions as a way of bringing change in South Africa. Yet Naude now believed 
that capitalism had fed on the government's migrant labour policy and homeland system, and that 
foreign and local investors had done nothing to challenge injustice. Naude took the first cautious 
step towards opposing foreign investment in a statement issued jointly with Buthelezi. The 
statement they issued contained a Marxist interpretation of the economy and this was a new 
41C F BNaude interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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departure for Naude. His openness to some Marxist thought was a result of his acceptance of BC, 
which in its analysis of South African society contained a strong critique of capitalism. Naude 
began to read Marxist and socialistic critiques, and he was also influenced by the new editor of 
Pro Veritate, Cedric Mayson, who had a more radical view on South Africa's political order.42 
In the statement, Naude and Buthelezi declared: 
"A radical redistribution of wealth, land and political power is essential for the 
establishment of a stable and moral society .... In South Africa for over a century 
capitalistic paternalism has produced the conclusive evidence which makes us reject 
government by minority elite .... If the homelands exist to make labour available to 
maintain the cash economy and standard of living of the elite ... and to establish an 
economic buffer zone of homeland economies to protect the central economy and 
provide benefits for the favoured few, we can come to only one conclusion. Foreign 
investment in the central economy is devoid of all morality." 
They called for a national convention in which the blacks in South Africa could speak for 
themselves on the matter of foreign investment. 43 
The co-operation between Naude and Buthelezi was short-lived. A year later Buthelezi officiated 
at the opening of a foreign-funded chemical factory in the homeland. When the CI questioned his 
actions, he replied that he could not deny jobs to the unemployed.44 The parting of the ways 
between Naude and Buthelezi was mirrored by the latter's estrangement with black anti-apartheid 
organisations. Buthelezi had been a member of the ANCY outh League before it was banned, and 
in the 1970s, while heading the KwaZulu homeland, appeared on platforms with BC leaders, 
condemning the government's divide and rule strategy. One of the events that contributed to his 
estrangement occurred in late 1976 after Zulu migrant workers attacked residents in Soweto. 
42C F B Naude-Clur interview and C Mayson interview with C Clur, 1988. 
43As quoted in Pro Veritate 15 March 1976. 
44Star, 30 May 1977. 
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While Buthelezi was not connected to the attack, his reac~ion afterwards, in criticising the police 
I 
for their role in the incident and for not rebuking the hostel dwellers, caused bitterness in black 
circles. As he moved further away from his former allies, he drifted towards the government, 
which funded his homeland and therefore his support-base, Inkatha, a Zulu party formed in 
1975.45 Naude said later he thought he had been mistaken in working with Buthelezi; he had 
hoped that "Buthelezi, given his background and his position, would become a major force for 
political change. But ... he was not prepared to step out of the structure which gave him that 
position of political power".46 
The CI became even more explicit in its support for the liberation struggle when its board of 
management met in Natal in September 1976. Shaken by events in the townships, the CI board 
declared a new stage in the struggle for liberation had been reached. It called for a national 
convention between black and white, and offered support for the goals of black political 
movements, both exiled and those still operating legally, insofar as their aims accorded with 
"biblical values of justice, freedom and human responsibilities". The CI also promised support "for 
all peaceful efforts to bring change, including work stayaways, economic sanctions and the 
discouragement of immigration".47 Naude realised this new stance could mean the State would 
take action to close the CI. 48 
45Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: chief with a double agenda, p 8. 
46C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
47Resolution adopted by the Annual General Meeting of the Christian Institute of Southern 
Africa at Edendale, Natal on 18 September 1976. 
48C F B Naude-Clur interview. 
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The CI followed up this resolution with a fuller statement on the issue of investment in South 
I 
Africa. It declared that the government's insistence on enforcing apartheid had produced a 
situation where it was difficult to prevent an escalation in violence and confrontation. One of the 
last remaining avenues of working for peaceful change was through economic pressure. The CI 
went on to assert that it supported the call against further investment in South Africa because 
investment in apartheid was "immoral, unjust and exploitative'', and previously neither pressure 
from investors nor economic growth had helped change the situation. The CI stated that many 
black organisations opposed foreign investment in South Africa - "and we believe this would be 
the opinion of the majority of South African blacks if their voice could be freely heard".49 
These resolutions not only angered the government, but naturally provoked criticism from the 
business community. They also upset a number of white members of the CI and many began to 
withdraw their support. Their unhappiness was summed up by a CI member who wrote to cancel 
his subscription to Pro Veritate: 
"It seems to me ... that the Institute has lost patience with the churches so that the tone 
of voice it now uses has become strident and thus counter-productive .... Do you 
really still love the racialist sinner while hating his sin or do you hate and ultimately 
condemn him too now? Are you speaking the truth in love? Or in condemnation? We 
know our problem and so it doesn't really help to rub our noses in it."50 
During this time of mounting tension between the CI and the authorities, the long process of 
litigation surrounding Naude's refusal to give evidence before the Schlebusch Commission at last 
drew to an end when the Transvaal Supreme Court in October 1976 upheld his conviction and 
sentence of a R50 fine or 30 days' imprisonment. Naude chose to go to jail rather than to pay the 
49Christian Institute statement on Investment in South Africa, 22 October 1976. 
50Pro Veritate, 15 December 1976. 
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fine. On 28 October 1976 Ilse Naude drove Naude to tqe Pretoria Magistrate's Court. He was 
J 
taken to the maximum security section of Pretoria Central Prison and spent the evening in his cell 
reading the Book of Amos. He was released the next morning after Naude's minister, Dr Jan van 
Rooyen, had driven to Pretoria to pay the fine. In justifying his action to the press, Van Rooyen 
said he had paid the fine because most South Africans had forgotten about the Schlebusch 
Commission and so Naude's stand was therefore "irrelevant". He also feared that Naude's 
imprisonment would spur unrest and tension and would give other countries "a chance to throw 
more stones" at South Africa. Naude was upset by this action of his minister and it caused a rift 
in their relationship. For a long time Dr van Rooyen had felt that Naude was too "extreme", and 
he regarded Naude's decision to go to jail as provocative and typical of his style of "seeking 
publicity". The leadership of the CI, on the other hand, supported and sympathised with Naude, 
who had taken a stand on a matter of principle. The rift between Naude and Van Rooyen aroused 
bitterness in the latter, and is reminiscent of the earlier break between Naude and Ben 
Engelbrecht. Van Rooyen, who had stood up for Naude for years against the DRC as his minister 
at the Parkhurst church, could not identify with the radical political stance of the Cl. He felt let 
down by Naude, but Beyers, while regretting the personal rift, was adamant that he would not be 
diverted from his course of action. He had felt that by refusing to pay his fine he was 
demonstrating symbolic support for the black struggle and that Van Rooyen had taken this away 
from him.51 
Less than a month after Naude's brief stay in jail, in November 1976, security police conducted 
an extensive raid on the offices of the CI and the SACC in Diakonia House in Braamfontein, 
51Rand Daily Mail, 29 October 1976, 30 October 1976, CF B Naude- Clur interview and 
J Van Rooyen-clur interview. 
198 
seizing books and documents from both organisations., One woman was detained during the 
I 
search, and in the course of the day Naude heard that Pro Veritate editor Cedric Mayson had 
been detained while on holiday in Mossel Bay in the Cape. British-born but a naturalised South 
African, the former Methodist church minister regarded himself as a "Christian revolutionary". 
Under his influence Pro Veritate became increasingly strident in its criticism of "white" power. 
Mayson was held without charge for 15 days while other CI staff members, including Oshadi 
Phakati and field worker Mashwabada Mayatula, were detained for months. A few months later 
the Cl's Cape Town branch was subject to a similar raid.52 
In 1977 anger and discontent continued to simmer in black and coloured townships and school 
boycotts continued. In spite of the systematic detention and banning of black leaders and 
publications, the spirit of resistance was kept alive at numerous mass funerals and meetings. 
Naude continued to attract strong government criticism. In March 1977, as a director of Ravan 
Press, he was once again charged with publishing offences - for conspiring with four black 
journalists to produce an undesirable publication. The charges were eventually dropped.53 
In a foretaste of what was awaiting the entire leadership of the Christian Institute, Transvaal 
regional director Oshadi Phakati was served with a five-year banning order in March 1977 and 
she was later detained under the new Internal Security Act from August to December 1976. After 
her banning Oshadi Phakati felt she had to choose between going to jail repeatedly for breaking 
her banning order, abandoning her work altogether or continuing it in another form outside the 
52P Randall, Not without honour: tribute to Beyers Naude, p 39, Walshe, Church versus 
state, p 214 and Rand Daily Mail, 26 November 1976 and Star, 23 March 1977. 
53Star, 11 October 1977. 
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country. Finally, she fled the country with her son andjoined Horst Kleinschmidt in the Cl's 
I 
Netherlands office.54 
Naude continued to travel across the country and a note of desperation crept into his speeches. 
He repeated his fears and warnings again and again. In February 1977, addressing the University 
of Cape Town's summer school symposium on the future of Afrikaners, he suggested that the 
"greatest threat to the Afrikaner and his future is the Afrikaner himself'. He said racial 
discrimination, not black consciousness or "Christian agitators", was behind the unrest in the 
country. He concluded: 
"Even at this late hour I want to suggest it is not too late for the Afrikaner to change to 
... prevent a tragedy - provided a sufficient number of Afrikaners are prepared to come 
forward, and by word and deed demonstrate their opposition to the current policy."55 
In the speech Naude called for whites to adopt a "new lifestyle". He tried to demonstrate his 
commitment to this "simpler lifestyle" by selling his large double-storey house in Greenside and 
buying a much smaller house in the same suburb. He said at the time he wished to "at least try to 
express some form of identification with the majority of the people in our country", and donated 
the profit to the Cl.56 In March 1977, Naude, in an address to black ministers graduating from 
the Federal Theological Seminary in Edendale, Pietermaritzburg, predicted the death of the 
apartheid system: "I believe this transition is going to be a turbulent, painful one ... but you are 
going to ''itness this birth: the appearance of a new independent and liberated state called 
Azania." He warned that ministers, both black and white, would face a dilemma about supporting 
540 Phakati interview with C Clur, 1988. 
55C F B Naude, "Die Afrikaner as Rebel", speech at panel discussion at UCT summer 
school on the theme: "Suid Afrika 1984: Afrikaner waarheen?, published in Pro Veritate, March 
1977. My translation. 
56Star, July 27 1977. 
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the demand for an end to white rule. 57 
Some colleagues felt that Naude was wasting his energy, among them CI board chairman Calvin 
Cook: 
"Beyers had moved towards black associations and to that extent he had disappeared 
from most white consciences. By that stage many regarded Naude as crying 'wolf, wolf', 
they had heard it all before. In a curious kind of way I felt that his being banned was 
a way in which he was going to save his soul. I felt that he needed time in quiet and 
silence to reassess his mission. When you saw him in those days he was desperately tired, 
and when a person is tired they are sometimes driven to speak when there may not have 
been anything fresh to say."58 
Naude presented what would be his final report as director of the CI at the organisation's annual 
general meeting in Johannesburg in September 1977. It was a clear exposition of the problems 
confronting South Africa and the churches: 
"The situation has developed into a struggle for power, with the majority of whites 
supporting the military, police and economic power of the government in the belief that 
this will guarantee their future security, while practically all blacks are convinced that the 
power of truth, the power of youth, the power of sustained black political aspirations, the 
power of numbers and of world pressure, will eventually enforce fundamental change and 
achieve hberation. The implications which this struggle has for the church are staggering 
and the challenge which this presents to the Christian faith is, I believe, only vaguely 
realised in our country." 
Naude argued that the institutionalised brutality of the apartheid system had engendered so much 
bitterness and hatred that many black leaders were coming to the conclusion that counter-violence 
was a tragic inevitability. He declared he had been wrong to hope that the DRC would eventually 
put pressure on the government to abandon its race polices. The DRC had rejected the CI and the 
57C F B Naude, "Christian ministry in a time of crisis", address to the graduates of the 
Federal Theolgoical Seminary at Edendale, Pietermaritzburg, March 16, 1977, published in Pro 
Veritate, April 1977. 
58C Cook interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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SACC and was now experiencing opposition from the black Dutch Reformed churches. Referring 
I 
to the multi-racial English churches, he said the CI was grateful for some support but was aware 
that most white church-goers were conservative and critical of the Cl's stand.59 
Two days after his address, on 12 September 1977, Steve Biko died of extensive head injuries and 
acute renal failure in police custody in Pretoria, tortured and killed by the security police. The CI 
joined South Africa's black community in mourning the death of Steve Biko and the last issue of 
Pro Veritate, of September 1977, was dedicated to him. An emotional editorial paid tribute to him 
and accused whites of sharing responsibility for his death.60 Naude was deeply saddened by his 
death: 
"I remember so well that I visited him in Port Elizabeth in July 1977, just before he was 
arrested for the last time and tortured and killed. We spoke that night about the future: 
I asked him, 'Steve, what do you see the role of whites in South Africa to be?' And 
he said to me: 'There will be a period where blacks will move out on their own. They have 
to do this, and without it they will never be able to break the shackles of white 
domination, of white paternalism and of white power.' Then he said to me: 'After that, 
there will be a new reorientation where hopefuly black and white will be able to meet each 
other as equals.' I asked him: 'Do you believe that you and I will be able to experience 
that moment?' And he was silent for a moment and then he said: 'It may be, but I don't 
think so'."61 
The Christian Institute was banned on Wednesday, 19 October 1977, along with all the country's 
Black Consciousness organisations and the World and Weekend World. Police had struck first 
in Cape Town in a raid on the home of Theo and Helen Kotze. Helen Kotze left the house to 
phone Naude and warn him.62 In Johannesburg police did not search homes, but went directly 
59C F B Naude, Director's Report of the Christian Institute, July 1976 to August 1977. 
60Pro Veritate, September 1977. 
61C F B Naude interview with B Bilheimer for A cry of reason: an Afrikaner speaks out. 
62 H Kotze interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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to the Cl's offices in Braamfontein. As CI staff began arriving they were ordered into the hall 
I 
while Beyers Naude and Cedric Mayson were escorted to their offices. Then the police began the 
systematic confiscation of all CI books, documents and furniture. By the end of the day the state 
had not only closed down the CI and Pro Veritate, but had banned the entire leadership of the CI 
for five years: Beyers Naude, Theo Kotze, Brian Brown and Cedric Mayson. Also banned were 
Peter Randall, by then working at the University of the Witwatersrand but still involved with 
Ravan Press, David Russell, an Anglican priest and CI member, and Donald Woods, editor of 
Daily Dispatch. Naude and the other CI members who were banned had to cease their work 
immediately. The government smashed in addition the entire Black Consciousness movement. The 
Black People's Convention (BPC), the Black Community Programmes (BCP), the South African 
Students' Organisation (SASO) and many other parent, youth, student and community 
organisations were declared unlawful in terms of the Internal Security Act. Police also swooped 
on scores of activists, detaining 70 Black Consciousness leaders.63 
The BC organisations were the main targets of the bannings, and the action amounted to an 
unofficial declaration of a State of Emergency, aimed at putting a lid on black political resistance 
which had gathered momentum since June 1976. But the bannings were not simply designed to 
quell urban disorder. Gerhart argues that had this been the case, the organisations might have 
been closed "months earlier, before student pressure through the Soweto Students Representative 
Council had successfully effected in June 1977 the en masse resignation of the Soweto Urban 
Council and before a boycott of Soweto secondary schools had resulted by August in the virtual 
collapse of Bantu Education in Johannesburg". The crackdown came shortly before the 
63Rand Daily Mail, 19 October, 20October1977, Star, 19 October, 20 October 1977 and 
Argus, 19 October, 20 October 1977. 
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November white general election; Vorster's action was de~igned to please the NP right wing and 
I 
pull in some confused former supporters of the disintegrated United Party.64 
By the end of 1977, at least 700 people - 250 of whom were under the age of 18 - had been 
detained and more than 171 banning orders were in force. In addition, 35 people had been 
banished to homelands and 440 convicted political prisoners were serving jail sentences. 65 Most 
of the people the state acted against were black, but Naude was by no means the only white 
person to have been banned. The common theme behind all the bannings was to stop or neutralise 
people who, from the government's point of view, were trying to overthrow the state. 
Nau de' s banning caused a considerable media outcry in South Africa and abroad, and in the 
course of the next few years the Minister of Justice received numerous requests, including calls 
from the DRC, for his banning to be lifted. Correspondence in the files of the Ministry of Justice 
indicate that in 1979-1980 period, when Alwyn Schlebusch was briefly the Minister of Justice, 
there was debate in the Cabinet and security circles over whether or not to lift his banning. 
Opinions were solicited from the newly formed National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the 
Commissioner of Police and, interestingly, there was disagreement. In a letter written in August 
1980, the new director-general of the NIS, Niel Barnard, supported the lifting of the ban, arguing 
that unbanning Naude would not make him a greater risk to the security of the state than if he 
stayed banned; he argued further that it would prove the government's bona fides in the context 
64G Gerhart, Black power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology, p 313. 
65SAIRR, Survey 1977, pp 106 - 107 and International Defence & Aid Fund, Prisoners 
of apartheid: a biographical list of political prisoners and banned persons in South Africa, pp 4 -
164. 
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of the talks that were taking place between the state an9 the SACC at that time. This verligte 
I 
voice was countered by the Commissioner of Police, who was firmly of the opinion that Naude 
should not be unbanned. A memorandum compiled by the Security Branch of the SA Police in 
December 1979 underpinned the Commissioner's decision. The report gives an exposition of the 
reason for banning Naude. It said: 
"The purpose of banning Naude is twofold: first to neutralise him in respect of the role 
he was playing in influencing the domestic situation ... Secondly the goal of the banning 
was to undermine his role as an external opinion-former." 
The police report notes that it had only been partially successful in realising these goals. The 
police suspected he was breaking his banning order, communicating with Chief Buthelezi, the 
SACC and also supporting the ANC, and acting as a channel for funding activists in South Africa. 
Concerning external contact, the police report noted that "many influential foreigners visiting 
South Africa personally visit Naude". The report also mentions that a leading unnamed theologian 
had met Naude in November 1979and had later reported his discussion to the police. The police 
report, quoting the theologian, said: 
"In retrospect, Naude would have followed precisely the same path, given the opportunity 
all over again. Because of his age he would not, however, try to re-establish an 
organisation like the Cl. The most important voice that had to be heeded was that of 
the black man .. .ln the light of 'injustices' he would not remain silent, but would have to 
speak out." 
The report further argued that Naude, by being unbanned, would have his credibility questioned 
by black activists, and that the only way to restore their faith would be by Naude once again 
"protesting against so-called injustice in South Africa". The report argued that if Naude was 
unbanned he would resume his role as a "klimaatskepper ". It concluded that 
"While the current restrictions have not eliminated completely his contact with leftist and 
black power elements, it is nevertheless an impediment to him. The restrictions on 
his freedom of movement, freedom to associate with people and the ban on publication 
of his ideas and thought prevents him from reaching most people." 
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The questions on whether or not to unban him was discussed at the State Security Council and 
I 
in the Cabinet during 1980. Twice, in December 1979 and in August 1980, the police were asked 
for an opinion, and the Commissioner continued to insist that the ban remain. In his second 
written communication, in August 1980, the Commissioner notes that "no prominent international 
church figure who visits South Africa does not include a visit to Naude. His stature as an 
international church figure has in no way been diminished".66 From the available documentation, 
it is clear that the security police played a key role in all security-related decisions and must have 
played a central role in having Naude's banning extended by a further two years when the original 
five-year order expired. 
October 1977 represented the end of an era in South Africa. Steve Biko was dead, the Black 
Consciousness organisations were crushed, and the CI was closed along with them. But as Calvin 
Cook had put it, long before the closure of the CI Beyers Naude had "moved towards black 
associations and to that extent he had disappeared from most white consciences". With his 
banning in 1977 he was forced to abandon his CI work. For the next seven years as a banned 
person he worked from his Greenside, Johannesburg home. The police report was generally 
correct in what it believed Naude was engaged in as a banned person. He was by then totally 
committed to the struggle for black liberation and worked in a variety of ways to support both 
the ANC and later the UDP, as Freedom Charter organisations moved into centre stage in the 
struggle for political freedom. It is beyond the scope of this study to delve into his activities 
during this time. But, as a result of his banning and the action taken against other opponents of 
66MJU 707 MJ 21/1 . File No 10/3/2/1-2468 (B/Bo) Inperking: Dr Beyers Naude. 
Algemeen. Minutes, reports and notes in the Ministry of Justice files, 1979 - 1980. My 
translations. 
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the state, he had concluded that pressure had to be exert~d more strongly to end National Party 
I 
rule.67 It was a commitment no less complete than that of his father's 75 years before when, at the 
end of the South African war, he committed himself to winning Afrikaner freedom. 
67C F B Naude, My land van hoop: die lewe van Beyers Naude, pp 109 -123 and CF B 
Naude interview in Beyers Naude: pilgrimage of an Afrikaner prophet. 
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8 Conclusion f 
I 
This study recounts Beyers Naude's life, with emphasis on his years with the Christian Institute, 
from 1963 to 1977. It has sought to place his life within the context of the political events which 
shaped South Africa and in this conclusion, it is necessary to briefly touch on events since then: 
The decade from 1977 saw gradual change in National Party political thinking and moves towards 
reform, but at the same time there was an attempt to do it on white terms, which meant massive 
repression against black revolutionary organisations. Naude, in one of his most perceptive 
speeches in 1975, had forecast a period of turbulence and recognised that the only hope of a 
political solution for South Africa would be when the National Party, in the face of black 
resistance, would agree to fundamental change; that process began in earnest in 1990 with the 
unbanning of the liberation movements. These recent events make it easier to assess the role 
Naude has played in church and political affairs in South Africa. 
Choosing a biographical study for a dissertation is problematic in that one cannot set out to 
conclusively prove a hypothesis. While patterns can be detected and certain actions can be 
interpreted and accounted for, there is also the random, human element, than can never be 
adequately explained. But while acknowledging this difficulty, this biographical study has sought 
to explain certain key questions: What made it possible for Beyers Naude to change and to keep 
on changing? Why did he have an impact on the South African political and church arenas? How 
strong was this impact? Where did he fail? 
Beyers N aude, referring to his own life, has often referred to the tight control exerted in 
traditional Afrikaner society. But he broke free and pursued a political agenda that so angered the 
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Nationalist government that it finally banned him. When seeking an answer to why it was possible 
/ 
for him to make this break it must be emphasised that this was a very gradual process of change 
in a person with an independent and headstrong character. His relationship with his parents, and 
particularly his resentment towards his domineering mother, had the effect of making Naude a 
non-conformist. As a young person and a student he had initially shied away from organisations 
which promoted exclusivity, such as the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond (ANS), yet he was 
not sufficiently independent to reject membership of the Afrikaner Broederbond when he began 
his career as a minister. 
An aspect of Naude's ministry that cut across his government-supporting days and his work 
outside the Afrikaner fold was his strong relationships with church and other colleagues. It is 
significant that when he came to question aspects of apartheid in the 1950s, he did so after 
counselling sessions with DRC missionary colleagues who were concerned with how apartheid 
was affecting their congregations. Throughout his life he set aside a great deal of his day to 
lengthy discussions with people who sought his counsel, but, as his colleagues have recounted, 
in many of these situations he absorbed other peoples' views in as much as he shared his own 
perceptions. The pattern of his life was to have meetings with many people every day. Hardly a 
day went by that Naude did not have discussions with some group or person about a current issue. 
The frequent contact with black people profoundly altered his political views; he empathised with 
the problems apartheid caused black South Africans. Naude fed on these meetings, and, assisted 
by his broader study of theology, and starting out with . a genuine Christian concern and 
commitment to mission and witness, he made changes in his thinking. 
But changes did not stop in 1963 when he started the Christian Institute with its moderate 
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programme of trying to unite Christian witness, and cha~lenging the DRC to rethink its support 
I 
for apartheid. He displayed a logic in his deductions, and that step-by-step approach took him 
much further in his political thinking than many of his liberal colleagues in the 1970s. His 
acceptance of Black Consciousness was not uncritical, yet he concluded that the black majority 
would not accept anything less than full political empowerment and so he supported the BC 
leaders in their endeavours. The government had recognised the threat posed by this black 
political awakening and the Christian Institute was closed down along with the BC organisations 
because it fully supported these black aspirations. After his banning, and throughout the 1980s 
and beyond, Naude continued to adjust his political thinking and actions, always basing it .on the 
basic acceptance of full black political empowerment. 
The second question is: Why did he have the impact he had? The recognition he received and the 
particular impact he has made stemmed from the fact that he was born a white Afrikaner and 
became a rebel against the white Afrikaner establishment at the pinnacle of its power in South 
Africa. He became a leading minister in the DRC; his background would on the surface seem to 
have precluded or made unlikely any radical changes in his life, yet radical changes occurred. He 
was a widely regarded leader in the Afrikaner community in the 1960s and his decision to 
challenge apartheid made him an object of admiration to outsiders and derision within his own 
circle. The media in South Africa contributed to his emergence as a public figure. As a small 
organisation, the CI had a very limited impact on South African church and civil society, yet the 
continual media focus, assisted by Naude's own flair for attracting publicity, kept him in the public 
eye. The English press sought to portray him as a martyred figure, but the generally critical 
Afrikaans press, whose agendas may have been better served by ignoring him, constantly reported 
on his activities. 
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Crucial to the impact he had was the international focus on,his activities, and from the government 
I 
correspondence quoted in the previous chapter, it is clear the NP establishment was extremely 
concerned about his external influence. The Cl's attack on apartheid coincided with a worldwide 
movement among churches to focus on racism, a process which gathered momentum after the 
World Council of Churches launched its Programme to Combat Racism in 1970. The DRC's 
support for the government's race policies was an issue of major concern internationally, 
especially to Reformed churches to which the DRC had links. In Beyers Naude the churches 
identified a prophetic voice; he was regarded by many Christians as a source of hope and a 
challenge to deeper obedience to God. As one American theologian put it: "He functioned as an 
important symbol and shared the optimistic conviction that God's rule will be established in the 
world and in South Africa."1 For this reason the CI received a great deal of moral and also 
financial support which enabled it to carry out its public agenda. 
The third question is how strong was the impact that he had? In brief, he challenged the Afrikaner 
establishment's claim that apartheid was in any respect a moral or Christian policy. He stimulated 
debate in the Afrikaans and the English-speaking churches about their responsibility in an unjust 
and unequal society. He promoted the ecumenical ideal of church and-Christian unity. In all these 
goals he achieved only limited success and so this section will also focus on the fourth question: 
Where did he fail? 
His work at the CI, although it spanned only 14 years, was a highpoint in his ministry. For Beyers 
1G H Wilson, review of C Ryan, Pilgrimage of faith, in Mid-stream, p 99 and J W de 
Gruchy, review of P Randall (ed), Not without honour: tribute to Beyers Naude in Journal of 
Theology for Southern Africa, p 88. 
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Naude, the Cl's first important contribution had been in exposing and destroying the DRC's 
I 
biblical justification of apartheid. The CI may have won the battle intellectually and theologically, 
but it failed to win the hearts and minds of Afrikaners. His break with the Broederbond, and 
specifically his involvement in leaking secret documents, marked him out as a traitor in many 
people's minds. The extent of the bitterness the Broederbond saga provoked is shown by its 
mention, quite irrelevantly, in the Schlebusch Commission report on the activities of the CI. Early 
CI supporters recognised that in some respects Naude was fighting an individual battle. Naude, 
misjudging the strength of the ideological hold which Afrikaner nationalism exerted on the church, 
became marginalised and lost a great deal of his influence in the Afrikaner community. His 
unrelenting challenge and criticism of the DRC for supporting apartheid and maintaining ethnically 
separate churches in the 1970s and the 1980s attracted criticism not only from conservative 
churchmen, but also from "verligtes" who considered him extreme and overly provocative. Yet, 
while he was rejected by the majority of Afrikaners, he became a symbol of hope for a minority 
of DRC ministers who publicly opposed their church's policies in the 1980s.2 
Naude's early commitment to mission had made him open to establishing contact with black 
ministers and it was this commitment, combined with his newly awakened concern for black South 
Africans, which led to the Cl's involvement in the African Independent Church (AICA) 
movement. Naude's years of work with these churches - so frustrating and seemingly fruitless at 
the time - set an example to the churches in South Africa. In handing over funds and cars to AICA 
ministers Naude was sometimes accused of being irresponsible to the point of recklessness. But 
these and other mistakes did not negate the significance of what he and others at the CI tried to 
2D Bosch interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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achieve. Naude took these churches seriously and recognised that they were destined to grow 
I 
within the South African church community. The SACC later followed the Cl's example in 
accepting the Independent churches as full members of the body of Christ. The AI churches 
continued to be fraught with divisions, but the recognition they won undoubtedly helped towards 
developing and strengthening ecumenical links in South Africa. 
Naude realised that in the early years he had been mistaken in believing that the English-speaking, 
multi-radial churches could play a major role as agents of change in South Africa. He appreciated 
the cour*geous stand taken by many individuals in these churches, but he was disillusioned with 
the ofteµ racist or paternalistic attitudes of the majority of rank-and-file members and some of 
i 
their leaoers. He came to the conclusion that the CI had to encourage and nurture small groups 
within these churches that would challenge fellow members to reconsider their obedience to the 
gospel. In the same way that he had supported the emergence of the Belydendekring in the DRC, 
he gave his support to the emergent black caucuses in the English-speaking churches. It was out 
of these that the black church leadership of the late 1970s and 1980s would emerge - figures such 
as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, Dr Allan Boesak and the Reverend 
. Frank Chikane. Peter Walshe has also noted the Cl's influence on the emerging black clergy, and 
even some individual white churchmen, such as Archbishop Denis Hurley, Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Durban. Walshe argued: 
"Through its (the Cl's) statements and analysis, its range of ecumenical contacts, its 
openness to black leadership and the personal influence of its own officers, the Christian 
Institute contributed in an important way to the ongoing articulation of what over the 
next decade was to become a robust, indigenous strain of liberation or contextual 
theology. So it was that by the late 1970s most South African denominations were 
showing signs of internal tensions and contradictions."3 
3P Walshe, Prophetic Christianity and the liberation movement in South Africa, p 57. 
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In spite of the tensions evident sometimes between the CI and the SACC member churches, the 
I 
CI played an important role in prodding the churches to take a stronger stand on challenging the 
status quo in South Africa. After the release of the "Message to the people of South Africa", with 
its attack on the government's race policies, it was the CI, led by Peter Randall and Naude, which 
played the dominant role in the development of the Spro-cas 1 and 2 programmes. Spro-cas, in 
spite of its flaws and the radical critique of it as a liberal, paternalistic effort, represented, for its 
time, a weighty indictment of white South Africans. It spelt out clearly that apartheid was 
immoral and impractical and that it was possible to develop alternatives. In the same way, the CI 
gave attention to issues such as conscientious objection and economic inequality. 
In the early years Naude had been influenced by the history of the German confessing church 
movement and he had hoped a similar movement would emerge in South Africa. The CI 
performed the function of giving support to courageous individual Christians, but a confessing 
church was not established. 
It was asserted earlier that part of Naude's "success" as a public figure was the international 
recognition he received. Overseas, particularly in Europe, he also played a vital role in drawing 
the attention of the international community to apartheid. Naude developed a network of contacts 
with influential church leaders, journalists and politicians to whom he could put across his views. 
His Reformed background gave him an entree to the Dutch churches, and his regular trips and 
numerous addresses and meetings focused the attention of European churches on the South 
African issue. His ability to speak Dutch fluently was a great advantage. Similarly his knowledge 
of German helped him gain influence with the German churches, despite the reluctance of the 
Germans to put pressure on the South African government. He also won the respect and support 
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of church leaders in the Scandinavian countries, Switzedand and Great Britain, and to a lesser 
extent in the United States. The honorary doctorates, the numerous prizes and invitations he 
received before, during and after his banning, and particularly the way he was sought out by 
international visitors to South Africa, were a testimony to his influence abroad. 
Naude felt that the CI had also been mistaken in initially regarding South Africa's problems as 
solely bound up with racial conflict. He came to recognise that it was a struggle between the 
haves and the have-nots, and that the CI had failed to make any impact on the lives of the poor. 
The last few chapters of this dissertation show that Naude gradually began to use some Marxist 
analysis in trying to understand the political and economic situation in South Africa. The tone of 
Pro Veritate in its final year increasingly contained criticism of the economic order, and Naude 
contributed to this debate. In spite ofNaude's acceptance of some socialist rhetoric, he never fully 
resolved his personal style of strong leadership with a theoretical commitment to "grassroots". 
Naude's impact was felt in church circles and in the wider political terrain. In the final years of the 
CI, throughout the seven years of his banning and beyond that period, he was a strong supporter 
of black political aspirations. His acceptance of black leadership, firstly BC leaders and later those 
involved in the United Democratic Front and the African National Congress, drew him to the 
centre of the "liberation struggle" and he played an important role as a leader in this movement. 
One example of his initiatives during this time was his strong support for sanctions, which he 
began to call for after he was unbanned in 1984. In white sectors of South Africa, Naude came 
in for strong criticism for supporting disinvestment, from old critics, but also from liberal white 
friends. Alan Paton was one of many who, while maintaining affection for Naude, could not 
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support his stand on sanctions and disinvestment. 4 I 
r 
I 
After he was unbanned Naude served as caretaker general secretary of the South African Council 
of Churches between 1985 and 1987, in a difficult phase of the history of the church when 
conflict with the state had escalated. Naude never changed his view that violence was 
counter-productive, but he believed the conflict was the inevitable result of apartheid and he 
refused to judge those who had taken up arms against white rule. He also believed that there was 
no turning back from change and that its people would finally be forced to resolve their 
differences around the conference table. He believed the ANC was destined to play a central role 
in negotiations. At a time when government propaganda against the ANC reached its height, he 
was a key figure in the drive for negotiations and meetings with the ANC from 1985.5 In the 
DRC, several theologians who had been unhappy about Naude's banning hoped that he would 
emerge from his banning somewhat chastened and willing to return to his church.6But they did 
not understand the change and growth in his thinking nor why he ignored their appeals to return 
to the Afrikaner fold. Naude's life has been a process of change. His two main points of focus 
were his own Afrikaner people and the black community, even though, ironically, for many years, 
it was from the hberal English-speaking white community that he attracted the most support and 
admiration. 
The Reverend Peter Moatshe, a minister of the black NGK.A, encapsulated the attitude of many 
4
"Beyers Naude in conversation with Alan Paton", Leadership, pp 82 -93. 
5F Van Zyl Slabbert interview with C Clur, 1988 and C Niehaus interview with C Clur, 
1994. 
6B Engelbrecht, "The Outcast Dominee. Let the church welcome him back, and listen to 
what he has got to say",Sunday Times, 30 September 1984 and B Marais-Clur interview. 
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black colleagues interviewed for this study when he remiuked: 
I 
"We see Beyers as a brother, as a father. He makes you realise that colour does not count, 
it is not colour which makes us different, but racist attitudes. Beyers has been received by 
all quarters of the black community. He has proved beyond doubt that he is a man of God. 
He is a symbol, a sign of hope, and I think the respect we give him will remain. What he 
stands for is people. It is for life. It is for a new future in South Africa."7 
In the 1980s and before the political changes of the 1990s many in the Afrikaans community still 
regarded him as a "traitor". The less harsh view, expressed in Vaderland, was that he is a 
"half-tragic figure, an honourable and sincere person who, like a hero in a Greek tragedy, was led 
by forces outside of his control to a situation which he did not want but from which he could not 
escape". 8 Naude was also criticised for refusing to acknowledge watershed changes that were 
made in the DRC when it rejected apartheid at its 1986 and 1990 synods. In the late 1980s there 
was a feeling that he was not recognising the DRC and the Afrikaans community's small steps to 
openness: he was still on the outside, highly critical of the government and the DRC. Ben Marais 
gave an inkling of these resentments when he remarked in an interview in 1988: 
"The day Beyers was unbanned I wrote him a letter and told him that I rejoiced that he 
was free. I said to him: 'Beyers, use every opportunity God gives to witness for what you 
believe, but don't be used by other people.' Even before he had my letter, I read that he 
had flown down to the British Consulate in Durban to identify with the UDP leaders who 
were hiding there. I wrote him several other letters but he did not reply .... More recently 
I spoke to someone involved in a political trial and he called Beyers a traitor to his 
people .... But if you ask me today I still like to believe Beyers is not a traitor in the 
ordinary sense. He acts according to his convictions, but I disagree with his methods."9 
In 1995 Ben Marais wrote the foreword for Naude's autobiography, and Marais still held the view 
that his old friend had immersed himself too much in politics. Marais had preceded N aude in 
7P Moatshe interview with C Ryan, 1987. 
8Vaderland, 25 November 1982. 
9B Marais interview with C Clur, 1988. 
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challenging conventional Afrikaner political beliefs, yet he acknowledged that when Nau de set out 
on his mission against apartheid there was no stopping him. He recognised that it cost both Naude 
and his wife, Ilse, a great deal: "When the great history of our church is one day written, their 
names will both appear in shining letters". 10 More recently Naude has been held up by both blacks 
and Afrikaners as an example of a South African who had the courage of his convictions. There 
will probably be a resentment of Naude among bittereinders for years to come, but he has 
recently begun to receive recognition from the quarter that he most wanted: Afrikaner church 
circles. The reception Naude received at the DRC's general synod in Pretoria in October 1994 
is the most important example. A motion passed almost unanimously stated that it had disregarded 
the prophetic witness of its church, in the form of Bennie Keet, Ben Marais and Beyers Naucte. 
When Beyers and Ilse Naude attended the synod the next day to accept the apology, members 
gave him a standing ovation. Naude was deeply moved by this gesture, but saddened that it could 
not be shared by the late Keet, David Bosch and others "who would not walk the apartheid road". 
The reconciliation between Naude and the DRC marked the end of a bitter chapter in the history 
of the church. For Naude, nearing 80, it was an event of great joy. It seemed to him as if God had 
spared him for this moment in his life. 11 
1
°B Marias, "Voornvrd, in CF B Naude, My land van hoop: die lewe van Beyers Naude, 
p 9. 
11Rapport, 30 October 1994. 
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